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INTRODUCTION 
Together with our partner law enforcement agencies, and with the assistance of the 
community, the FBI will continue to pursue those who support violent extremism and 
promote the radicalization of others, whether online or in person. 
  —Department of Justice Press Release1 
 
My concern is that [the FBI is] not looking at criminal behavior. We’re not looking at 
violent behavior. But we’re focusing on religious practices and that this is evident, and I 
could cite other evidence . . . of training materials and written materials of the FBI 
that describe people who, you know, wear Muslim clothing, et cetera, as being signals 
that they may be violent. 
  —Representative Jan Schakowsky (D-IL), before the United States 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on 
Domestic Threat Intelligence2 
 
In the last ten years, the federal government’s commitment to 
counterterrorism has spurred innumerable changes to our legal system, with the 
emergence of new laws, norms, and mechanisms,3 and with the repurposing of 
preexisting tools.4 The preventative framework—where the government aims to 
prevent future terrorism—now defines counterterrorism programs at home and 
abroad.5 A preventative approach propels questions about how to understand, 
 
1. U.S. Attorney’s Office E. Dist. of Va., Leader of “Revolution Muslim” Sentenced to 138 Months for 
Using Internet to Solicit Murder, Encourage Violent Extremism, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (June 22, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/news/2012/06/20120622mortonnr.html. 
2. Rep. Mike Rogers Holds a Hearing on Intelligence, CQ-ROLLCALL POL. TRANSCRIPTIONS, 
Oct. 6, 2011 [hereinafter Hearing on Intelligence], available at 10/5/11 EMEDIAPT 17:31:00 (Westlaw). 
3. These changes were rooted in preexisting legal structures. James Forman, Jr., Exporting 
Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 331, 332–41 (2009). 
4. The material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2006 & Supp. III 2009), and 
even the naval base at Guantánamo Bay, are examples of tools that existed before 9/11 but were put 
to new uses after. 
5. See, e.g., COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE 
PAPER 11, 29 (2006), available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/include/terrorism 
.whitepaper.pdf (“[O]ur full engagement in the preventive mode has moved our focus to the 
preparatory stages of terrorist planning and to those who would support and actively encourage such 
activity. Thus, we rely strongly on the material support statutes to prosecute those who provide funds, 
services, equipment and all types of assistance to terrorists, terrorist organizations, and designated 
state sponsors of terrorism . . . .”); Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism 
in a Post-9/11 America, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 429, 431–37 (2011); Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? 
Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 429–36 (2007) 
[hereinafter Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy?]; Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support 
Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 26–36 (2005) [hereinafter Chesney, Sleeper 
Scenario]; Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and 
Counterterrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 377, 379–85 (2009); Petra Bartosiewicz, 
Op-Ed., How Not to Catch a Terrorist, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2011, at A22; Petra Bartosiewicz, To Catch a 
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model, and manage risk to the foreground.6 The government has embraced 
“radicalization” as the parlance for that risk, spawning a growing number of 
“counter-radicalization” and “countering violent extremism” programs focused on 
monitoring and influencing the political and religious cultures of Muslim 
communities in the United States. 
Radicalization suggests that the path from Muslim to terrorist is a predictable 
one produced by or correlated with religious and political cultures of Muslim 
communities. Government radicalization discourses and programs are almost 
entirely fixated on Islam and Muslims, despite data that the terrorist threat 
emanating from Muslims is minimal to nonexistent, including in comparison to 
violence from white-supremacist and right-wing groups.7 The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and the New York City Police Department (NYPD) have led 
the way in theorizing radicalization and shifting national security policing towards 
a focus on gathering intelligence on Muslim communities.8 Radicalization has 
 
Terrorist: The FBI Hunts for the Enemy Within, HARPER’S MAG., Aug. 2011, at 37 [hereinafter 
Bartosiewicz, To Catch a Terrorist ]. See generally DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: 
WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2007) (describing and critiquing government anti-
terrorism efforts). 
6. In the realm of terrorism, the chances are small but the potential consequences huge, the 
argument goes; so it makes sense for the government to act aggressively and preventatively, even if 
the risk of the act itself is relatively minor. See, e.g., Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 575, 604–16 (2010) (“[T]he post-9/11 domestic intelligence process is properly 
regarded as a form of risk assessment.”); see also Clive Walker, Neighbor Terrorism and the All-Risks 
Policing of Terrorism, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 121, 130 (2009) (“[T ]he operation of all-risks 
policing powers involves the police treating anyone and everyone as a risk and taking action on the 
basis of leads even more vague and haphazard than intelligence or suspicion.”). 
7. A recent report found:  
For the second year in a row, there were no fatalities or injuries from Muslim-American 
terrorism. Meanwhile, the United States suffered approximately 14,000 murders in 2012. 
Since 9/11, Muslim-American terrorism has claimed 33 lives in the United States, out of 
more than 180,000 murders committed in the United States during this period. Over the 
same period, more than 200 Americans have been killed in political violence by white 
supremacists and other groups on the far right, according to a recent study published by 
the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy. Sixty-six Americans were 
killed in mass shootings by non-Muslims in 2012 alone, twice as many fatalities as from 
Muslim-American terrorism in all 11 years since 9/11. 
Charles Kurzman, Muslim-American Terrorism: Declining Further, TRIANGLE CTR. ON TERRORISM & 
HOMELAND SEC. 1 (Feb. 1, 2013), http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman_Muslim-
American_Terrorism_February_1_2013.pdf (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted); see also Spencer 
Ackerman, Report: U.S. Muslim Terrorism Was Practically Nil in 2012, WIRED: DANGER ROOM (Feb. 1, 
2013, 12:57 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/02/american-muslim-terrorism. See 
generally COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, TERRORISM 2002–2005, at 
1–2 (2006), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005/terror02 
_05.pdf (differentiating domestic extremists from “violent global jihadist movement”); Mark Follman 
et al., A Guide to Mass Shootings in America, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 27, 2013, 7:45 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/mass-shootings-map (detailing mass shootings from 
1982 to 2012). 
8. See, e.g., JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42553, COUNTERING 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES 3, 7–9 (2012) (discussing “countering violent 
extremism” efforts by the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and FBI); 
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come to frame all aspects of Muslim life as central to the counterterrorism 
intelligence-gathering project: from those who attend mosque and sport a beard 
compliant with religious tradition, to those who express outrage at the United 
States’s increasing reliance on drone strikes in Muslim-majority countries; and 
from mosques to hookah bars and points in between. Law enforcement’s 
contribution to our understanding of radicalization, and the resultant police 
practices, are the subject of this Article. 
After 9/11, the FBI, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the NYPD 
adopted a preventative approach to countering terrorism, emphasizing the need 
for proactive intelligence gathering and “forward-leaning”9 preventative 
prosecutions.10 That intelligence gathering is now defined through a concern with 
 
Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. 125, 146 n.93 (2012) [hereinafter Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? ] (noting the Obama 
administration’s preference for the “violent extremism” language). Other federal agencies are similarly 
concerned with radicalization. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., PROTECTING THE FORCE: LESSONS 
FROM FORT HOOD 4, 12, 15–18, 20 (2010), available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/dod-
protectingtheforce-web_security_hr_13jan10.pdf (referring to the need for the Department of 
Defense to respond to the problem of “self-radicalization”). Radicalization policing might be 
understood as a modern-day application of the old Al Capone approach to policing: where law 
enforcement charges a big-time criminal with lesser pretextual charges as a way to get him off the 
streets. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy 
of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 618–24 (2005). But when law enforcement is 
policing radicalization, the concern is not for some past crime. The concern in policing radicalization 
is the prevention of a future crime, predicted by the religious and political commitments of a 
community or an individual. 
9. Bartosiewicz, To Catch a Terrorist, supra note 5, at 39 (describing a memo by FBI Director 
Robert Mueller issued days after 9/11 announcing a new policy of “‘forward-leaning—preventative—
prosecutions’”). 
10. See, e.g., COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION, supra note 5; Counterterrorism Units, NYPD, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/administration/counterterrorism_units.shtml (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2013); Directorate of Intelligence: Intelligence Philosophy, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/intelligence/philosophy (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (“The FBI has a mandate from Congress, the 
President, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to protect national 
security by producing intelligence in support of its own investigative mission, national intelligence 
priorities, and needs of other customers.”); Directorate of Intelligence: Mission, FBI, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/mission (last visited Apr. 15, 2013) (“The FBI’s national 
security mission is to lead and coordinate intelligence efforts that drive actions to protect the United 
States.”). For an argument about the comparative advantages of engaging local law enforcement in 
intelligence gathering in counterterrorism work and looking to the NYPD as an example, see Samuel 
J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter) Terrorism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1715, 1728–36 (2010) 
[hereinafter Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter) Terrorism] (arguing in part that local 
counterterrorism intelligence is “situated to play a vital role in gathering the intelligence necessary for 
understanding the radicalization process”). See also David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and 
Immigration Enforcement: A Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/11 America, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 1–2 
(2006) (discussing how state and local law enforcement’s refusal to become involved in immigration 
enforcement “both illuminates a turning point in American policing, and teaches us important lessons 
in how we must go forward in the war on terror if we are to succeed”); Matthew C. Waxman, National 
Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289 (2012) (discussing the role of state and local 
government in post-9/11 national security law and policy, and arguing for a federalism frame that 
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radicalization, substantially expanding what is considered the legitimate scope of 
police work. Legal scholarship has grappled with the preventative paradigm11 but 
largely ignored the government’s new theory for predicting future terrorism.12 
While some have forcefully argued that the threat of radicalization is overstated,13 
scholars have provided inadequate critical attention to either the construction of 
radicalization as a process or the growing number of government programs based 
thereon.14 This Article is aimed at that gap; the Article examines how government 
concern with radicalization and increased allowances for law enforcement 
intelligence gathering have allowed law enforcement to marshal significant 
resources towards monitoring American Muslim communities.15 
 
emphasizes vertical intergovernmental arrangements to promote and mediate policy values over the 
long term). 
11. See, e.g., COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 109; Aziz, supra note 5; Chesney, Beyond 
Conspiracy?, supra note 5; Chesney, Sleeper Scenario, supra note 5; Waxman, supra note 5. 
12. See Aziz Z. Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, 2 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 39 
(2010) [hereinafter Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization]; Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious 
Speech in Domestic Counterterrorism, 89 TEX. L. REV. 833 (2011) [hereinafter Huq, The Signaling Function]; 
Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 155–62; Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter) 
Terrorism, supra note 10. There is more scholarly engagement with radicalization once you step outside 
the legal academic literature. See Arun Kundnani, Radicalisation: The Journey of a Concept, 54 RACE & 
CLASS 3 (2012); Faiza Patel, Rethinking Radicalization, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. passim (Mar. 8, 2011), 
http://brennan.3cdn.net/f737600b433d98d25e_6pm6beukt.pdf. On the British experience in 
particular, see ARUN KUNDNANI, INST. OF RACE RELATIONS, SPOOKED!: HOW NOT TO PREVENT 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM 6–7, 10–22 (2009), available at http://www.irr.org.uk/pdf2/spooked.pdf, and 
Paul Thomas, Failed and Friendless: The UK’s ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ Programme, 12 BRIT. J. POL. & 
INT’L REL. 442, 444–47, 450 (2010). 
13. E.g., Compilation of Hearings on Islamist Radicalization—Volume I: Hearings Before the H. Comm. 
on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 71–77 (2011) [hereinafter King Hearing I ] (statement of Leroy Baca, 
Sheriff, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department); id. at 228–31 (statement of Bert Useem, 
Department Head and Professor, Sociology Department, Purdue University); see also John Mueller & 
Mark G. Stewart, The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought Response to September 11, 37 INT’L 
SECURITY 81, 87–89 (2012); Charles Kurzman, Muslim-American Terrorism in the Decade Since 9/11, 
TRIANGLE CTR. ON TERRORISM & HOMELAND SEC. 2–9 (Feb. 8, 2012), http://kurzman.unc.edu/ 
files/2011/06/Kurzman_Muslim-American_Terrorism_in_the_Decade_Since_9_11.pdf (analyzing 
data regarding terrorism from the past decade). 
14. Academics and advocacy groups have started to write critically of the concept. Huq, 
Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 56–69; Kundnani, supra note 12, at 8–22; Rascoff, 
Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 162–79; Letter from Alliance for Justice et al. to Senator 
Diane Feinstein, Chairman, U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence (Sept. 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.defendingdissent.org/pdf/letters/feinsteinIntelAuth.pdf (opposing the Wolf Amend-
ment to the Intelligence Authorization Act, which would set up a radicalization commission); Michael 
German, Radically Wrong: A Counterproductive Approach to Counterterrorism, ACLU BLOG RTS.  
(Feb. 14, 2013, 10:52 AM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-free-speech/radically-wrong-
counterproductive-approach-counterterrorism; Patel, supra note 12, at 8–12. 
15. Examining the government’s concept is important because the state has a particular 
“[i ]nvestment in ‘radicalization’ modeling,” as it “yields dividends in the form of legitimacy for 
policies of investigation and prosecution bottomed on the state’s claim of expertise.” Huq, Modeling 
Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 40. These claims are particularly “forceful in the terrorism 
domain because, unlike other areas of risk regulation . . . it is a field where the state claims to have 
privileged access to information and where it has comparatively few academic competitors.” Id. 
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There is no singular, official, government-wide understanding of radicaliza-
tion.16 Indeed, more often than not, government officials and documents refer to 
“radicalization,” “radical” and “radicalized” Muslims, “radical Islam,” “violent 
extremists,” and so on, without explanation of what precisely these terms mean.17 
Importantly, however, these references assume causal connections between 
radicalism, extremism, Islam, and terrorism. 
Despite diversity and indeterminacy in these narratives, government 
accounts of radicalization converge upon three important themes. First, 
radicalization is an observable and, to some extent, predictable process by which 
Muslims become terrorists, willing and able to commit violence against the United 
States (or American interests) in the name of Islam or the global Muslim 
community.18 Second, in its effort to combat terrorism, the government has a role 
to play in monitoring and countering radicalization.19 Third, radicalization is an 
outcome of certain religious and political cultures within Muslim communities. 
Stated another way, religious and political cultures within Muslim communities 
foment radicalization in individuals. This should be a fairly uncontroversial 
summation of the federal government’s approach. Putting the pieces together, the 
 
16. There is a growing academic and think tank literature trying to understand radicalization as 
a process in the real world. See, e.g., JIHADI TERRORISM AND THE RADICALISATION CHALLENGE IN 
EUROPE passim (Rik Coolsaet ed., 2008); CLARK MCCAULEY & SOPHIA MOSKALENKO, FRICTION: 
HOW RADICALIZATION HAPPENS TO THEM AND US passim (2011); Peter Neumann, Nat’l Sec. 
Preparedness Grp., Preventing Violent Radicalization in America, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. 15–19 ( June 
2011), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf. 
17. Similarly, the term “terrorism” is socially constructed and contested, including by courts. 
See, e.g., Wadie E. Said, Humanitarian Law Project and the Supreme Court’s Construction of Terrorism, 2011 
BYU L. REV. 1455, 1456–57, 1460 (2011) (explaining the Supreme Court’s use of the word 
“terrorism” throughout history). 
18. See MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIV., RADICALIZA-
TION IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 21 (2007), available at http://www.nypdshield.org/ 
public/sitefiles/documents/nypd_report-radicalization_in_the_west.pdf; Patel, supra note 12, at 1–2. 
19. Samuel J. Rascoff notes that counter-radicalization is “open-ended and undertheorized” as 
a concept, but “the core intuition behind counter-radicalization is that the prevention of future 
violence requires official involvement in shaping the ideational currents that are thought to underpin 
that violence.” Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 126–27, 145 (discussing, in addition 
to various forms of counter-radicalization, “de-radicalization,” and explaining that government 
“efforts to bring about change in ideation may also take the form of attempts to roll back an 
individual’s or group’s existing radical commitments”). He describes the change that counter-
radicalization has wrought in this way: 
[C]ounter-radicalization has changed the structure of government. It involves three 
interrelated phenomena: the creation of a domestic intelligence network for the purpose of 
informing counter-radicalization efforts; the creation and repurposing of government posts 
for a counter-radicalization infrastructure; and the imposition of counter-radicalization 
goals into the traditional welfare state. 
Id. at 155–56. He credits the rise of the domestic counter-radicalization agenda to three things: (1) the 
rise conforms to “the preemptive logic of counterterrorism, which focuses on strategies that minimize 
the risk and intensity of future terrorist attacks”; (2) the rise is viewed as an exercise of “‘soft power’” 
preferable to the mixed record that the United States has on the exercise of “‘hard power’” in the 
national security context; and (3) the increased sense that there is a “‘homegrown’ dimension” to the 
terrorist threat. Id. at 127–29. 
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federal government’s embrace of radicalization discourse results directly in the 
proliferation of government counter-radicalization programs,20 as well as related 
initiatives to counter violent extremism,21 targeted at monitoring and shaping the 
forms that religion and politics take in Muslim communities,22 and emphasizing 
the need for “cooperation” from Muslim communities.23 
Radicalization has transformed the landscape of preventative 
counterterrorism policing, placing political and religious cultures of Muslim 
communities at the center of the counterterrorism project, with unexamined costs. 
 
20. Id. at 145, 148. 
21. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO 
PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES (2011) [hereinafter EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf; Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Working Grp., 
Homeland Security Advisory Council, HOMELAND SEC. 15–26 (last visited Dec. 21, 2013), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac_cve_working_group_recommendations.pdf. The adminis-
tration uses both phrases—violent extremism and radicalization—and the terms seem to stand for the 
same conceptual framework. 
22. There is a growing racial and religious profiling literature on how post-9/11 policies 
discriminatorily target American Muslim communities, from airport screening and questioning at the 
border to charitable giving and surveillance. See, e.g., SHIRIN SINNAR ET AL., ASIAN LAW CAUCUS & 
STANFORD LAW SCH. IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS CLINIC, RETURNING HOME: HOW U.S. GOVERNMENT 
PRACTICES UNDERMINE CIVIL RIGHTS AT OUR NATION’S DOORSTEP 4–5 (2009), available at 
http://www.asianlawcaucus.org/sites/asian-law-caucus/files/Returning%20Home.pdf [hereinafter 
SINNAR ET AL., RETURNING HOME]; Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial 
Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1267–77 (2004); Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by 
Expressive Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621,  
622–623, 625 (2004); Kevin Lapp, Pressing Public Necessity: The Unconstitutionality of the Absconder 
Apprehension Initiative, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 573, 573–76 (2005); Tom Lininger, Sects, 
Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of Religious Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1244–48 
(2004); Shirin Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement: The First Amendment and Counterterrorism Interviews, 77 
BROOK. L. REV. 41, 47–49, 54–56 (2011) [hereinafter Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement]; Under the 
Radar: Muslims Deported, Detained, and Denied on Unsubstantiated Terrorism Allegations, CTR. FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE 1–4 (May 4, 2011), http://www.privacysos.org/sites/all/files 
/undertheradar(2).pdf; Thomas Cincotta, Manufacturing the Muslim Menace: Private Firms, Public Servants, 
and the Threat to Rights and Security, POL. RES. ASSOCIATES 32 (2011), http://www.publiceye.org/liberty 
/training/Muslim_Menace_Complete.pdf; Unreasonable Intrusions: Investigating the Politics, Faith & 
Finances of Americans Returning Home, MUSLIM ADVOCATES (Apr. 2009), https:// 
d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/muslimadvocates/pages/178/attachments/original/1360963837/U
nreasonable_Intrusions_2009.pdf?1360963837; Jennifer Turner, Blocking Faith, Freezing Charity: Chilling 
Muslim Charitable Giving in the “War on Terrorism Financing,” ACLU 59–75 (June 16, 2009), 
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/humanrights/block-ingfaith.pdf. Murad Hussain has called much of 
this “cultural profiling.” Murad Hussain, Note, Defending the Faithful: Speaking the Language of Group 
Harm in Free Exercise Challenges to Counterterrorism Profiling, 117 YALE L.J. 920, 926 (2008) (discussing 
post-9/11 “cultural profiling” as “law enforcement policies that specifically target expressions of 
cultural identity as proxy criteria thought to be correlated with criminality, terrorist connections, or 
other subversive propensities”). Debating the utility of racial profiling in the national security context 
is beyond the scope of this Article. Sharon Davies has done an elegant job unpacking the debate. See 
Sharon Davies, Profiling Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 45 (2003). 
23. See Aziz Huq, The Social Production of National Security, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 637, 685 (2013); 
Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. (forthcoming 2014) 
(manuscript at 38) (on file with author). 
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The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief history of law 
enforcement’s production and embrace of radicalization. Part II analyzes the 
seminal NYPD report Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat.24 Part III 
provides a schematic for understanding radicalization policing. Part III.A lays out 
the standards governing the FBI’s and NYPD’s policing, with a focus on the 
relaxed standards on intelligence gathering in the post-9/11 era. Part III.B 
identifies and explores the core preventative policing techniques of policing 
radicalization: mapping, aggressive recruitment and deployment of informants, 
voluntary or pretextual interviews, community engagement, and Internet 
monitoring. Part IV identifies harms related to policing radicalization. Part IV.A 
introduces how radicalization attaches stigma to Muslim religious and political 
cultures and geographies. Part IV.B examines the fundamental tensions that 
radicalization produces between law enforcement and Muslim communities, and 
Muslim and American identities. Part IV.C examines the pressure radicalization 
creates on American Muslim identity performances. 
A few notes on vocabulary are in order. 
In referring to “radicalization,” I refer to the discursive construct rather than 
any actual process, with a particular focus on government constructions. 
Government concern with radicalization and violent extremism is fairly 
coterminous25—greater religiosity and politicization in Muslims is associated with 
the threat of terrorism. Similarly, government counter-radicalization and 
countering violent extremism programs both reflect the proposition that 
government must monitor and influence the religious and political cultures of 
Muslim communities as a way to ward off future terrorism. While I am concerned 
with both radicalization and violent extremism frameworks for understanding 
terrorist threats, I default towards the terminology of radicalization, since the 
concept is more theorized. Any marginal differences are beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
I refer repeatedly to the religious and political cultures of Muslim communi-
ties. I use this phraseology to capture government concern with monitoring and 
influencing the religious ideas and practices and the political ideas and activities in 
Muslim communities. Government concern is both general (viz., the political and 
religious ideas that have currency in the imagined national American Muslim 
community) and site specific—attuned to the political and religious ideas with 
currency in a particular place where Muslims gather (e.g., a mosque or a Muslim 
 
24. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18. 
25. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 112TH 
CONG., A TICKING TIME BOMB: COUNTERTERRORISM LESSONS FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S 
FAILURE TO PREVENT THE FORT HOOD ATTACK 17 (2011) [hereinafter S. COMM. ON HOMELAND 
SEC., A TICKING TIME BOMB], available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/Fort 
_Hood/FortHoodReport.pdf (“The process by which an individual transitions to a violent Islamist 
extremist is known as radicalization.”). 
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student group). It is also individual and community based. Drawing on the 
discipline of political geography and its conversation with law,26 I occasionally use 
the term “geography” to capture law enforcement’s efforts to surveil and generate 
profiles on specific sites where Muslims gather and Muslim religious and political 
cultures emerge. Radicalization lends itself to this project by constituting Muslim 
gathering spaces as suspicious spaces. 
Herein lies the larger problem with radicalization. While in some ways it 
offers only a thin veneer over suspicion of Muslims and Islam (or conflations 
between Muslims, Islam, and terrorism), the veneer is thick enough to change the 
terms of the debate. Law enforcement’s concern with mosques, antiwar 
sentiments, hijabs, and niqabs is now cloaked in expertise about the process by 
which Muslims become terrorists. In a colorblind world where intent defines our 
understanding of discrimination, the language of justification for government 
action can make all the difference.27 
 
26. See, e.g., NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER, at 
xi–xiv (1994) (“[C]oncealed within legal thought and legal practice are a number of representations—
or ‘geographies’—of the spaces of political, social, and economic life. . . . While struggling to make 
sense of the complexity and ambiguity of social life, legal agents—whether judges, legal theorists, 
administrative officers, or ordinary people—represent and evaluate space in various ways. . . . These 
juridical representations touch all aspects of legal life . . . . The legal representation of space must be 
seen as constituted by—and, in turn, constitutive of—complex, normatively charged and often 
competing visions of social and political life under law.”); DAVID DELANEY, RACE, PLACE, AND THE 
LAW 1836–1948, at 6–10 (1998) (“It is hard to understate the central significance of geographical 
themes—space, place, and mobility—to the social and political history of race relations and antiblack 
racism in the United States.”); Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al., Space and Legal Pluralism: 
An Introduction, in SPATIALIZING LAW: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL GEOGRAPHY OF LAW IN SOCIETY 1, 
3–9 (Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al. eds., 2009) (“All social and legal institutions, relations and 
practices are located and distributed in space. . . . Law is also used for creating spaces for more 
specific purposes with special legal regimes that are superimposed on this general geographical 
political and administrative grid, such as economic zones, zones for urban planning, ‘problem’ or 
‘safety’ zones . . . . Within legal spaces, we also find constructions of ‘dangerous’ spaces as opposed to 
‘good’ or sanctioned spaces . . . . Legal constructions of space are used as an instrument to control 
people and resources.”); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal 
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1844–45 (1994) (“[P]olitical geography—the position and function 
of jurisdictional and quasi-jurisdictional boundaries—helps to promote a racially separate and unequal 
distribution of political influence and economic resources. . . . Thus, racial segregation persists in the 
absence of explicit, legally enforceable racial restrictions.” (footnote omitted)); Steve Herbert, The 
Geopolitics of the Police: Foucault, Disciplinary Power and the Tactics of the Los Angeles Police Department, 15 
POL. GEOGRAPHY 47, 50 (1996) (“Because of its high level of technological and organizational 
sophistication, the LAPD is an unusually appropriate object of attention for an examination of the 
geopolitics of contemporary discipline.”). 
27. Through her “preservation-through-transformation” theory, Reva Siegel has explained 
how social hierarchies sustain themselves in part by evolving their justificatory rhetoric. Reva B. 
Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996); Reva 
Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997). 
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I. RADICALIZATION BRIEFLY HISTORICIZED 
The process by which an individual transitions to a violent Islamist extremist is known 
as radicalization. 
  —Special Report by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs28 
 
Why is it that a whole range of political, cultural, social, and even economic events has 
often seemed reducible in so Pavlovian a way to ‘Islam’? What is it about ‘Islam’ that 
provokes so quick and unrestrained a response? 
  —Edward Said29 
 
The following account charts the course of radicalization as a concept 
articulated, accepted, and implemented by agencies of the U.S. government and 
the NYPD. The account is not intended to be exhaustive, nor does it explore with 
any detail the broad array of policies spawned by radicalization. It is simply meant 
to convey the rapid ascent of radicalization as a concept and government policy 
priority. Throughout this Article, I focus on the DOJ, FBI, and NYPD. The 
DOJ—of which the FBI is a part—is the primary law enforcement entity 
responsible for policing and prosecuting terrorism and terrorism-related activity.30 
The NYPD’s counterterrorism efforts are the next most prominent. The NYPD is 
engaged with counterterrorism policing through its Intelligence and Counterter-
rorism Divisions (as well as its Community Affairs Bureau), and in collaboration 
with the FBI through the New York Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).31 
 
28. S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., A TICKING TIME BOMB, supra note 25. 
29. EDWARD W. SAID, COVERING ISLAM: HOW THE MEDIA AND THE EXPERTS 
DETERMINE HOW WE SEE THE REST OF THE WORLD 9 (1981). 
30. When NYPD counterterrorism work culminates in a terrorism-related indictment, it is 
typically a federal indictment. But New York recently made use of the terrorism provisions in its state 
criminal code for the first time in prosecutions against Ahmed Ferhani and Mohamed Mamdouh. See 
William K. Rashbaum & Colin Moynihan, Most Serious Charges Are Rejected in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 15, 2011, at A28 (describing the charges on which the state grand jury elected to indict the 
defendants); see also Joseph Goldstein & William K. Rashbaum, City Bomb Plot Suspect Called Fan of 
Qaeda Cleric, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at A1 (discussing the New York state-level prosecution 
against Jose Pimentel). In decisions much-speculated about, the FBI declined to be involved in these 
cases. Goldstein & Rashbaum, supra; Michael Greenberg, The Problem of the New York Police, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/oct/25/problem-new 
-york-police [hereinafter Greenberg, The Problem of the New York Police]. 
31. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER DICKEY, SECURING THE CITY: INSIDE AMERICA’S BEST 
COUNTERTERROR FORCE—THE NYPD 163 (2009) (stating that as of early 2006, at least the upper 
echelons of the FBI and the NYPD were working together to combat terrorism); LEONARD LEVITT, 
NYPD CONFIDENTIAL: POWER AND CORRUPTION IN THE COUNTRY’S GREATEST POLICE FORCE 
236–37 (2009) (discussing the New York City police commissioner’s appointment of the NYPD’s 
first deputy commissioner of counterterrorism, whose responsibilities include fashioning a police 
response to terrorism in New York City and supervising the detectives in the FBI-led JTTF); Richard 
Falkenrath, Deputy Comm’r for Counterterrorism, N.Y. Police Dep’t, Address at the Wash. Inst. for 
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On both sides of the Atlantic, radicalization and counter-radicalization are 
new concepts for understanding the threat of terrorism at home and the role of 
government in responding. Radicalization theories are relatively new in Europe 
and even newer in the United States.32 Radicalization and counter-radicalization 
 
Near E. Policy (June 23, 2009), available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/falkenrath 
20090623.pdf (discussing information-sharing and other counterterrorism cooperation between the 
NYPD and FBI); Counterterrorism Units, supra note 10 (describing the NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau 
and its various divisions); Protecting America from Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces, FBI, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs ( last visited Apr. 15, 2013) 
(describing the FBI JTTFs); see also Michael Greenberg, New York: The Police and the Protesters, N.Y. 
REV. BOOKS (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/oct/11/new-york 
-police-and-protesters [hereinafter Greenberg, New York: The Police and the Protesters] (discussing the 
countertterrorism activities of the NYPD Intelligence Division and its interactions with the FBI and 
JTTF); Greenberg, The Problem of the New York Police, supra note 30 (discussing terrorist plots revealed 
as failed or foiled by the FBI or NYPD). 
32. Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 41 n.10 (noting the author’s inability 
to find any references to radicalization prior to 2001); Kundnani, supra note 12, at 4–10 (tracing the 
emergence of the radicalization theories in European accounts to 2004). On the American borrowing 
of the British/European experience, see Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 148, which 
notes that “American domestic counter-radicalization is emerging mainly as a (modified) import from 
Europe, chiefly from the United Kingdom,” and Kundnani, supra note 12, at 3–7. On the British 
experience itself, see KUNDNANI, supra note 12, and Thomas, supra note 12. See also Huq, Modeling 
Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 51–56. The concept gained traction during a period when the 
Bush administration’s approach to prosecuting terrorism through the federal courts was under 
considerable attack, from entities inside and outside of the government. Starting as early as 2003 and 
through 2007, a number of prominent investigations into the Bush administration’s Article III 
terrorism-related prosecutions determined that the administration was bloating its record. COLE & 
LOBEL, supra note 5, at 110–11 (“The key to understanding the administration’s claim that it has 
obtained more than four hundred criminal indictments and two hundred convictions in ‘terrorism-
related’ cases is the word ‘related.’ . . . [T]he majority of [those] indictments and convictions . . . are 
for minor, nonviolent offenses such as making false statements on a federal form, immigration 
infractions, or credit card fraud.”); Dan Eggen & Julie Tate, U.S. Campaign Produces Few Convictions on 
Terrorism Charges, WASH. POST, June 12, 2005, at A1; Scott Shane & Lowell Bergmann, Adding Up the 
Ounces of Prevention, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, at C1; Karen J. Greenberg & Daniel Freifeld, Terrorist 
Trials, 2001–2007: Lessons Learned, CTR. ON L. & SEC. 1 (Oct. 2007), http://www.lawandsecurity 
.org/portals/0/documents/08_ttrc2007update1.pdf; Terrorist Trial Report Card: U.S. Edition, CTR. ON 
L. & SEC. 3 (2006), http://www.lawandsecurity.org/portals/0/documents/09_ttrccomplete.pdf; 
Terrorist Trials: A Report Card, CTR. ON L. & SEC. 1–2 (Feb. 2005), http://www.lawandsecurity 
.org/portals/0/documents/12_terroristtrialreportcard.pdf (“The legal war on terror has yielded few 
visible results. There have been relatively few indictments, fewer trials, and almost no convictions on 
charges reflecting dangerous crimes.”); TRAC, Criminal Terrorism Enforcement Since the 9/11/01 Attacks: 
A TRAC Special Report, SYRACUSE UNIV. (Dec. 8, 2003), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports 
/terrorism/report031208.html. In February 2007, the DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 
issued a damning report examining the DOJ’s terrorism-related statistics. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S INTERNAL CONTROLS OVER 
TERRORISM REPORTING (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/plus/a0720 
/final.pdf. The OIG “found that the Department components and the Department as a whole did 
not accurately report terrorism-related statistics. The Department components lacked adequate 
internal controls for gathering, verifying, and reporting terrorism-related statistics.” Id. at xvii. For 
example, the FBI overstated the number of terrorism-related convictions “because the FBI initially 
coded the investigative cases as terrorism-related when the cases were opened, but did not recode 
cases when no link to terrorism was established.” Id. at viii, 17–19 (describing various cases where the 
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programs are primarily if not almost exclusively concerned with Muslim 
communities. 
The chronology of the U.S. government’s rapid embrace of radicalization 
starts in earnest in 2006.33 At that time, the FBI issued an Intelligence Assessment, 
The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad, asserting the existence of an 
identifiable and predictable process by which a Muslim becomes a terrorist.34 The 
FBI identified the four stages of radicalization as “preradicalization,” 
“identification,” “indoctrination,” and “action.”35 In addition to proposing what 
on its face seems a reductionist view of how someone might decide to commit any 
crime—let alone a crime of great magnitude—the twelve-page document includes 
almost no citations, sourcing, or indication of methodology. Four out of the five 
sources listed in the document’s seven footnotes are from the 1990s, one from the 
 
FBI failed to properly recode cases). The greatest inaccuracies were a result of coding “statistical data 
as terrorism or anti-terrorism related [without] support that a case showed any reasonable link to 
terrorist activity.” Id. at xi–xii; see also id. at 42–56. Similar to the FBI, the Executive Office for United 
States Attorneys (EOUSA), and the Offices of the United States Attorneys (USAO) inaccurately 
reported because “the USAOs categorized the cases against the defendants under the anti-terrorism 
program activity when the case was filed but did not change the categorization based upon further 
investigation or based on the actual evidence found or offenses for which the defendants were 
convicted.” Id. at xiii. The DOJ OIG’s report echoed an earlier report by the Government 
Accountability Office that found similar lack of oversight in DOJ’s reporting of terrorism statistics, as 
well as inconsistencies between the FBI’s and EOUSA’s classification schemes. U.S. GOV’T. 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-266, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT: BETTER MANAGEMENT 
OVERSIGHT AND INTERNAL CONTROLS NEEDED TO ENSURE ACCURACY OF TERRORISM-
RELATED STATISTICS 6 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/236927.pdf (finding at 
least 132 of 288 cases misclassified as terrorism-related). For a view in line with the government’s 
defense, see Robert M. Chesney, Federal Prosecution of Terrorism-Related Offenses: Conviction and Sentencing 
Data in Light of the “Soft-Sentence” and “Data-Reliability” Critiques, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 851, 889 
(2007) (concluding that the overall pattern of dispositions and sentences indicates the DOJ’s program 
has been successful). But see Richman & Stuntz, supra note 8 (discussing the success of U.S. 
preemptive counterterrorism tactics, but emphasizing their possible costs to credibility). 
33. The earliest reference to a U.S. government concern with Muslim “radicalization” seems 
to be from 2003, regarding prisons. Terrorism: Radical Islamic Influence of Chaplaincy of the U.S. Military and 
Prisons: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. & Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
108th Cong. 8–9 (2003) (statement of John S. Pistole, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation) (“U.S. correctional institutions are a viable venue for . . . 
radicalization and recruitment. . . . To assist in ferreting out potential radicalization issues within the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons system, the Bureau of Prisons maintains a presence on the FBI’s National 
Joint Terrorism Task Force.”); see also The Homeland Security Implications of Radicalization: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Intelligence, Info. Sharing, & Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 109th 
Cong. 14 (2006) (statement of Donald Van Duyn, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, 
Federal Bureau of Investigations) (“[T]he FBI and the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) have been actively 
engaged in efforts to detect, deter, and interdict efforts by terrorist and extremist groups to radicalize 
or recruit in US prisons since February 2003.”). 
34. FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS: FROM CONVERSION 
TO JIHAD 2 (2006). Although not made public, this document was leaked. 
35. Id. at 3. In 2003, a professor of psychology guest wrote an article for the FBI Law 
Enforcement Bulletin theorizing four stages of “radicalization.” See Randy Borum, Understanding the 
Terrorist Mind-Set, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., July 2003, at 7 (arguing that “four observable stages 
appear to frame a process of ideological development” of a terrorist). 
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1960s.36 The next pivotal development came in 2007, when the NYPD 
Intelligence Division published a pivotal almost 100-page public report, 
Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat.37 That report mirrors the 2006 FBI 
Intelligence Assessment, theorizing the process from Muslim to terrorist, with 
similar stages and markers, but in much greater detail.38 
The FBI Intelligence Assessment and the NYPD report sowed the idea of 
radicalization and counter-radicalization into government discourse.39 Since 2007, 
U.S. federal and local government literature has taken for granted a problem with 
Muslim radicalization in the United States; government programming based on 
that assumption has developed at a clip. In Congress, for example, both the House 
and Senate Homeland Security Committees have devoted considerable resources 
to the development of the radicalization discourse, emphasizing the need for the 
government to monitor and respond to radicalization.40 More recently, the White 
 
36. FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., supra note 34, at 12 nn.1–7. 
37. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18. 
38. The four stages take on a slightly modified parlance from the FBI: “[p]re-radicalization,” 
“[s]elf-identification,” “[i ]ndoctrination,” and “[j ]ihadization.” Id. at 21. Each stage has “specific 
signatures associated with it.” Id.; see infra Part II. 
39. For another accounting of the federal and state government literature, see Huq, Modeling 
Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 43–51 (discussing both state-level and federal-level responses 
to “radicalization” in the U.S.). Huq suggests that the NYPD’s publication of the “radicalization” 
theory was related to the NYPD’s drive to establish itself as the preeminent national security law 
enforcement entity, even over the FBI. Id. at 64–65. On the larger questions of federal and state law 
enforcment competition and cooperation, see Waxman, supra note 10; Matthew Waxman, Policing 
Terrorism, DEFINING IDEAS (May 4, 2012), http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/ 
article/116471 (arguing federalism is key to forming a more efficient counterterrorism system). 
40. Under Peter King’s leadership, in 2011 and 2012, the House Homeland Security 
Committee held a series of hearings premised on the assertion that American Muslims are radicalizing 
at an increasing rate and pose a significant threat to the United States. See Compilation of Hearings on 
Islamist Radicalization—Volume III: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 75 (2012) 
(statement of Rep. Peter T. King, Chairman H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.) (reiterating the necessity 
of the hearings based on “a crisis of radicalization to violence . . . within the Muslim-American 
community”); Compilation of Hearings on Islamist Radicalization—Volume II: Joint Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) 
[hereinafter King Hearing II ] (statement of Rep. Peter T. King, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland 
Sec.) (“[Responding] to . . . a growing security threat from radicalization both within the military as 
well as against military personnel and their families residing in the United States.”); King Hearing I, 
supra note 13, at 278 (statement of Rep. Peter T. King, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.) 
(“[A]l-shabaab . . . is engaged in an on-going [sic] successful effort to recruit and radicalize dozens of 
Muslim American jihadis who pose a direct threat to the United States.”); id. at 204 (addressing the 
“issue of Islamic radicalization in U.S. prisons . . . . because the danger remains real and present”); id. 
at 2 (arguing that the need for the hearings is based on al-Qaeda’s attempts to “recruit and radicalize” 
people in the United States). Witnesses at these hearings have balked at King’s premises. See King 
Hearing I, supra note 13, at 73–74 (statement of Leroy Baca, Sheriff, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department) (arguing that no particular religion is more susceptible to radicalization and that 
cooperation and relationship building are more effective than arrests and enforcement); id. at 231 
(statement of Bert Useem, Department Head and Professor, Sociology Department, Purdue 
University) (“U.S. prisons are not systematically generating a terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland.”); 
id. at 200 (statement of Rep. Keith Ellison) (noting the threat of prison radicalization “seems to be 
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House has embraced the need to “counter violent extremism” and 
“radicalization,” playing a leadership role in encouraging such programs in its 2010 
and 2011 national security strategy papers.41 The Obama administration’s 2011 
Strategic Implementation Plan, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism 
in the United States, announces prioritization of government programs supporting 
 
false, or, at least, overstated” (quoting Bert Useem & Obie Clayton, Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners, 8 
AM. SOC’Y CRIMINOLOGY 561, 586 (2009))). Under Joe Lieberman’s imprimatur, the Senate 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, too, has held a series of hearings and 
issued a number of reports embracing and expounding on the NYPD’s radicalization theory. See, e.g., 
King Hearing II, supra, at 45 (noting that the Senate Committee’s report heavily relied on the NYPD’s 
RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST report); A Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons from the U.S. 
Government’s Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 14 (2011) (statement of Samuel J. Rascoff, Assistant Professor of 
Law, New York University School of Law) (recommending cooperation with Muslim communities as 
an effective means of counter-radicalization); Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell 
Blocks?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 1 (2006) 
(statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins, Chairwoman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental 
Affairs) (citing a need to learn more about radicalization in prisons); STAFF OF S. COMM. ON 
HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 112TH CONG., ZACHARY CHESSER: A CASE STUDY 
IN ONLINE ISLAMIST RADICALIZATION AND ITS MEANING FOR THE THREAT OF HOMEGROWN 
TERRORISM 3–4 (2012) [hereinafter S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., ONLINE ISLAMIST 
RADICALIZATION], available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CHESSER%20FINAL 
%20REPORT(1).pdf (examining the phenomenon of online radicalization through Zachary Chesser); 
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 110TH CONG., VIOLENT 
ISLAMIST EXTREMISM, THE INTERNET, AND THE HOMEGROWN TERRORIST THREAT 4–5 (2008) 
[hereinafter S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM] (adopting the 
NYPD’s four-stage radicalization model). Mitch Silber testified about the report before the Senate 
Homeland Security committee. Violent Islamist Extremism—2007: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong., 140–54 (2007) (testimony of Mitchell D. Silber, 
Senior Intelligence Analyst, Intelligence Division, New York City Police Department). Tellingly, the 
Congressional Research Service’s recent reports on “American jihadist terrorism” and countering 
violent extremism take for granted the existence of a legible, predictable radicalization process, while 
at the same time counseling some degree of caution. Both cite to the NYPD report to define 
radicalization. See BJELOPERA, supra note 8, at 3–4; JEROME P. BJELOPERA & MARK A. RANDOL, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41416, AMERICAN JIHADIST TERRORISM: COMBATING A COMPLEX 
THREAT 1–2, 11–14 (2010); see also JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41416, 
AMERICAN JIHADIST TERRORISM: COMBATING A COMPLEX THREAT 12 (2013) (referring to the 
NYPD report as “widely circulated within the law enforcement community”). 
41. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 21, 
at 2–3, 5–6 (discussing the need to prevent and counter radicalization and extremism); EXEC. OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 19, 26, 37 (2010) [hereinafter EXEC. OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (discussing generally how to fight 
radicalism and extremism); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR 
COUNTERTERRORISM 6, 9–12 (2011) [hereinafter EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STRATEGY 
FOR COUNTERTERRORISM], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism 
_strategy.pdf (stating that cooperation is necessary to fight radicalization and discussing strategies to 
defeat al-Qaeda and its ideologies); Lorenzo Vidino, Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons From 
Europe, U.S. INST. PEACE 2 (Nov. 2010), http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR262%20%20 
Countering_Radicalization_in_America.pdf (noting the Obama administration has recently “ask[ed] 
several governmental agencies to craft policies to ‘counter violent extremism’ and devise appropriate 
counterradicalization plans”). 
2013] POLICING “RADICALIZATION” 823 
 
community-based approaches to “countering violent extremism.”42 While the 
Obama plan is short on details,43 its issuance suggests more government 
community-engagement programs across the board. The U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)44 
 
42. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 21, at 
2–7; see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 41, at 
19–22, 26–27 (discussing plans to advance security interests by working with the international 
community to disrupt al-Qaeda forces); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STRATEGY FOR 
COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 41, at 6–7, 9–12 (discussing strategy of building international 
security partnerships to counter al-Qaeda). 
43. For an analysis of the White House’s proposal, see Huq, supra note 23. See also German, 
supra note 14 (“Rather than challenge the radicalization theory with the many studies that refute it, the 
Obama administration issued a plan for preventing violent extremism. While the White House 
deserves some credit for using more careful language and for emphasizing the need for community 
engagement, it perpetuates the notion that ‘radicalization to violence’ is a discernible process that 
government can identify, predict and interdict, and establishes policies that again threaten civil 
liberties.”). 
44. Some have argued that DHS and NCTC have rejected religiosity as a proxy for violence, 
or the idea of one “radicalization” pathway to terrorism. Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, supra 
note 12, at 49–50; Patel, supra note 12, at 13. But former DHS Secretary Napolitano regularly referred 
to the need for the government to counter violent extremism. Understanding the Homeland Threat 
Landscape—Considerations for the 112th Congress: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 
12 (2011) (statement of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security) (referring to 
the need to counter violent extremism, and to DHS’s efforts to “compile . . . case studies that 
examine recent incidents involving terrorism . . . . [that] focus on common behaviors and indicators 
regarding violent extremism”); Janet Napolitano, Partnering with Communities to Counter Violent 
Extremism, HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 6, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/node/7913 (“We therefore see 
countering violent extremism as both a ‘whole of government’ and ‘whole of nation’ effort.”); Office 
of the Press Sec’y, Secretary Napolitano Meets with State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement on Countering 
Violent Extremism, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov 
/news/2012/01/18/secretary-napolitano-meets-state-local-and-tribal-law-enforcement-countering-
violent (chronicling Secretary Napolitano’s meetings with law enforcement officials to “engage them 
on the critical task of preventing violent extremism”); see also HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL 
STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 22 (2007) (proposing that law enforcement agencies should 
“identify and address sources of violent extremist radicalization in the Homeland”). Napolitano has 
spoken about the threat of “right-wing extremism,” but in June 2009, DHS retracted a report entitled 
Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and 
Recruitment, after the report sparked controversy. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., RIGHTWING EXTREMISM: CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
CLIMATE FUELING RESURGENCE IN RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT (2009), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf; see also R. Jeffrey Smith, Homeland Security Department 
Curtails Home-Grown Terror Analysis, WASH. POST (June 7, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/homeland-security-department-curtails-home-grown-terror-analysis/2011/06/02/AGQEaDLH 
_story.html. Daryl Johnson, the author of the report on rightwing extremism, stated, “Other reports 
written by DHS about Muslim extremists . . . got through without any major problems,” while “[o]urs 
[on right wing extremism] went through endless reviews and edits, and nothing came out.” Smith, 
supra; see also Amy Goodman, Former DHS Analyst Daryl Johnson on How He Was Silenced for Warning of 
Far-Right Militants in U.S., DEMOCRACY NOW! (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.democracynow 
.org/2012/8/9/former_dhs_analyst_daryl_johnson_on (speaking about the backlash he experienced 
after the right-wing extremism report was disclosed to the public). The Washington Post reported that 
DHS “cut the number of personnel studying domestic terrorism unrelated to Islam, canceled 
numerous state and local law enforcement briefings, and held up dissemination of nearly a dozen 
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have also worked to model, assess, and encourage government programs to 
respond to “radicalization” and “violent extremism.”45 
The FBI and DOJ policies reflect a clear prioritization of countering 
radicalization and violent extremism.46 The DOJ and FBI regularly refer to 
radicalization, and to Muslim individuals adhering to “extremist” or “radical” 
ideologies, as the targets of their investigations and prosecutions.47 FBI training 
 
reports on extremist groups.” Smith, supra; see also Spencer Ackerman, DHS Crushed This Analyst for 
Warning About Far-Right Terror, WIRED (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/ 
08/dhs/all (relating how “‘they dissolved [Johnson’s] team’” after the DHS repudiated the report on 
rightwing extremism). 
45. See RICHARD A. BEST, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41022, THE NATIONAL 
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER (NCTC)—RESPONSIBILITIES AND POTENTIAL CONGRESSIONAL 
CONCERNS 6 (2011) (referring to a 2006 NCTC implementation plan which included as an objective 
“containing violent extremism”); THE NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., COUNTERTERRORISM 
2012 CALENDAR 140 (2012) (“Radicalization is a dynamic and multi-layered process involving several 
factors that interact with one another to influence an individual. There is no single factor that explains 
radicalization and mobilization.”); Hearing on Intelligence, supra note 2 (recording statements by Matthew 
Olsen, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, that the NCTC includes within its mandate 
“the problem of countering violent extremism” and that the NCTC, with FBI and DHS, is “train[ing] 
local state law enforcement to better spot the signs of radicalization”); About Us, NAT’L 
COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/about_nctc.html ( last visited Apr. 15, 
2013) (“NCTC’s Radicalization and Extremist Messaging Group leads the [Intelligence Community’s] 
efforts on radicalization issues.”); see also 50 U.S.C. § 404o(d)(2) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (establishing 
the NCTC with a mission to “conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities”). 
46. In some forums, the FBI has suggested it does not sanction the idea of a fixed 
radicalization process. See Homeland Threats and Agency Responses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland 
Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 12 (2012) (statement of Kevin L. Perkins, Associate Deputy 
Director, FBI) (“These individuals have no typical profile; their experiences and motives are often 
distinct.”); Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 48 (quoting a few FBI statements on 
radicalization). This doublespeak is a common trend. In a report on “32 Terrorism Cases Against the 
Homeland” prepared by the New York State Intelligence Center, for example, the authors write: 
“There is no definitive terrorist profile. However, we were able to identify trends in basic pedigree 
information to suggest that these individuals are largely young males, between the ages of 18–33, who 
explicitly support or follow radical Islamic ideology.” N.Y. STATE INTELLIGENCE CTR., THE 
VIGILANCE PROJECT: AN ANALYSIS OF 32 TERRORISM CASES AGAINST THE HOMELAND 4 (2010); 
see also Falkenrath, supra note 31 (“The analysts who follow radicalization have a number of different 
theories about what is driving this, and as a former academic—a former professor—I must say I’m 
not yet persuaded as to which theory is right. The NYPD intelligence division put out a very 
important report about two years ago on radicalization laying out its analysis of ten major cases of 
homegrown radicalization and the steps that the individuals went through. And we think that’s a pretty 
good framework for evaluating these different plots.” (emphasis added)). 
47. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year of 2013: Hearings 
Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 112th Cong. 11 (2012) (statement of Robert S. 
Mueller, III, Director, FBI) (framing as particularly important “al Qaeda’s use of on-line chat rooms 
and Web sites to recruit and radicalize followers to commit acts of terrorism”); id. at 7 (statement of 
Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI) (referring to a case of “homegrown violent extremists” as 
“exemplif[ying] the need to continue to enhance our intelligence capabilities and to get the right 
information to the right peoplebefore any harm is done”); Ten Years After 9/11–2011: Hearings Before 
the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 215 (2011) (statement of Robert S. 
Mueller, III, Director, FBI) (“Individuals may be radicalized over the Internet even if they do not 
receive direct guidance or training from a terrorist group.”); FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., supra 
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note 34 (presenting a “model of the radicalization process for a legal US person who is a convert to 
Islam”); Dennis A. Ballas, Prisoner Radicalization, FBI (Oct. 2010), http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/ 
publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/October-2010/confronting-science-and-market-positioning 
(discussing “the threat of inmate radicalization”); Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Al Qaeda 
Operative Convicted by Jury in One of the Most Serious Terrorist Plots Against America Since 9/11, U.S. DEP’T 
JUST. (May 1, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/May/12-nsd-565.html (quoting Loretta E. 
Lynch, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York) (referring to the defendant’s “‘journey of 
radicalization’”); Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Maryland Man Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to 
Provide Material Support to Terrorists, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (May 4, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
2012/May/12-nsd-579.html (quoting FBI Special Agent Charge Venizelos) (referring to the 
defendant as a “radicalized teen,” and commenting that “[t]his investigation and the guilty plea 
announced today underscores [sic] the continuing threat we face from violent extremism and 
radicalism, both from within our country and from across the world”); Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. 
Affairs, North Carolina Resident Found Guilty of Terrorism Violations, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (June 14, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-nsd-755.html (“[S]ome defendants also allegedly 
radicalized others to believe that violent jihadwas [sic] a personal religious obligation.”); Dep’t of 
Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Two Indicted for Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST. (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/October/11-nsd-1385.html 
(quoting Mark Giuliano, Executive Assistant Director of the FBI’s National Security Branch) 
(warning that individuals have “used the Internet to further their radicalization and contribute to the 
radicalization of others”); Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Virginia Man Accused of Attempting to 
Bomb U.S. Capitol in Suicide Attack, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
2012/February/12-nsd-234.html (quoting Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National 
Security and James W. McJunkin, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI Washington Field Office, 
respectively), (announcing the arrest of a “homegrown violent extremist[]” who adhered to a “radical” 
version of Islam); Saudi National Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to HAMAS and Other 
Violent Jihadists, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Mar. 4, 2004), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/March/04 
_crm_137.htm (announcing the indictment of a graduate student from Saudi Arabia for operating 
websites on behalf of various Islamic organizations and “radical” Saudi sheikhs); Two Plead Guilty to 
Domestic Terrorism Charges of Conspiring to Attack Military Facilities, Jewish Targets, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 
14, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/December/07_nsd_1006.html (announcing the 
guilty pleas of two members of a domestic “radical Islamic organization”); U.S. Attorney’s Office 
Dist. of Mass., Massachusetts Man Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists, FBI (Oct. 
21, 2009), http://www.fbi.gov/boston/press-releases/2009/bs102109a.htm (“[C]oconspirators 
attempted to radicalize others and inspire each other by, among other things, watching and 
distributing jihadi videos.”); U.S. Attorney’s Office E. Dist. of Va., Leader of Revolution Muslim Pleads 
Guilty to Using Internet to Solicit Murder and Encourage Violent Extremism, FBI (Feb. 9, 2012), http:// 
www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2012/leader-of-revolution-muslim-pleads-guilty-to-using-
internet-to-solicit-murder-and-encourage-violent-extremism (quoting Raymond W. Kelly, NYPD 
Commissioner) (“‘Morton used the Internet to conspire to solicit murder, and . . . encouraged others 
to solicit the murder of an artist whose material he deemed offensive.’”); U.S. Attorney’s Office E. 
Dist. of Va., supra note 1 (quoting James W. McJunkin, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s 
Washington Field Office) (“‘[T]he FBI will continue to pursue those who support violent extremism 
and promote the radicalization of others . . . .’”); U.S. Attorney’s Office N. Dist. Ala., Uzbek National 
Pleads Guilty to Charges of Threatening to Kill the President and Providing Material Support to Terrorist Activity, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/usao/aln/News/February%202012 
/February%2010,%202012%20Uzbek.html (quoting FBI Special Agent in Charge Patrick J. Maley) 
(“‘This case serves as a reminder of the dangers of the Internet on radicalizing our youth right in our 
own back yards . . . .’”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2012 PERFORMANCE BUDGET: OFFICE 
OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS 31 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013justification 
/pdf/fy13-ojp-justification.pdf (documenting $4,000,000 for research to develop “a better 
understanding of the domestic radicalization phenomenon”). 
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materials describe indices of radicalization considered worthy of police scrutiny.48 
Other materials further correlate devoutness in Muslims with violence.49 While the 
FBI stated that “[s]trong religious beliefs should never be confused with violent 
extremism,” the 2006 FBI Intelligence Assessment is “still in official use.”50 It is 
 
48. See Hearing on Intelligence, supra note 2 (“My concern is that [the FBI is] not looking at 
criminal behavior. We’re not looking at violent behavior. But we’re focusing on religious practices and 
that this is evident, and I could cite other evidence . . . of training materials and written materials of 
the FBI that describe people who, you know, wear Muslim clothing, et cetera, as being signals that 
they may be violent.”); FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI-CTC COLLABORATIVE AFTER-
ACTION REPORTS NAC 09-15, at 2 (2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/ 
20111019/ACLURM009767.pdf (“It would have been nice to have . . . more time and focus on the 
significance of different types of clothing and other significant indicators in a person’s appearance and 
items of their possible radicalization level.”); see also JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE, ORIENTATION 
AND OPERATIONS TRAINING (2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/ 
20111019/ACLURM005626.pdf (listing orientation sessions such as “Arab Culture, Basic Islam, and 
Radicalization”); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’ SELECTION OF MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS 6 n.6 
(2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM001509.pdf (de-
fining radicalization as “the process by which inmates who do not invite or plan overt terrorist acts 
adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious 
purposes”). 
49. See Spencer Ackerman, FBI Teaches Agents: ‘Mainstream’ Muslims are ‘Violent, Radical’, WIRED 
(Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/09/fbi-muslims-radical/all (“At the 
Bureau’s training ground in Quantico, Virginia, agents are shown a chart contending that the more 
‘devout’ a Muslim, the more likely he is to be ‘violent.’”); Spencer Ackerman, New Evidence of Anti-
Islam Bias Underscores Deep Challenges for FBI’s Reform Pledge, WIRED (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.wired 
.com/dangerroom/2011/09/fbi-islam-domination/all [hereinafter Ackerman, New Evidence] (“[T]he 
[FBI] library also contains books by anti-Islam authors that portray the religion as devoted to murder 
and world domination.”). 
50. Ackerman, New Evidence, supra note 49 (quoting FBI Nat’l Press Office, Response to Media 
Reporting Regarding Counterterrorism Training, FBI (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/ 
press-releases/response-to-media-reporting-regarding-counterterrorism-training). Ackerman asked the 
FBI to reconcile its statement with the fact that the FBI Intelligence Assessment is still in use. FBI 
spokesman Christopher Allen replied, “The assessment you cite includes a series of indicators of 
radicalization. These indicators do not conflict with our statement that strong religious beliefs should 
never be confused with violent extremism.” Ackerman, New Evidence, supra note 49; see also 
BJELOPERA, supra note 8, at 3 n.6 (citing Carol Dyer et al., Countering Violent Islamic Extremism: A 
Community Responsibility, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Dec. 2007, at 6, for the proposition that the 
FBI’s own four-stage model of radicalization closely follows that of the NYPD); Carol Dyer et al., 
supra, at 3, 4 (“The FBI assesses the radicalization process as four stages: preradicalization, identifica-
tion, indoctrination, and action.”); Letter from Am. Civil Liberties Union et al. to Robert S. Mueller, 
III, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation 2 (Oct. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Letter to Mueller], available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/sign_on_letter_to_dir_mueller_re_radicalization_report_10_4_11 
.pdf (“Contrary to your statement that strong religious beliefs should not be confused with violent 
extremism, the 2006 FBI report states that these religious practices indicate a person is on a path to 
becoming a violent extremist. The report encourages law enforcement officials unfairly and 
inappropriately to view Muslim converts as potential threats.”). In response to the revelations about 
biased training, Deputy Attorney General James Cole issued a memo calling for review of materials, 
particularly those on counterterrorism and countering violent extremism. Memorandum from James 
Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen. to Heads of Components and U.S. Attorneys 1 (Mar. 20, 2012), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/dag/training-guiding-principles.pdf (citing Memorandum from James 
Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of Components and U.S. Attorneys (Sept. 28, 2011)). In his 
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nearly impossible to reconcile these two statements given that the Intelligence 
Assessment clearly equates “radical” Muslim religious and political activity to 
terrorism. For example, the Intelligence Assessment identifies “indicators the FBI 
has developed in order to identify an individual going through the radicalization 
process”—those indicators include “[w]earing traditional Muslim attire,” 
“[g]rowing facial hair,” “[f]requent attendance at a mosque or prayer group,” 
“[t]ravel to a Muslim country,” “[i]ncreased activity in a pro-Muslim social group 
or political cause,” and “[p]rosletyzing.”51 
The embrace of radicalization discourse results directly in the proliferation of 
government counter-radicalization programs,52 as well as related initiatives to 
counter violent extremism,53 targeted at shaping the forms that religion and 
politics take in Muslim communities.54 Since 2010, federal agencies, including the 
FBI, DOJ, DHS, and NCTC, have taken on new “counter-radicalization” 
initiatives, ranging in form from engagement in and outreach to Muslim 
communities, to creating imam councils of “moderate” imams, to forming greater 
intelligence collection networks.55 The pace of these programs is hard to keep up 
with. Most recently, in 2012, the FBI established a Countering Violent Extremism 
office in its National Security Branch;56 in February 2013, the White House 
 
2012 memorandum, he announced his ratification of principles for FBI training, drafted by a working 
group on training issues within the Attorney General’s Arab-Muslim Engagement Advisory Group. 
Id. 
51. FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., supra note 34, at 10; see also Letter to Mueller, supra note 
50 (relisting ‘“indicators’” of a convert’s extremism). 
52. “Counter-radicalization programs have proliferated across a wide variety of countries over 
the last five years. American domestic counter-radicalization is emerging mainly as a (modified) 
import from Europe, chiefly from the United Kingdom.” Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra 
note 8, at 148 (footnote omitted). 
53. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 
21 (outlining how the federal government will support community-based efforts to prevent violent 
extremism); Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Working Grp., supra note 21 (presenting findings 
and recommendations related to community-based prevention of violent extremism). 
54. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 126–27 (“[T]he core intuition behind 
counter-radicalization is that the prevention of future violence requires official involvement in 
shaping the ideational currents that are thought to underpin that violence.”). 
55. Id. at 145–46, 153–59; see also Working with Communities to Disrupt Terror Plots: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Intelligence, Info. Sharing & Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 
111th Cong. 53 (2010) (statement of Deborah A. Ramirez, Executive Director, Partnering for 
Prevention and Community Safety Initiative, Northeastern University School of Law) (discussing the 
need for a “systematic strategy to obtain and use community information to thwart terrorism and to 
fight extremism”). 
56. Homeland Threats and Agency Responses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 8 (2012) (statement of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of 
Homeland Security). 
828 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:809 
 
announced its plan to launch an interagency working group to counter “online 
radicalization to violence.”57 
In addition to influencing policing, a concern with radicalization has also 
started to shape the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. While prosecutions are 
beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that a growing number of 
national security prosecutions target political and religious speech.58 This targeting 
 
57. Quintan Wiktorowicz, Working to Counter Online Radicalization to Violence in the United States, 
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 5, 2013, 10:02 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/02/05/ 
working-counter-online-radicalization-violence-united-states. 
58. One version of the critique is that Muslim defendants are prosecuted with their speech. See 
Huq, The Signaling Function, supra note 12 (analyzing the legal and policy significance of state reliance 
upon religious speech as a predictor of terrorism risk); Steven R. Morrison, Terrorism Online: Is Speech 
the Same as it Ever Was?, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 963, 970 (2011) (“Speech has become a target of 
terrorism investigations.”); see also Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the 
United States, CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE 16 (2011), http://www.nlg-npap.org 
/system/files/targetedandentrapped.pdf. Granted, proving political motivation can be part of the 
prosecution’s burden to meet. But prosecutors regularly introduce inflammatory evidence with 
unclear relevance to the facts on trial. Introducing YouTube videos watched and religious literature 
consumed by defendants, for example, has become commonplace in terrorism-related trials. CTR. FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, supra, at 16; Wadie E. Said, The Terrorist Informant, 85 WASH. L. 
REV. 687, 712 (2010) [hereinafter Said, The Terrorist Informant] (discussing prosecutions where there is 
a concern that entrapment tactics were deployed); id. at 717 (“The [Siraj Matin] trial saw the admission 
of evidence of Siraj’s support for al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hamas leaders, violence against Jews, and books 
and videos endorsing and praising so-called violent jihad, which bolstered the government’s 
predisposition argument.”); id. at 722–23 (“The prosecution [against the Fort Dix Five] also 
introduced evidence showing that the defendants had repeatedly watched al-Qaeda videos and 
downloaded lectures that spoke in favor of Islamist violence, in addition to their firing weapons in the 
woods on several occasions.”). In Fahad Hashmi’s case, the government intended to introduce a 
surveillance tape of Hashmi’s political activities at trial. Laura Rovner & Jeanne Theoharis, Preferring 
Order to Justice, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1331, 1391–97 (2012). While prosecutors regularly introduce 
evidence of political speech into the proceedings, they oppose efforts by defense counsel to include 
the larger political context to which the defendant may have been speaking. See, e.g., Government’s 
Motion in Limine to Preclude Argument and Evidence Related to the United States Government’s 
Political Policies and Activities Abroad and in Domestic (Criminal) Terrorism Investigations and 
Related Matters, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-cr-10017-GAO (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2011), ECF No. 
280; Government’s Motion in Limine to Limit Defense Comment and Inquiry Regarding 
Inadmissible Subject Matter, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-cr-10017-GAO (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 
2011), ECF No. 279; see also Rovner & Theoharis, supra. For a distinct yet related concern about the 
perils of a distinct sort of “terrorism enforcement as a kind of foreign policy tool, that is, geared at 
prosecuting individuals connected to organizations targeting foreign individuals and entities” rather 
than “as a matter of direct national security,” see Wadie E. Said, The Material Support Prosecution and 
Foreign Policy, 86 IND. L.J. 543, 545 (2011). Said observes: 
Historically, the terrorism trial concerned itself with acts of violence with a United States 
nexus. In such a case, an inquiry as to underlying foreign policy was not legitimate, since 
what was being criminalized was actual violence. As the terrorism prosecution post-9/11 
has focused on conduct further removed from violent activity, the question of what 
standards allow a group to be classified as terrorist becomes more relevant. When all 
nonstate violence can be deemed terrorist, it is legitimate to require the government to 
articulate standards for groups to follow if they are to overcome their designated FTO 
status. 
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is facilitated by the material support ban, now the predominant charge in 
terrorism-related prosecutions, with an already broad scope that is further 
magnified when used, as it regularly is, in combination with a conspiracy charge.59 
Most prominent is the government’s prosecution against Tarek Mehanna.60 The 
government brought material support, conspiracy, and attempt charges against 
Mehanna, as well as charges of providing false information to the FBI.61 The 
 
Id. at 593–94; see also Laila Al-Arian, Who Stands with the Accused?, NATION, June 2–9, 2012 at 31–34; 
Noor Elashi, Echoes of Korematsu: The Holy Land Five Case, COUNTERPUNCH (Aug. 31, 2011), 
http://www.counterpunch.org/2011/08/31/the-holy-land-five-case. 
59. Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11, 2001–September 11, 2011, CTR. ON L. & SEC.  
19–21 (2011), http://www.lawandsecurity.org/portals/0/documents/ttrc%20ten%20year%20Issue 
.pdf [hereinafter Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011]; see also RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, 
JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN FEDERAL 
COURTS 11–12 (2009), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf 
/090723-LS-in-pursuit-justice-09-update.pdf (showing that the material support statutes were the 
most commonly charged substantive offenses in the authors’ data); Steven R. Morrison, Conspiracy 
Law’s Threat to Free Speech, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 866, 874, 876 (2013) (discussing two material 
support cases in conspiracy law context); Chesney, supra note 32, at 857 (discussing charges under the 
material support statute as one of several terrorism prevention strategies adopted by the DOJ); 
Steven R. Morrison, The System of Modern Criminal Conspiracy (Nov. 11, 2012), http://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1955158 (arguing that modern U.S. conspiracy law is 
systemically different from its prior iterations). The most recent Terrorist Trial Report Card found 
that the most commonly charged crimes are material support for terrorists and foreign terrorist 
organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2012), and general criminal conspiracy. 18 U.S.C. § 371 
(2012). Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra, at 13–14. From 2009–2011, the most common charges 
are the same, but also include conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons or property in a 
foreign country. Id. at 14; see also 18 U.S.C. § 956A (2012). Human Rights First’s 2009 report reached 
similar conclusions, although it also noted the aiding-and-abetting (18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)) statute was 
among the most commonly charged. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra, at 26. Both reports find the money 
laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2012), false statements, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012), and weapons charges, 
18 U.S.C. § 924 (2012), provisions to be charged next most frequently. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra, at 
28 fig.12; Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra, at 13 tbl.12. 
60. The government’s prosecution against Tarek Mehanna has been most loudly criticized as 
an attack on the First Amendment—indeed for demonstrating the “Muslim exemption” to the First 
Amendment. See, e.g., Andrew F. March, Op-Ed., A Dangerous Mind, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY REV., Apr. 
12, 2012, at 1; David Cole, 39 Ways to Limit Free Speech, N.Y. REV. BOOKS BLOG (Apr. 19, 2012, 3:15 
PM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/apr/19/39-ways-limit-free-speech; Nancy Murray, 
It’s Official. There Is a Muslim Exemption to the First Amendment, BOSTON.COM (Apr. 12, 2012, 5:00 PM), 
http://boston.com/community/blogs/on_liberty/2012/04/its_official_there_is_a_muslim.html; see also 
Ross Caputi, If Tarek Mehanna Is Guilty So Am I, COMMON DREAMS (Apr. 16, 2012), https://www 
.commondreams.org/view/2012/04/16-13; Francis Reynolds, Laila Al-Arian: Free Speech Under Attack 
for Muslim-Americans, NATION (June 25, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/video/168534/laila-al 
-arian-free-speech-under-attack-muslim-americans. On behalf of and co-counseled with the Center 
for Constitutional Rights, I submitted an amicus brief in the appeal of the judgment against Mehanna. 
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for Constitutional Rights in Support of Defendant-Appellant Tarek 
Mehanna and Reversal of the Judgment Below, Dec. 26, 2012. 
61. Second Superseding Indictment at 1, 11, 19–20, 23, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34–35, United States v. 
Mehanna, Cr. No. 09-cr-10017-GAO (D. Mass. June, 17, 2010), ECF No. 83; U.S. Attorney’s Office 
Dist. of Mass., supra note 47; U.S. Attorney’s Office Dist. of Mass., Two Men Charged with Material 
Support to Terrorists, Conspiracy to Kill in a Foreign Country, and Other Offenses, FBI (Nov. 5, 2009), 
http://www.fbi.gov/boston/press-releases/2009/bs110509.htm. 
830 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:809 
 
underlying facts centered on his translation and posting of documents online, 
including an old Arabic text, 39 Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad, downloading 
videos, engaging in online chats critical of U.S. foreign policy, and traveling to 
Yemen in 2004.62 The prosecution’s theory centralized Mehanna’s translation of 
39 Ways as a response to Osama bin Laden’s call for global Muslim jihad and 
Mehanna’s vocal opposition to U.S. foreign policy in Muslim-majority countries.63 
The prosecution framed Mehanna as a “media wing” for al-Qaeda,64 aiming to 
inspire jihad through propagation of ideology.65 The defense suggested he was 
simply a fierce critic of U.S. policies, engaging in protected speech activity.66 
Similarly, while the prosecution framed Mehanna’s trip to Yemen as a failed 
 
62. Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 61, at 6–9, 14; see also Government’s 
Sentencing Memorandum at 2–3, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-cr-10017-GAO (D. Mass. Apr. 
10, 2012), ECF No. 430; Defendant’s Memorandum on Appropriate Sentence Under the Sentencing 
Guidelines at 3–5, United States v. Mehanna, No. 1:09-cr-10017-GAO (D. Mass. Apr. 9, 2012), ECF 
No. 429; U.S. Attorney’s Office Dist. of Mass., Tarek Mehanna Sentenced to 17.5 Years on Terrorism-
Related Charges, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 12, 2012), www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/2012/April/ 
MehannaTarekSentencingPR.html (describing conviction and sentencing). 
63. See Transcript of Record at 3-32 to 3-53, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-cr-10017-
GAO (D. Mass. Oct. 27, 2011), ECF No. 386. This raises a related but distinct concern that the 
government introduces evidence of terrorist violence, or videos of Osama bin Laden, even where that 
evidence is entirely disconnected to the facts charged against the defendant, presumably to suggest a 
connection between the defendant and the portrayed terrorist violence. See, e.g., Walt Nett, Judge Rejects 
Videos in Aldawsari Case, AMARILLO GLOBE-NEWS, June 16, 2012, at A6 (showing that the judge 
excluded the Arabic version but allowed into evidence the English version of the videos that the 
defense argued were unrelated to the facts at hand); Milton J. Valencia, Jury Will See Bin Laden Video in 
Trial, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 27, 2011, at B2; Milton J. Valencia, Terror Trial Jury Shown Attack Videos, BOS. 
GLOBE, Nov. 8, 2011, at B1, B4 (the judge permitted prosecutors to show jurors “a series of violent 
videos . . . depicting suicide bombings and glorifying the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks . . . to depict 
Mehanna as an Al Qaeda supporter who translated and distributed the videos to non-Arabic speakers, 
to willfully promote Al Qaeda’s ideology”); see also Al-Arian, supra note 58, at 31–32 (stating that 
author’s father faced charges including “conspiracy to kill and maim persons abroad,” even though 
“prosecutors freely admitted that [her] father had no connection to any violence”); Elashi, supra note 
58 (describing Mehanna’s defense’s strategy for appeal, including on the grounds that the district 
court “[a]bused its discretion by allowing ‘inflammatory evidence of little or no probative value,’ 
which included multiple scenes of suicide bombings”); Murray, supra note 60 (explaining Mehanna 
was convicted of various material support to terrorism charges despite the fact that “[n]o evidence 
was presented in court directly linking him to a terrorist group”). 
64. Transcript of Record, supra note 63, at 3-49. 
65. See, e.g., id. at 3-47. The government’s oft-discredited expert, Evan Kohlmann, contributed 
to the government’s situating of Mehanna as part of the larger threat of violent extremism and radical 
Islam. See generally Transcript of Record at 26-141, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-cr-10017-GAO 
(D. Mass. Dec. 2, 2011). Indeed, Marc Sageman, another expert on terrorism issues who works 
regularly for the U.S. government, was called as a defense expert at trial to discredit Kohlmann. See 
generally Transcript of Record at 34-13, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-cr-10017-GAO (D. Mass. 
Dec. 14, 2011). For the broader criticisms of Kohlmann, see Petra Bartosiewicz, Experts in Terror, 
NATION, Feb. 4, 2008, at 18, 18–21; Wesley Yang, The Terrorist Search Engine, N.Y. MAG., Dec. 13, 
2010, at 40; Jonathon M. Seidl, Defense Trying to Stop ‘Terrorism’ Expert from Testifying at Ft. Hood Shooter 
Trial, BLAZE (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/defense-trying-to-stop-terrorism-
expert-from-testifying-at-ft-hood-shooters-trial. 
66. See Transcript of Record, supra note 63, at 3-68 to 3-74. 
2013] POLICING “RADICALIZATION” 831 
 
attempt to visit a training camp,67 Mehanna says he was going abroad for religious 
schooling.68 Mehanna was found guilty at trial and faces a seventeen-year sentence. 
The prosecution has been criticized vehemently for its attack on the First 
Amendment—indeed for demonstrating the “Muslim exemption [sic]” to the First 
Amendment.69 The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed. The 
government’s prosecution of Mehanna does not stand alone. Instead, it 
exemplifies a new trend in focusing criminal prosecutions on religious and 
political speech in order to serve a larger counter-radicalization agenda.70 
 
67. See id. at 3-29. 
68. See id. at 3-70 to 3-71 (“Yemen is known for . . . the study of Islamic law. The government 
of Yemen funds these schools. People can attend by just showing up. They’re not political at all; they 
are simply religious schools. And Tarek had talked to people that at some point in his life he would 
like to go to Yemen and study at these schools: study Arabic and study Islamic law.”). 
69. See, e.g., March, supra note 60; Cole, supra note 60; Murray, supra note 60; see also Reynolds, 
supra note 60. 
70. Consider these prosecutions: 
 The prosecution against Zachary Chesser and Jesse Morton, on material support, 
conspiracy, and Internet-use-related charges, primarily regarding communication of threats 
and solicitation of “violent jihadists,” based on posts to RevolutionMuslim.com and other 
websites where defendants posted YouTube videos and articles, including lectures by 
Anwar al-Aulaqi. At the heart of allegations was a post by both defendants regarding South 
Park’s then-upcoming episode depicting Muhammad, which the prosecution characterized 
as constitutive of threats, and the defendants later characterized as invitations for 
discussion of the issues to avoid misunderstanding. Both men pled guilty. 
For Jesse Curtis Morton, see Statement of Facts at 16–19, United States v. Morton, No. 1:12-cr-35-
LO (E.D. Va. Feb. 9, 2012), ECF No. 24 (detailing some of Morton’s conduct in relation to the case); 
Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Morton, No. 1:12-cr-35-LO (E.D. Va. Feb. 9, 2012), ECF No. 
23 (stating that Morton pled guilty to a three-count criminal information); Position of the United 
States with Respect to Sentencing Factors at 9, United States v. Morton, No. 1:12-cr-35-LO (E.D. Va. 
June 14, 2012), ECF No. 37 (arguing for prison sentence of 151 months); Criminal Information at 1, 
United States v. Morton, No. 1:12-cr-35-LO (E.D. Va. Feb. 9, 2012), ECF No. 20 (listing the 
criminal charges against Morton); Affidavit of Special Agent Paula R. Menges at 16, United States v. 
Morton, No. 1:12-cr-35-LO (E.D. Va. May, 13 2011), ECF No. 3 (concluding that Morton knowingly 
and unlawfully communicated threats); Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum and Position with 
Respect to Sentencing Factors at 12, United States v. Morton, No. 1:12-cr-35-LO (E.D. Va. June 18, 
2012), ECF No. 38 (requesting a prison sentence of forty-six to fifty-seven months followed by a 
period of supervised release); U.S. Attorney’s Office E. Dist. of Va., supra note 47; U.S. Attorney’s 
Office E. Dist. of Va., supra note 1. For Zachary Adam Chesser, for whom many documents were 
sealed, see Statement of Facts at 12–14, United States v. Chesser, No. 1:10-cr-395-LO (E.D. Va. Oct. 
20, 2010), ECF No. 32 (detailing some of Chesser’s conduct); Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. 
Chesser, No. 1:10-cr-395-LO (E.D. Va. Oct. 20, 2010), ECF No. 31 (stating that Chesser pled guilty 
to a three-count criminal information); Position of the United States with Respect to Sentencing 
Factors at 12, United States v. Chesser, No. 1:10-cr-395-LO (E.D. Va. Feb. 18, 2011), ECF No. 46 
(arguing for a prison sentence of 360 months); Defendant’s Position with Regard to Sentencing 
Factors at 31, United States v. Chesser, No. 1:10-cr-395-LO (E.D. Va. Feb. 18, 2011), ECF No. 44 
(requesting a prison sentence of 240 months); S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., ONLINE ISLAMIST 
RADICALIZATION, supra note 40, at 21 (concluding that Chesser was a harbinger of violent extremism 
online); Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Virginia Man Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to 
a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Encouraging Violent Jihadists to Kill U.S. Citizens, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Oct. 
20, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/October/10-nsd-1174.html; Dep’t of Justice Office 
of Pub. Affairs, Virginia Man Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison for Providing Material Support and Encouraging 




Violent Jihadists to Kill U.S. Citizens, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 24, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-nsd-238.html; U.S. Attorney’s Office E. Dist. of 
Va., Fairfax County Man Accused of Providing Material Support to Terrorists, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 21, 
2010), http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/news/2010/07/20100721chessernr.html. 
 The prosecution against Javed Iqbal and Saleh Elahwal, on material support, conspiracy, 
and other charges, for providing access to Al-Manar, Hezbollah’s TV station, through their 
satellite television businesses. Hezbollah is a designated foreign terrorist organization 
(FTO), and both Hezbollah and Al-Manar are designated as Specially Designated Global 
Terrorists (SDGT). Both men ultimately pled guilty to providing satellite transmission 
services to Al-Manar in exchange for money. 
See Government’s Letter in Support of Sentencing at 1, United States v. Iqbal, No. 1:06-cr-1054-RMB 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2009), ECF No. 107 (arguing for a sixty-three-month sentence); Government’s 
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Pre-Trial Motions at 1, United States v. Iqbal, 
No. 1:06-cr-1054-RMB (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2007), ECF No. 37 (arguing for denial of the defendants’ 
pre-trial motions); Indictment at 3–18, United States v. Iqbal, No. 1:06-cr-1054-RMB (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
15, 2006), ECF No. 9 ( listing eleven counts against the defendants); Joint Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Defendants’ Pre-Trial Motions at 50, United States v. Iqbal, No. 1:06-cr-1054-RMB 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2007), ECF No. 35 (arguing for dismissal of the indictment or alternative relief); 
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office S. Dist. N.Y., New Jersey Man Sentenced to 17 Months in 
Prison for Providing Material Support and Resources to Hizballah (June 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/June09/elahwalsalehsentencingpr.pdf; Press Release, 
U.S. Attorney’s Office S. Dist. N.Y., Staten Island Man Sentenced to 69 Months in Prison for 
Providing Material Support and Resources to Hizballah (Apr. 23, 2009), available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/April09/iqbaljavedsentencingpr.pdf; Press Release, U.S. 
Attorney’s Office S. Dist. N.Y., Staten Island Satellite TV Operator Pleads Guilty to Providing 
Material Support to Hizballah TV Station (Dec. 23, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ 
nys/pressreleases/December08/iqbaljavedpleapr.pdf; Man Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to 
Hizballah TV Station, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 30, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/ 
December/08-nsd-1156.html. 
 The prosecution against Jubair Ahmad, on a material support charge, for preparing a video 
containing a prayer in support of jihad and mujahideen on behalf of Lashkar-i-Taiba, an 
FTO. Ahmad pled guilty. 
See Statement of Facts at 3–4, United States v. Ahmad, No. 1:11-cr-554-TSE (E.D. Va. Dec. 2, 2011), 
ECF No. 43 (describing Ahmad’s conduct with regard to the case); Plea Agreement at 1, United 
States v. Ahmad No. 1:11-cr-554-TSE (E.D. Va. Dec. 2, 2011), ECF No. 42 (pleading guilty to the 
charge); Position of the United States with Regard to Sentencing at 2, United States v. Ahmad, No. 
1:11-cr-554-TSE (E.D. Va. Apr. 3, 2012), ECF No. 45 (requesting that the court apply the statutory 
maximum of 180 months); Criminal Information, United States v. Ahmad, No. 1:11-cr-554-TSE 
(E.D. Va. Dec. 2, 2011), ECF No. 39 (charging Ahmad with unlawfully, knowingly, and willfully 
providing material support to Lashkar-i-Taiba); Defendant’s Position with Regard to Sentencing 
Factors at 1, United States v. Ahmad, No. 1:11-cr-554-TSE (E.D. Va. Apr. 7, 2012), ECF No. 49 
(requesting that the court impose a sentence of twenty-four months). 
 Because the defendants pled guilty in each of these cases, the underlying facts are difficult to 
discern. Chesser and Morton have published open letters contesting the version of facts to which they 
pled. See, e.g., Zachary Chesser, Victims of the American Inquisition, ASEERUN (Feb. 17, 2012), http:// 
aseerun.org/2012/02/20/victims-of-the-american-inquisition (stating Chesser’s account of the events 
leading up to his incarceration); Younus Abdullah Muhammad (Jesse Morton), Seeking Clarification: A 
Reaction to My Arrest for South Park Opposition, ISLAMPOLICY (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.islampolicy 
.com/2012_01_08_archive.html (presenting Morton’s version of his statements regarding the creators 
of South Park). Even on the government’s version of the facts, each of these cases, and the potential 
pattern they represent of targeting speech, are worthy of close examination and further scrutiny. 
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II. RADICALIZATION DEFINED AND DECONSTRUCTED 
Now, let me talk a little bit about the threat and issues related to radicalization. We 
take the threat very seriously, obviously. 
  —Richard Falkenrath, Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism, 
New York City Police Department71 
 
Despite the impetus to find a terrorist profile or hallmarks of radicalization to hone in  
on incipient terrorists, empirical research has emphatically and repeatedly concluded 
that there is no such profile and no such easily identifiable hallmarks. 
  —Brennan Center for Justice Report72 
The NYPD Intelligence Division’s 2007 report Radicalization in the West: The 
Homegrown Threat is the most exhaustive account produced by a law enforcement 
entity in the United States.73 Government agencies regularly cite the report, 
bolstering its authority.74 Understanding radicalization discourse, its ambitions and 
limitations, requires a critical examination of the report. This Part charts the 
Intelligence Division’s argument and engages with the limitations of its study. 
Prepared by NYPD Senior Intelligence Analysts Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin 
Bhatt, the NYPD report theorizes the process of going from Muslim to terrorist. 
While Silber and Bhatt suggest there is no fixed trajectory for radicalization, they 
extrapolate just that, suggesting a predictability that allows for sound direction for 
terrorism policing.75 
 
71. Falkenrath, supra note 31. 
72. Patel, supra note 12, at 8. 
73. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18. See Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 
43–56, for more on the state and federal government literature, as well as information on the British 
counterpart; see also Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 145–61 (discussing the 
background of U.S. domestic counter-radicalization and its various manifestations). There is also a 
larger academic literature on “radicalization,” much of which collapses Muslim identity manifestations 
(individual and collective) with potential for terrorism. See Kundnani, supra note 12 (examining 
critically the academic literature). 
74. See, e.g., S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., A TICKING TIME BOMB, supra note 25, at 17 n.6 
(noting the Senate report’s “framework is adapted from a publicly available description of the 
radicalization process by the [NYPD] Intelligence Division,” and then citing to the NYPD 
radicalization report); S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM, supra note 
40, at 4–5 (referring to and summarizing the NYPD model of “radicalization” in framing the role of 
the Internet in generating “violent Islamist extremism”). In the wake of the Associated Press (AP) 
reports on the NYPD Intelligence Division’s program of blanket surveillance of Muslim 
communities, the federal government, and the FBI in particular, distanced itself from the NYPD. 
Jason Grant, FBI Leader: Muslims’ Trust Is Broken He Breaks Silence on Spying Backlash, STAR-LEDGER, 
Mar. 7, 2012, available at http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/03/recent_nypd_spying_uproar 
_shak.html; Samantha Henry, NJ FBI: NYPD Monitoring Damaged Public Trust, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Mar. 7, 2012, http://www.ap.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2012/nj-fbi-nypd-monitoring-damaged-
public-trust; Pete Yost, Holder Disturbed by Reports on NYPD Muslim Spying, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 
8, 2012, http://www.ap.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2012/holder-disturbed-by-reports-on-nypd 
-muslim-spying. 
75. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 8, 84 (stating that while “[t]here is no useful profile to 
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Silber and Bhatt begin concerned with Muslims and Islam.76 They interpose 
as the target of terrorism prevention a process they call “radicalization.” Silber and 
Bhatt express a need to intervene at an “earlier point” where “the potential 
terrorist or group of terrorists begin and progress through a process of 
radicalization,” culminating in “a terrorist attack.”77 To that end, they delineate a 
four-stage radicalization process: “pre-radicalization,” “self-identification,” 
“indoctrination,” and “jihadization,” each associated with “specific signatures.”78 
The first stage, “pre-radicalization,” is concerned with “[f]ifteen to thirty-five 
year-old male Muslims who live in male-dominated societies”79 and “enclaves of 
ethnic, Muslim communities—communities that are dominated by Middle 
Eastern, North African, and South Asian cultures.”80 Rather than articulate 
anything nearing a description of a discrete stage in a multi-step process, the 
report defines preradicalization’s circumference as spatial and cultural, gendered, 
classed, and aged. The immigrant Muslim neighborhood becomes a site of 
suspicion. Silber and Bhatt hypothesize that “[m]iddle class families and students” 
are of greatest concern, including “the bored and/or frustrated, successful college 
students, the unemployed, the second and third generation, new immigrants, petty 
criminals, and prison parolees.”81 
 
assist law enforcement or intelligence,” there is “remarkable consistency in the behaviors and 
trajectory of each of the plots across all the stages”). 
76. Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 59 (noting that the NYPD by its 
“decision to couple Islam and terror . . . and by the sampling methodology” treats “the ‘Muslim’ a 
priori as a source of risk and harm”). 
77. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 5. 
78. Id. at 21. 
79. Id. at 24. The report reasons: “These individuals are at an age where they often are seeking 
to identify who they really are while trying to find the ‘meaning of life’. [sic] This age group is usually 
very action-oriented.” Id. The emphasis on male-dominated societies is worth noting, especially given 
the popular narrative that situates Muslim cultures as threatening due, in part, to their dogged 
commitment to backward values. See Amna Akbar & Rupal Oza, “Muslim Fundamentalism” and Human 
Rights in an Age of Terror and Empire, in GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: 
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES (Margaret Satterthwaite & Jayne C. Huckerby eds., 2013) (discussing 
the prevalence of these narratives among conservatives and liberals, including certain feminist human 
rights activists). 
80. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 24. Silber and Bhatt argue that these communities 
“often serve as ‘ideological sanctuaries’ for the seeds of radical thought.” Id. at 24. “Pre-radicalization 
is the point of origin for individuals before they begin this progression. . . . The majority of the 
individuals involved in these plots began as ‘unremarkable’ - they had ‘ordinary’ jobs, had lived 
‘ordinary’ lives and had little, if any criminal history.” Id. at 6. The focus on immigrant communities is 
puzzling when one considers the significant proportion of African Americans within American 
Muslim communities. See, e.g., Allison Keyes, A History of Black Muslims in America, NPR (Aug. 23, 
2005), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4811402; U.S. Religious Landscape 
Survey, PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE 40 (Feb. 2008), http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/ 
report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf; Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in Alienation or Support for 
Extremism, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 8–9 (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy 
-pdf/Muslim%20American%20Report%2010-02-12%20fix.pdf. 
81. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 24. At the same time, they note that “[ l ]ittle, if any, 
criminal history” binds the men in the cases they examined for the report. Id. at 25. 
2013] POLICING “RADICALIZATION” 835 
 
The second stage, “self-identification,” involves gravitation toward “Salafi 
Islam” and a “Salafi mosque.”82 (In the United States, Salafism tends to be 
understood as a homogeneous “fundamentalist” strain of Islam—indeed the 
primary strain of concern. To the contrary, Salafism is a mode of interpretation 
with various geographical and historical iterations.)83 The associated factors are 
widespread expressions of Muslim identity or religiosity: “pilgrimage to Mecca,” 
“[g]rowing a beard,” and “pa[ying] off the mortgage on [one’s] house because 
Islam forbids paying interest on loans.”84 Here, Muslim religious practice—core 
First Amendment activity, unconnected to any suspicion of criminal activity—
becomes a predictor for criminality. 
Equally troubling, Silber and Bhatt situate dissent with mainstream American 
political discourse, and identification with other Muslims, as integral to 
radicalization. “[A]lienation, discrimination, racism[—]real or perceived”—and 
“exposure” to “international conflicts involving Muslims,” trigger this stage.85 
“Becoming involved in social activism and community issues” is a signature 
factor.86 
In the third phase, “indoctrination,” “an individual progressively intensifies 
his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi87 ideology and concludes, without question, 
that the conditions and circumstances exist where [militant jihad] is required to 
support and further the cause.”88 This stage is marked by “[w]ithdrawal from the 
[m]osque,” “[p]oliticization of [n]ew [b]eliefs,” “[h]olding meetings and 
discussions with an increasing radical agenda in more private settings,” and 
“watching jihadi videos . . . that highlight[] atrocities committed against 
 
82. Id. at 6, 32–33. 
83. See, e.g., PRINCETON READINGS IN ISLAMIST THOUGHT: TEXTS AND CONTEXTS FROM 
AL-BANNA TO BIN LADEN 3–5, 19–23 (Roxanne L. Euben & Muhammed Qasim Zaman eds., 2009); 
Henri Lauzière, The Construction of Salafiyya: Reconsidering Salafism from the Perspective of Conceptual History, 
42 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 369 (2010); see also Akbar & Oza, supra note 79, at 162 (“[T]erms such 
as . . . ‘salafi’ seem to stand in for an entire set of arguments and political positions as if they are 
obvious markers—without need of verification—of bad, threatening, Muslims.”); Diala Shamas & 
Nermeen Arastu, MUSLIM AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES COAL. ET AL., Mapping Muslims: NYPD Spying and Its 
Impact on American Muslims, CUNY SCH. L. 16 (2013), http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics/ 
immigration/clear/Mapping-Muslims.pdf (describing Salafism and the difference between Salafism 
and radicalization). 
84. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 61. 
85. Id. at 32. 
86. Id. at 33. 
87. This hyphenated term, in itself, it seems, a product of the “War on Terror,” collapses two 
terms—jihad and Salafi—regularly misused in the United States. See Akbar & Oza, supra note 79, at 
162. 
88. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 7; see also id. at 38 (“The key aspect of this stage is the 
acceptance of a religious-political worldview that justifies, legitimizes, encourages, or supports 
violence against anything kufr or un-Islamic, including the West, its citizens, its allies, or other 
Muslims whose opinions are contrary to the extremist agenda.”). 
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Muslims.”89 Similar to the second stage, possessing particular religious and 
political ideologies is posited to hasten the radicalization process. 
The first three stages of radicalization are focused on where Muslims live and 
congregate, manifestations of religious and political beliefs, and social or religious 
activities.90 In the final stage, “jihadization,” the process finally culminates in an 
intent to commit a criminal act.91 Jihadization includes a number of substages, one 
of which is “[a]ttack [p]lanning.”92 “‘Outward Bound’-like [a]ctivities,” such as 
“camping, white-water rafting, paintball games, target shooting,” are construed as 
training activities.93 “[T]ravel[] abroad” (in particular, to Pakistan, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Somalia)94 is in itself troubling, the report asserts, as 
travel might involve attendance at a training camp or at a “religious retreat steeped 
with extremist thought.”95 The report also discusses “[m]ental [r]einforcement 
[a]ctivities” as indicators, including visiting “[e]xtremist websites, chatrooms, and 
blogs” and watching “[j]ihadist videos and tapes.”96 
At the report’s core are troubling conclusions: that Muslim religiosity and 
politicization predictably correlate with terrorism; and that Muslim collective 
spaces—where Muslim political and religious cultures would emerge—are sites for 
radicalization. Silber and Bhatt frame a concern with “radicalization” as a reason 
to target the religious and political cultures of Muslim communities. The first stage 
focuses on young men situated in Muslim communities or institutions, 
 
89. Id. at 38–39, 63. 
90. Interestingly, Silber and Bhatt define the criminal act with a very particular intent: “[T]he 
ultimate objective for any attack is always the same—to punish the West, overthrow the democratic 
order, reestablish the Caliphate, and institute sharia.” Id. at 45. 
91. Id. at 7, 45. 
92. Id. at 47. This substage includes “[d]rawing maps, videotaping targets, and staking out 
target areas,” as well as “[a]cquiring [m]ateriel/[d]eveloping the [d]evice” most “commercially 
available or reasonably obtainable” like “[f]ertilizer-based devices, commercial explosives, cell phones 
and explosive ignition devices.” Id. These activities are occasionally “associated with low-end criminal 
activity and almost always suspicious activity such as: cooking chemicals . . . [and] purchasing large 
amounts of any one chemical or material.” Id. 
93. Id. at 46; see also Chris Hawley, NYPD Monitored Muslim Students All over the Northeast, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.ap.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2012/nypd-
monitored-muslim-students-all-over-northeast (reporting that the NYPD sent an undercover officer 
on a whitewater rafting trip with eighteen Muslim students). 
94. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 45. The FBI Intelligence Assessment also frames travel 
as an important part of “radicalization.” FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., supra note 34, at 8 
(“Overseas travel can be a significant experience that appears to accelerate the radicalization process. 
Although radicalization can occur without overseas travel, it appears to provide the networking and 
experience necessary to participate in operational activity. The experience may vary from religious or 
language instruction to basic paramilitary training.”). As Darryl Li and Ramzi Kassem have powerfully 
shown, the reasons for this travel could be multifold. Ramzi Kassem, From Altruists to Outlaws: The 
Criminalization of Traveling Islamic Volunteers, 10 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 85, 85–87 (2011); 
Darryl Li, A Universal Enemy?: “Foreign Fighters” and Legal Regimes of Exclusion and Exemption Under the 
“Global War on Terror”, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 355, 369–73 (2010). 
95. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 45–46. 
96. Id. at 47. 
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encompassing a reason to scrutinize where these men socialize and with whom 
these men associate. The later stages focus on increasingly religious and politicized 
Muslims who identify with a global concept of Muslim community and who resist 
American cultural norms and foreign policy. According to Silber and Bhatt, while 
expressing Muslim identity or hanging out in Muslim spots does not guarantee 
radicalization, it will always point towards the dangerous possibility: 
It is useful to think of the radicalization process in terms of a funnel. 
Entering the process does not mean one will progress through all four 
stages and become a terrorist. However, it also does not mean that if one 
doesn’t become a terrorist, he or she is no longer a threat. Individuals 
who have been radicalized but are not jihadists may serve as mentors and 
agents of influence to those who might become the terrorists of 
tomorrow.97 
The report also identifies various Muslim gathering places as radicalization or 
extremism “incubators” that facilitate radicalization.98 As such, they invite law 
enforcement surveillance of Muslim religious and political cultures and 
geographies. 
The flaws in Silber and Bhatt’s methodology make clear the inherent 
unreliability of the radicalization theory. A certain impulse towards racial and 
religious typecasting may seem obvious on the surface of their theory. After all, 
they start by singling out Muslims and Islam for posing the threat of radicalization, 
and by isolating Muslim religious and political cultures as fundamental to the 
problem. But even if one agrees with the parameters of their study, their case 
studies are woefully inadequate to justify an aggressive policing regime. The report 
relies on an incredibly small number of case studies—eleven cases total, with five 
American cases as the focus99—for the ambitious conclusions it draws. 
The case studies are mismatched to the report’s ambitious conclusions. Silber 
and Bhatt draw out a whole assortment of details from the lives of men in their 
case studies, pointing to them as indicative of a process of radicalization. The 
report places causal value on whichever details it chooses to recognize in the case 
studies—details that may be altogether disconnected from the crime with which 
the men were ultimately charged. For example, because the U.S. examples it 
identifies all involved second-generation immigrants the report identifies 
 
97. Id. at 10. Similarly, the FBI Intelligence Assessment finds: “The evidence suggests that the 
radicalization of an individual is a fluid process that does not have a time table and does not always 
lead to action. US converts, under the right circumstances, may enter, exit, or even re-enter the 
radicalization process at any stage.” FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., supra note 34, at 4. 
98. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 18, 22, 68, 70–72 (listing “radicalization incubators,” 
which include “cafes, cab driver hangouts, flophouses, prisons, student associations, non-
governmental organizations, hookah (water pipe) bars, butcher shops and book stores”). 
99. See id. at 5, 87. In the language of the NYPD, the report reviewed “nearly one dozen 
terrorist-related case studies”: five from within the United States and six from abroad. Id. at 7, 17. 
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immigrant communities as the relevant ground for “pre-radicalization.”100 Or, the 
report discusses a man Mike, who asked his friends to start calling him Maher, 
suggesting that the name change is indicative of “radicalization.”101 Similarly, the 
report discusses men who spent time in an Islamic bookstore or with Muslim 
student associations on college campuses, and constructs those venues as 
radicalization “[i]incubators.”102 The list goes on and on. The report suggests that 
convergence in particular details between the small number of case studies should 
be sufficient to invest the details with predictive authority. But apart from pointing 
to occasional convergence, Silber and Bhatt offer no reason to find a causal nexus 
between the details they identify as radicalization markers and the crimes with 
which these men were charged. 
Moreover, the report purports to model behavior for terrorism based on a 
number of cases where the defendants were not even charged with committing a 
violent terrorist act.103 The five American cases are particularly noteworthy. None 
involved the commission of any violent crime. Four out of five seemed to have 
never involved any intent to commit violent crime.104 For example, the 
government charged Fahad Hashmi for allowing Junaid Babar to store socks, 
ponchos, and raincoats in his apartment; Babar then allegedly transferred those 
materials to al-Qaeda.105 Three of the cases deal with trips abroad, allegedly to 
 
100. Id. at 59–60. 
101. Id. at 61. The AP’s reporting revealed the NYPD was in fact scrutinizing Muslims in 
New York who changed their names: 
The New York Police Department monitors everyone in the city who changes his or her 
name, according to interviews and internal police documents obtained by The Associated 
Press. For those whose names sound Arabic or might be from Muslim countries, police 
run comprehensive background checks that include reviewing travel records, criminal 
histories, business licenses and immigration documents. 
Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, NYPD Keeps Files on Muslims Who Change Their Names, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Oct. 26, 2011), http://ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2011/NYPD-keeps-files-on 
-Muslims-who-change-their-names (discussing an investigation that revealed how NYPD monitored 
name changes on the basis that “would-be terrorists could use their new names to lie low in New 
York”). 
102. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 70, 72–73. 
103. See Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 57 (“The NYPD report mixes 
studies of completed terrorism conspiracies with incidents in which an attack was apparently 
forestalled; it discusses both realized and potential threats.”). 
104. Silber and Bhatt are somewhat self-conscious about their reliance on cases that did not 
culminate in an act of violence. In discussing the three travel cases, they offer: “The lack of rich 
details on these U.S. cases, coupled with the fact that they were disrupted at a relatively early stage, 
obscured the fact that radicalization had occurred. Nevertheless, the three U.S. cases still provided 
sufficient evidence to corroborate parts of each of the four stages . . . .” SILBER & BHATT, supra note 
18, at 58. 
105. See Rovner & Theoharis, supra note 58, at 1347–53; see also Indictment, United States v. 
Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr-442-LAP (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2006), ECF No. 1 ( listing four counts against 
Hashmi); Defendant’s Response to Government’s Motion to Admit Certain Evidence at Trial at 1–2, 
United States v. Hashmi, 1:06-cr-442-LAP (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2009), ECF No. 123 (referring to 
evidence that Hashmi permitted Babar to store goods in his apartment). A number of questions have 
been raised about the government’s prosecution against Hashmi, including the possibility that Babar 
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fight or train with terrorists: (1) the case against the “Lackawanna Seven” for a 
May 2001 trip to Afghanistan, where the men did not like the anti-American 
sentiment they encountered at the camp and quickly returned to the United 
States;106 (2) the case against the “Portland Seven,” where the men were turned 
away at the border of Afghanistan as they allegedly tried to enter to fight alongside 
the Taliban;107 and (3) the “Virginia Paintball Case,” where some of “the men are 
alleged to have attended a training camp run by Lashkar-i-Taiba, a militant group 
committed to driving India from Kashmir” and to have urged others “to fight 
with the Taliban in Afghanistan—before the United States attacked Afghanistan.”108 
 
was working with the government as an informant all along. Rovner & Theoharis, supra note 58, at 
1352–53, 1403 n.371 (citing the court’s statement that Babar would be sentenced to time served for 
his “‘exceptional’” service as he “‘began cooperating even before his arrest’”). 
106. See Criminal Complaint at 6–11, United States v. Goba, No. 1:02-m-107 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 
13, 2002), ECF No. 1; COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 117–18 (explaining that even though the FBI 
found no evidence that the men were involved in criminal activity, out of fear of being tried as enemy 
combatants, the men pled guilty to single counts of material support and received seven to ten year 
jail sentences); Matthew Purdy & Lowell Bergman, Where the Trail Led: Between Evidence and Suspicion; 
Unclear Danger: Inside the Lackawanna Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, at N1; see also Roya Aziz & 
Monica Lam, Profiles: The Lackawanna Cell, FRONTLINE (Oct. 16, 2003), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/inside/profiles.html (providing profiles of each of the “Lackawanna 
Seven”); How Dangerous Was the Lackawanna Cell?, FRONTLINE (Oct. 16, 2003), http://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/inside/howdangerous.html (interviewing various experts 
regarding the dangerousness of the “Lackawanna Seven”); Interview Sahim Alwan, FRONTLINE (Oct. 
16, 2003), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/interviews/alwan.html (inter-
viewing one of the “Lackawanna Seven”). 
107. Indictment at 8–11, United States v. Battle, No. 02-cr-399-JO (D. Or. Oct. 3, 2002), 
ECF No. 1. On October 3, 2002, the men were indicted for unsuccessfully trying to join a terrorist 
organization. Al Saoub never returned and was killed in Afghanistan in October 2003. Id. The rest of 
the men pled guilty and received sentences of various lengths, from three years in a work camp to 
eight years. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 119 (“The Portland reference presumably refers to six 
men who pleaded guilty to attempting to travel to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban. They 
never made it there. While the citizens among them could certainly have been tried for attempted 
treason, there was no allegation that any were involved in terrorism.”); Hal Bernton, 2 More Defendants 
in Portland’s Terrorism Case Enter Guilty Pleas, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 17, 2003, at B1; Two Defendants in 
‘Portland Cell’ Case Plead Guilty to Conspiracy to Contribute Services to the Taliban, Federal Weapons Charges, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 18, 2003), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_crm_513 
.htm. 
108. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 118; see also Indictment at 7–10, United States v. Royer, 
No. 1:03-cr-296-LMB (E.D. Va. June 25, 2003), ECF No. 1 (describing the group’s involvement with 
Lashkar-i-Taiba). The case,  
which netted the government eleven ‘terrorism’ convictions, involved a group of men in 
Virginia accused of playing paintball games, owning hunting rifles, and planning to fight 
for Muslim causes in Kashmir. . . . As with the Lackawanna defendants, none of the men 
was ever charged with planning to undertake terrorist activity of any kind, here or abroad. 
COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 118; see also Huq, The Signaling Function, supra note 12, at 845–46 
(looking at the prosecution against Ali al-Timimi, one of the defendants in the Virginia case, as an 
example of how “religious speech or dogma can be a basis for solicitation or aiding-and-abetting 
charges” in the terrorism context and “suggest[ing] that such prosecutions can rely on ambiguous 
religious statements that require interpretation”); Jerry Markon, ‘Va. Jihad’ Case Hailed as Key in War on 
Terror, WASH. POST, June 8, 2006, at A3 (articulating the view of those who saw the case as 
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At least one case features a plot with a heavy-handed government 
informant.109 The fifth of the five American cases, against Shahawar Siraj Matin, 
involved what one might consider a traditional terrorist plot: to blow up the 
Herald Square subway station in New York City. It emerged at trial, however, that 
an NYPD informant worked on Matin for months to encourage anger in Matin 
toward American foreign policy against Muslims. The informant repeatedly poked 
and prodded Matin that it was his duty to take violent action against the United 
States, and suggested the method and means to obtain the necessary materials to 
commit such violent action.110 The case has been widely criticized for the 
techniques employed by the government in obtaining the indictment and 
conviction, though when the defense raised the entrapment defense at trial, it 
failed, as it almost always does.111 
So, the NYPD actively participated in—molded even—what it purports to 
study. To say the least, creating a model for terrorist radicalization based on 
government-facilitated plots seems of limited value for its predictive power. It 
creates a dangerous “feedback loop: the police influence the content and direction 
of prosecutions and then rely on those prosecutions as evidence of the underlying 
crime problem.”112 That evidence, in turn, further constitutes the need for the 
aggressive police powers. 
Somewhat ironically, the NYPD does not discuss the few violent plots 
prosecuted after 9/11 that did not involve coercive government interference.113 
Those plots are few in number—and do not in themselves justify the expansive 
 
“target[ ing] Muslim men who had done nothing more than innocuously play paintball in the woods 
and who never intended attacks inside the United States”). 
109. See Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 58. 
110. See, e.g., United States v. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d 408, 414–16 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 533 
F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2008); AMITAVA KUMAR, A FOREIGNER CARRYING IN THE CROOK OF HIS ARM A 
TINY BOMB 124 (2010); Said, The Terrorist Informant, supra note 58, at 715–32 (discussing Matin and 
other cases); Robin Shulman, The Informer: Behind the Scenes, or Setting the Stage?, WASH. POST, May 29, 
2007, at C1; Targeted and Entrapped, supra note 58, at 33–37; Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra note 
59, at 26; see also Bartosiewicz, To Catch a Terrorist, supra note 5, at 41 (discussing the “more active role” 
informants are given); Entrapment or Foiling Terror? FBI’s Reliance on Paid Informants Raises Questions About 
Validity of Terrorism Cases, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.democracynow.org 
/2010/10/6/entrapment_or_foiling_terror_fbis_reliance [hereinafter Entrapment or Foiling Terror? ] 
(investigating three cases). 
111. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 414–17, 420–23; see also Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, 
supra note 12, at 58 ( listing coercion, entrapment, and other incentives in cases involving the use of 
informants). 
112. Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 58 (“In relying on cases involving 
informants—including one in New York City—the NYPD report thus relies on facts created by the 
police themselves.”). 
113. Trevor Aaronson, The Informants, MOTHER JONES, Sept.–Oct. 2011, at 32, 32–33 (“With 
three exceptions, all of the high-profile domestic terror plots of the last decade were actually FBI 
stings. (The exceptions are Najibullah Zazi, who came close to bombing the New York City subway 
system in September 2009; Hesham Mohamed Hadayet, an Egyptian who opened fire on the El-Al 
ticket counter at the Los Angeles airport; and failed Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad.)”). 
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radicalization paradigm. In fact, it is unclear whether there exists an American set 
of data on which such a theory for modeling radicalization to actual violence could 
even be extrapolated.114 The vast majority of the 500 to 600 terrorism-related 
prosecutions are precisely that, terrorism-related, often with an unclear nexus to 
any violence or intention to commit violent acts.115 Far from typically including 
violence, the criminal prohibition on material support,116 now charged in the vast 
 
114. Writing in 2007, Cole and Lobel critically analyzed the Bush administration’s record of 
terrorism prosecutions in the federal courts. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 115 (“Virtually all of the 
convictions on terrorism charges the Justice Department has obtained since 9/11 involve no acts of 
terrorism per se, nor conspiracy to engage in terrorist acts, nor even the aiding and abetting of 
terrorist crimes, but only material support to a group the government has labeled terrorist. . . . 
Because [material support laws] are so sweeping, a conviction under these laws does not mean that a 
terrorist has been convicted, or that any terrorism has been prevented.”); see also Eric Umansky, 
Department of Pre-Crime, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/ 
2008/02/department-pre-crime (dubbing the material support laws “a prosecutor’s dream,” as they 
“don’t require evidence of a plot or even of a desire to help terrorists,” providing “the government a 
shot at convictions traditional criminal laws could never provide”). Cole and Lobel further 
deconstructed the Bush administration’s claims about the five “terror cells” it claimed to have 
disrupted. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 116–17 (“[The men] were charged under the material-
support laws, which make it possible to convict individuals without showing that they have actually 
undertaken, planned, supported, or even thought about furthering terrorist activity. None of the 
putative cell members was charged with, much less convicted of, attempting or conspiring to engage 
in any actual terrorist conduct. Indeed, there was little or no reason to believe that any of them were 
actual terrorists waiting to strike.”); see also id. at 111–14, 121–22 (discussing inadequacies in the 
government’s cases against Sami Al-Arian, Sami al-Hussayen, James Yee, Brandon Mayfield, 
Muhammad Salah, and Abedelhaleem Ashqar; José Padilla and Yaser Hamdi; and counting as 
potential successes for the preventative paradigm the prosecutions against Iyman Faris and Ahmed 
Abu Ali). For a different view of Abu Ali, drawing from his interrogation under torture, see Wadie E. 
Said, The Message and Means of the Modern Terrorism Prosecution, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
175, 183–87 (2012). Cole and Lobel further note Richard Reid as the only person actually attempting 
to carry out a terrorist act and Zacarias Moussaoui as one of only four convicted for conspiracy to 
engage in terrorist conduct, but say neither can be attributed as a success to the preventative 
paradigm. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 120 (describing that a flight attendant noticed Reid in the 
act, and Moussaoui was arrested prior to the institutionalization of the preventative paradigm). 
115. Whereas the Mother Jones fall 2011 study identified 508 post-9/11 terrorism defendants, 
Aaronson, supra note 113, at 36–37, the Center for Law and Security’s fall 2011 study identified 578. 
Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra note 59, at 7. 
116. Two provisions in the criminal code penalize material support to foreign terrorist 
organizations (FTOs), so designated by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of 
Treasury and Attorney General: section 2339A and section 2339B. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2012). 
The designation must be based on a finding that the entity engages in “terrorist activity” or 
“terrorism,” and thereby “threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of 
the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(C) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1189(d)(4) (2012). So-designated FTOs 
may seek review of the designation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit within thirty days of designation. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(1) (2012). Whereas section 2339A 
criminalizes providing material support knowing that such support would be used in support of 
terrorism, section 2339B dispenses with the specific intent requirement. Section 2339B makes it a 
federal crime to “knowingly provide[ ] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist 
organization . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). For definitions of “terrorist activity” and “terrorism,” see 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2012) and 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012), respectively. The mental state 
required to violate section 2339B is knowledge of either the group’s designation as a terrorist 
organization or the group’s commission of terrorist acts, not specific intent to further terrorism. 18 
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majority of terrorism-related cases,117 has been subject to serious critique precisely 
for its breadth,118 the pressure it puts on the First Amendment,119 and the 
discretion it gives prosecutors.120 Typically, material support charges do not 
 
U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1); CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33035, MATERIAL SUPPORT OF 
TERRORISTS AND FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: SUNSET AMENDMENTS 6 (2005). 
 Congress created the crime of material support in 1996 as part of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)’s Title III—International Terrorism Prohibitions. H.R. REP. 
NO. 104-518, at 35 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). Post-9/11, Congress expanded the definition of “material 
support or resources” to cover “expert advice or assistance,” Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 805, 115 Stat. 272, 377 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A); and “service,” 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub L. No. 108-458, § 6603, 118 Stat. 
3638, 3762–64 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); H.R. REP. NO. 108-796, at 
128 (2004) (Conf. Rep.). Congress also clarified that the mental state required to violate section 2339B 
was knowledge of either the group’s designation as a terrorist organization or the group’s commission 
of terrorist acts, not specific intent to further terrorism, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1); defined “training” as 
“instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge,” 18 
U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2); defined “expert advice or assistance” as “advice or assistance derived from 
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge,” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(b)(3). A Review of the Tools to 
Fight Terrorism Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. & Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 6 (2004) (joint statement of Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Att’y Gen., Department 
of Justice and Barry Sabin, Chief, Counterterrorism Section, Criminal Division, Department of 
Justice); H.R. REP. NO. 108-796, at 128; DOYLE, supra, at 4, 6. Congress further clarified that 
“personnel” meant a person who had 
knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to provide a foreign terrorist 
organization with 1 or more individuals (who may be or include himself) to work under 
that terrorist organization’s direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or 
otherwise direct the operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely 
independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall 
not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization’s direction and 
control. 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § 6603; H.R. REP. NO. 108-796, at 129; 
DOYLE, supra, at 5. 
117. Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra note 59, at 19 (“Since 2007, material support has 
gone from being charged in 11.6% of cases to 69.4% in 2010. In 2011 so far, 87.5% of cases involve a 
material support charge.”). The majority of charges involve material support to terrorism, general 
criminal conspiracy, false statements, money laundering, and immigration and identity fraud. Id. at 
13–14, 19–21; ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 59; Chesney, supra note 32, at 856, 860. 
118. Aiding Terrorists: An Examination of the Material Support Statute: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 25 (2004) [hereinafter Aiding Terrorists] (statement of David Cole, Professor 
of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) (testifying that “the statute is vague and over-broad”). 
The statutory scheme defines material support or resources to include provision of  
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments 
or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, 
safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, 
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or 
include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials. 
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4) (providing the same definition). 
119. Aiding Terrorists, supra note 118, at 24–26; David Cole, The First Amendment’s Borders: The 
Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARVARD L. & POL’Y REV. 
147 (2012); Morrison, Conspiracy Law’s Threat to Free Speech, supra note 59; Rovner & Theoharis, supra 
note 58, at 1348–57; Wadie E. Said, Humanitarian Law Project and the Supreme Court’s Construction of 
Terrorism, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1455, 1498–1508. 
120. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 115 (“Because [material support laws] are so sweeping, a 
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actually include any act of violence. Moreover, a growing number of high-profile 
prosecutions that feature a violent terrorist plot—the majority it seems—rely on 
government informants that encourage, design, or facilitate the plots.121 That the 
government-facilitated violent plots far outnumber any nongovernment-facilitated 
violent plots should give rise to skepticism about the nature of the underlying 
threat. 
The problem, of course, is that despite a claim to the contrary, Silber and 
Bhatt’s NYPD report is not a neutral study confined to the Ivory Tower.122 A 
series of Pulitzer Prize–winning investigative reports by the Associated Press (AP) 
 
conviction under these laws does not mean that a terrorist has been convicted, or that any terrorism 
has been prevented.”); Umansky, supra note 114. The Supreme Court rejected First and Fifth 
Amendment challenges to the scheme in a pre-enforcement challenge on facts fairly dissimilar from 
the typical context in which the statute is used. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 
2722, 2730 (2010). On the grounds of particular importance here, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment concerns primarily on the grounds that the statute did not criminalize “independent 
advocacy,” as opposed to work done under the direction of a foreign terrorist organization. Id. at 
2709–11. The Court found the independent advocacy distinction relevant for its Fifth Amendment 
analysis as well. The Court went to pains to explain that “personnel” and “service” did not include 
“independent advocacy.” Id. at 2720–21. The Court further reasoned that the material statute did not 
prevent plaintiffs from speaking on any topic and advocacy, so long as they did not do so at the 
direction of, or in coordination with, a foreign terrorist organization. The dissent argued that the 
majority’s distinction between directed and independent advocacy was unfounded in First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 2733–37 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Court also rejected plaintiffs’ 
Fifth Amendment void-for-vagueness challenge on the grounds that plaintiffs’ activities fell clearly 
within the terms “training” and “expert advice or assistance.” Id. at 2720. 
121. See, e.g., Aaronson, supra note 113, at 32 (describing how, in one year, FBI sting 
operations resulted in prosecutions against 158 defendants, of which forty-nine had participated in 
plots led by an FBI operative instigating terrorist action); see also Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra 
note 59, at 26 (“Since 2009, the federal government has expanded its use of aggressive and often 
controversial investigations, whereby a confidential informant or undercover officer makes contact 
with a potential terror suspect and assists him in the planning of an attempted terror crime.”). 
122. The NYPD report stirred some controversy, drawing criticism that it would engender 
racial and religious profiling. Memorandum from Aziz Huq, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Concerns with 
Mitchell D. Silber & Arvin Bhatt, N.Y. Police Dep’t, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown 
Threat 1 (Aug. 30, 2007), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/436ea44aae969ab3c5_sbm6vtxgi.pdf 
(“The Report applies a highly questionable methodology to draw conclusions unwarranted by its 
insufficient data set, conclusions that will likely result in racial and religious profiling deleterious both 
to civil liberties and to genuine efforts at attaining security.”); Letter from Raymond W. Kelly, Police 
Comm’r, N.Y. Police Dep’t, to Faiza Ali, Muslim Am. Civil Liberties Coal. (Oct. 6, 2008), available at 
http://brennan.3cdn.net/b881ffda53e1324896_43m6bp19j.pdf; Letter from Muslim Am. Civil 
Liberties Coal. to Raymond Kelly, Police Comm’r, N.Y. Police Dep’t (Sept. 8, 2009) [hereinafter 
Muslim Am. Civil Liberties Coal. 2009 Letter], available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-
/Justice/20090908.MACLC%27s.Response.to.Clarification.pdf; Letter from Muslim Am. Civil 
Liberties Coal. to Raymond Kelly, Police Comm’r, N.Y. Police Dep’t (Oct. 23, 2008), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Justice/10.23.MACLC.pdf; Letter from Muslim Am. Civil 
Liberties Coal. to Raymond Kelly, Police Comm’r, N.Y. Police Dep’t (Nov. 23, 2007), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Justice/MACLC%20Community%20Statement.pdf. In re-
sponse, the NYPD reissued the report with a two-page statement of clarification noting the report 
was not meant as a “policy prescriptive.” SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 11–12. But see Muslim 
Am. Civil Liberties Coal. 2009 Letter, supra (responding to the NYPD’s statement of clarification as 
insufficient). 
844 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:809 
 
later revealed the NYPD Intelligence Division’s operation of a “Demographics 
Unit.”123 Leaked documents from that unit borrowed heavily from the NYPD 
report’s vocabulary and logic,124 suggesting the report was effectively functioning 
as an operational guide.125 The NYPD’s program, as well the FBI’s related 
approach, will be explored next. 
 
123. Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, Documents Show NY Police Watched Devout Muslims, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2011/ 
Documents-show-NY-police-watched-devout-Muslims [hereinafter Apuzzo & Goldman, Police 
Watched Devout Muslims]; Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, Inside the Spy Unit That NYPD Says Doesn’t 
Exist, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.ap.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2011/inside-
the-spy-unit-that-nypd-says-doesnt-exist; Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, With CIA Help, NYPD 
Moves Covertly in Muslim Areas, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.ap.org/content/ap-
in-the-news/2011/with-cia-help-nypd-moves-covertly-in-muslim-areas [hereinafter Apuzzo & 
Goldman, NYPD Moves Covertly]; Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, NYPD Built Secret Files on Mosques 
Outside NY, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.ap.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2012/ 
nypd-built-secret-files-on-mosques-outside-ny; The Demographics Unit, NYPD, http://wid.ap.org/ 
documents/nypd-demo.pdf ( last visited Apr. 9, 2013). In a deposition regarding the NYPD’s 
Demographics Unit—now called the Zone Assessment Unit—the commanding officer of the NYPD 
stated clearly that none of the information collected by that unit resulted in any leads to any actual 
terrorism investigations. Deposition of Thomas Galati at 27, 36, 72–86, Handschu v. Special Servs. 
Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203 (CSH) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Galati Deposition], available at 
http://www.nyclu.org/files/releases/Handschu_Galati_6.28.12.pdf; see also Justin Elliott, Fact Check: 
How the NYPD Overstated Its Counterterrorism Record, PROPUBLICA (July 10, 2012), http://www.pro 
publica.org/article/fact-check-how-the-nypd-overstated-its-counterterrorism-record; Adam Goldman 
& Matt Apuzzo, NYPD: Muslim Spying Led to No Leads, Terror Cases, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 21, 
2012), http://www.ap.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2012/nypd-muslim-spying-led-to-no-leads-terror 
-cases [hereinafter Goldman & Apuzzo, NYPD: Muslim Spying]; Adam Serwer, NYPD: Muslims’ 
Conversations About Anti-Muslim Bias Justify Spying on Muslims, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 23, 2012), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/08/nypd-muslim-surveillance-transcript-redacted; Seth 
Freed Wessler, The Real Reason Why Big Brother’s Still Spying on New York City’s Muslims, COLORLINES 
(Aug. 29, 2012), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/08/nypd_muslim_spying_fail.html. 
124. DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIV., EGYPTIAN LOCATIONS OF 
INTEREST REPORT 7–37 (2006) [hereinafter DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, EGYPTIAN LOCATIONS OF 
INTEREST REPORT], available at http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/documents/nypd/nypd-
egypt.pdf ( listing Egyptian “Locations of Interest,” which include coffee shops, restaurants, grocery 
stores, cafes, Halal meat stores, and book stores); DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, NYPD INTELLIGENCE 
DIV., SYRIAN LOCATIONS OF CONCERN REPORT [hereinafter DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, SYRIAN 
LOCATIONS OF CONCERN REPORT], available at http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/documents/ 
nypd/nypd-syria.pdf (stating that Syrian “Locations of Interest” include bars, cafes, bakeries, 
restaurants, grocery stores, and newsstands); SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 22 (“radicalization 
incubators” include “cafes, cab driver hangouts, flophouses, prisons, student associations, non-
governmental organizations, hookah (water pipe) bars, butcher shops and book stores”); Adam 
Goldman et al., NYPD Eyed US Citizens in Intel Effort, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 22, 2011), http:// 
www.ap.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2011/nypd-eyed-us-citizens-in-intel-effort (“Police document-
ed where Moroccans bought groceries, which hotels they visited and where they prayed.”). 
125. See, e.g., Apuzzo & Goldman, supra note 101; Hawley, supra note 93; Eileen Sullivan, 
NYPD Spied on City’s Muslim Anti-Terror Partners, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.ap 
.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2011/nypd-spied-on-citys-muslim-anti-terror-partners. For the whole 
series of the AP’s reporting on the NYPD’s Demographics Unit, see Highlights of AP’s Pulitzer Prize-
Winning Probe into NYPD Intelligence Operations, ASSOCIATED PRESS, http://ap.org/nypd (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2013); see also Ramzi Kassem, Praying While Muslim: How the NYPD’s Covert Intelligence Operation 
Has Criminalized an Entire Community, NATION, July 2–9, 2012, at 25 (providing background on NYPD 
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III. POLICING THE NEW TERRORISM 
Shamiur Rahman, a 19-year-old American of Bangladeshi descent who has now 
denounced his work as an informant, said police told him to embrace a strategy called 
“create and capture.” He said it involved creating a conversation about jihad or 
terrorism, then capturing the response to send to the NYPD. 
  —Associated Press126 
 
I have never made a lead from rhetoric that came from a Demographics report . . . . 
  —Thomas Galati, Commanding Officer of the NYPD Intelligence 
Division127 
 
For the FBI and NYPD, the preventative framework has facilitated a shift 
from being law enforcement agencies to being dual purpose intelligence gathering 
and law enforcement agencies.128 Radicalization has transformed the project of 
counterterrorism intelligence gathering into one squarely focused on gathering as 
much information as possible about Muslim life in the United States, with a 
particular emphasis on political and religious cultures of Muslim communities. 
This Part describes how radicalization theory translates into contemporary police 
practice. The policing tactics described here are enabled by constitutional doctrine, 
including the Fourth Amendment, typically thought of as the bulwark against the 
state’s intrusions. The problem is not of constitutional exceptionalism then, but 
 
Demographics Unit operations and anecdotal evidence of NYPD surveillance); Amna Akbar, 
Blueprints: Mapping US Muslim Communities, ALJAZEERA (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/ 
indepth/opinion/2011/09/201191994512478104.html (discussing the theories behind the NYPD’s 
and FBI’s rationale for mapping Muslim communities). 
126. Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, Informant: NYPD Paid Me to ‘Bait’ Muslims, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.ap.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2012/informant-nypd-paid-me-
to-bait-muslims (“For his work, [Rahman] earned as much as $1,000 a month and goodwill from the 
police after a string of minor marijuana arrests.”). 
127. Galati Deposition, supra note 123, at 124. 
128. Moreover, the related growth of cross-governmental collaboration through Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces, fusion centers, shared databases like eGuardian, and federal-state-local 
enforcement has created exponential growth in the information and enforcement power available to 
the government. See Federal Government Intelligence Sharing with State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement: An 
Assessment Ten Years After 9/11: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the H. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 13–15 (2012) (statement of Eric Velez-Villar, Assistant Director, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice); STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON 
INVESTIGATIONS, S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS, 112TH CONG., FEDERAL 
SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS (Comm. Print 2012); 
JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34070, FUSION CENTERS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR 
CONGRESS 1–2 (2008); eGuardian Frequently Asked Questions (Mar. 8, 2010), available at http:// 
www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclueg000020.pdf; Michael German & Jay Stanley, What’s Wrong with Fusion 
Centers?, ACLU 3–5 (2007), http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf; 
Protecting America from Terrorist Attack, supra note 31. 
846 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:809 
 
rather the extensive powers afforded to government by current constitutional 
doctrine.129 
Before laying out the core preventative policing techniques, I will provide a 
general overview of the relevant standards for each agency.130 Part III.A lays out 
the standards governing the FBI’s and NYPD’s policing. Relaxed standards and 
minimal accountability mechanisms have created a legal landscape in which the 
FBI and NYPD exercise broad unchecked authority to collect intelligence. Part 
III.B identifies a number of policing techniques as core to “radicalization” 
policing: mapping, aggressive recruitment and deployment of informants, 
voluntary or pretextual interviews, community engagement, and Internet trolling. 
Subparts A and B paint a picture of how policing standards and practices have 
combined to focus on radicalization and therefore the religious and political 
cultures of Muslim communities.131 
A. Standards 
In the last decade, the FBI and NYPD have expanded their investigative 
powers and discretion. Each agency no longer requires the police to suspect 
criminal wrongdoing before it deploys a stunning array of investigative arsenal. In 
fact, both agencies rely on precisely those techniques for which the ex ante 
internal standards have become de minimis; those tactics are also nearly immune 
from ex post facto judicial challenge.132 
The FBI is governed primarily by the Attorney General’s Investigative 
 
129. For an argument that the Fourth Amendment adopts the perpetrator’s perspective, 
resulting in disproportionate burdens on communities of color, see Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the 
Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 965–74 (2002). 
130. See, e.g., COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 1–19; Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra 
note 22, at 58–61; Kassem, supra note 125; Emily Berman, Domestic Intelligence: New Powers, New Risks, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 26–30 (2011), http://brennan.3cdn.net/b80aa0bab0b425857d 
_jdm6b8776.pdf. While I lay out reasons why challenging these techniques is difficult, the question of 
the legality of the policing techniques presented here is beyond the scope of this Article. There is a 
growing literature, and a number of lawsuits asking the question. See, e.g., Complaint at 2–4, Hassan v. 
City of New York, No. 2:12-cv-03401-SDW-MCA (D.N.J. June 6, 2012), ECF No. 1; Tracey Maclin, 
“Voluntary” Interviews and Airport Searches of Middle Eastern Men: The Fourth Amendment in a Time of Terror, 
73 MISS. L.J. 471, 493–510 (2003); Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 56–57. 
131. See Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 156 (“[T]he government has 
invested heavily in intelligence collection and analysis as part of a comprehensive approach to 
domestic counter-radicalization. Counter-radicalization inevitably entails judgments about which 
individuals or communities have already or may become radicalized as well as the nature of the 
radicalization process itself. Thus, the government has employed the nascent domestic intelligence 
apparatus to locate the boundaries—both conceptually and empirically—between radical and non-
radical Islam.” (footnotes omitted)). 
132. This is particularly significant because standards for both the FBI and NYPD, and for 
other local police departments around the country, were developed in response to public pressure 
demanding change from McCarthy era excesses of police power. See Paul G. Chevigny, Politics and Law 
in the Control of Local Surveillance, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 736–38 (1984). 
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Guidelines (the Guidelines), issued at the discretion of the Attorney General.133 
The original Guidelines were promulgated by Attorney General Edward Levi in 
1976 to ward off the possibility of a congressional statutory charter in the face of 
public outrage over J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI and of the Church Committee’s 
findings about the FBI’s extensive disruptive surveillance of communists, black 
and women’s liberationists, and the New Left more generally.134 The Guidelines 
“proceed[ed] from the proposition that Government monitoring of individuals or 
groups because they hold unpopular or controversial political views is intolerable 
in our society.”135 The Levi Guidelines included three increasingly robust 
investigative phases: preliminary, limited, and full investigations. Commencement 
of each stage required a nexus to criminal activity. Each phase permitted more 
intrusive investigative techniques, but required higher suspicion thresholds and 
included greater procedural safeguards. 
The Guidelines have been significantly relaxed since 9/11, allowing the FBI 
to exercise greater power with fewer procedural constraints or suspicion 
thresholds.136 In 2002 and 2008, Attorneys General John Ashcroft and Michael 
Mukasey issued the Guidelines that have governed the FBI in the post-9/11 era. 
 
133. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL BUREAU 
OF INVESTIGATION’S COMPLIANCE WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S INVESTIGATIVE 
GUIDELINES 36–59 (2005) [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., FBI COMPLIANCE], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0509/index.htm; Berman, supra note 130, at 7, 13 
(outlining the role of the Attorney General and the Guidelines in constraining the FBI). Importantly, 
the DOJ’s guidance bans profiling based on race and ethnicity in law enforcement practices, but it 
does not explicitly ban profiling based on religion or national origin, and does not apply to national 
and border security contexts. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE 
REGARDING THE USE OF RACE BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/guidance_on_race.pdf. 
134. Lininger, supra note 22, at 1213–14; Berman, supra note 130, at 9–10; see also OFFICE OF 
THE INSPECTOR GEN., FBI COMPLIANCE, supra note 133, at 29–36 (summarizing the FBI’s pre-
Guidelines activities). 
135. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., FBI COMPLIANCE, supra note 133, at 36 (citing FBI 
Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th 
Cong. 257 (1976) (testimony of Edward H. Levi, Att’y General, Department of Justice)). 
136. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR 
DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS (2008) [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., GUIDELINES 
FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS], available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines 
.pdf; OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS (2002), available at http://www.fas.org/ 
irp/agency/doj/fbi/fbiundercover.pdf; OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM 
ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS (2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/general 
crimes2.pdf. For a discussion of the history of the FBI Guidelines, with a focus on post-9/11 
changes, see Berman, supra note 130. See also COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, 1–19; Sinnar, Questioning 
Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 58–61. See generally JEROME P. BJELOPERA & MARK A. RANDOL, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41780, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND TERRORISM 
INVESTIGATIONS 1 (2011) (noting the Guidelines and DIOGs provide “the FBI more leeway to 
engage in proactive investigative work that does not depend on criminal predication (i.e., a nexus to 
past or future criminal activity)”). 
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Importantly, the 2008 Guidelines created the “assessment,” a new stage of FBI 
investigation, prior to what used to be the first stage of investigation, a 
“preliminary investigation.”137 While an assessment requires no “particular factual 
predication” or suspicion of wrongdoing or criminal activity, it authorizes the use 
of intrusive investigative techniques.138 For example, in conducting an assessment, 
the FBI may use unlimited physical surveillance, pretextual interviews, and 
deployment of confidential informants, absent any suspicion of wrongdoing, and 
with little to no procedural safeguards.139 
First issued in 2008, and then revised in 2011, the FBI’s Domestic 
Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) provides direction for the 
Guidelines’ implementation.140 The DIOG allows for five types of assessments, 
which can be deployed mostly or partly based on First Amendment activity.141 
The DIOG also authorizes mapping, accessing information in the possession of 
other government agencies, Internet monitoring, and interviewing of 
“complainants” even prior to the opening of an assessment.142 Importantly, the 
 
137. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS, 
supra note 136, at 17–18, 20–21. 
138. Assessments do require an “authorized purpose.” Id. at 17; see also Memorandum from 
the Fed. Bureau of Investigation to All Field Offices (Sept. 24, 2009), available at http://www.aclu 
.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111019/ACLURM004887.pdf (providing standards for the type of 
information agents in the Counterterrorism Division should solicit in the assessment stage and 
beyond). 
139. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS 
GUIDE 4-13 to 4-14, 5-2, 6-7 (2011). 
140. Id. The DIOG is in a way the regulation to the Guidelines’ law. Muslim Advocates, a 
California-based advocacy organization, filed a Freedom of Information Act request for the 2008 
DIOGs. See Muslim Advocates Seeks FBI Guidelines on Racial Profiling of Muslim Americans, MUSLIM 
ADVOCATES (June 17, 2009), http://www.muslimadvocates.org/muslim_advocates_seeks_fbi_ 
guidelines_on_racial_profiling_of_muslim_americans. The DOJ released redacted excerpts of the 
DIOGs, available at http://documents.nytimes.com/the-new-operations-manual-from-the-f-b-I. The 
current 2011 DIOG is available on the FBI’s website. Before the 2008 DIOG, there was the Manual 
of Investigative and Operational Guidelines. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, MANUAL OF 
INVESTIGATIVE AND OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, available at http://vault.fbi.gov/miog/manual-of-
investigative-operations-and-guidelines-miog-part-02-01-of-06/view; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GEN., FBI COMPLIANCE, supra note 133. 
141. Investigative activity cannot be based solely on First Amendment activity. Large sections 
of the assessment-related rules are redacted. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 139, at 5-4 
to 5-37; see also Charlie Savage, F.B.I. Agents Get Leeway to Push Privacy Bounds, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 
2011, at A1, A13; Charlie Savage, F.B.I. Focusing on Security over Ordinary Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 
2011, at A16 (finding that between 2009 and 2011, the FBI opened 82,325 assessments, 42,888 of 
which were to see whether people were terrorists or spies; the vast majority of assessments were 
closed out “without finding information that justified a more intensive inquiry”). The 2008 DIOG 
was similarly lenient as to the permissible role of First Amendment activity in the opening of an 
assessment. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERA-
TIONS GUIDE (2008), available at http://documents.nytimes.com/the-new-operations-manual-from 
-the-f-b-I; Berman, supra note 130, at 23–25. As with the 2008 DIOG, in the 2011 DIOG, the section 
on “undisclosed participation” by “confidential human sources”—informants—is largely redacted. 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, , supra note 139, at 16-2 to 16-11. 
142. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 139. 
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Guidelines and the DIOG are not enforceable in court; nor are they the product 
of any meaningful public engagement. 
The NYPD is governed by its patrol guide and the Handschu Guidelines.143 A 
federal consent decree resulting from a 1970s class action lawsuit complaining of 
police infiltration and surveillance of that time’s radicals, the Handschu Guidelines 
provide parameters and oversight for the NYPD’s surveillance of political and 
religious activity.144 Mirroring the cyclical history of the FBI,145 meaningful 
restraints on the NYPD were removed after 9/11. In 2002, the NYPD argued in 
court that Handschu undermined the department’s ability to keep New York City 
safe from terrorism and requested greater flexibility in its ability to gather and 
disseminate intelligence.146 In 2003, the court approved modified guidelines 
submitted by the NYPD, eliminating the prior required criminal nexus for 
surveillance of political activity, insulating the NYPD from independent review by 
the Handschu Authority, and relaxing the rules for collection, retention, and 
dissemination of information.147 The revised guidelines allow the NYPD to initiate 
 
143. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); BARRY KAMINS, 
NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT PATROL GUIDE MANUAL (2006). 
144. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 737 F. Supp. 1289, 1303–04 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Handschu, 
605 F. Supp. at 1388–92. For information on the underlying activities of the Bureau of Special 
Services, the NYPD’s then-intelligence arm, see, for example, Emanuel Perlmutter, Police Intelligence 
Unit Watches Racial Activity: Undercover Detectives Play Major Role in Curbing Subversive Forces, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 27, 1964, at 19. See also Targeted and Entrapped, supra note 58, at 12–13 (describing the background 
of the litigation and the settlement terms). The original Guidelines required factual criminal predicates 
for investigations of political and religious activity. More specifically, the consent decree prohibited 
the NYPD from investigating political activity unless there was “specific information” that the group 
was linked to a crime that had been committed or was about to be committed. Handschu also required 
transparency in approval procedures for such investigations and provided for an oversight body to 
ensure compliance and provide for review of alleged violations. Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1390–91. 
Handschu further created an independent oversight body, the Handschu Authority, through which 
investigation of political activity had to be preapproved, and grievances by members of the public 
could be filed; this process limited the NYPD’s ability to collect, retain, and disseminate intelligence, 
and provided grievance procedures for individuals. Id. For a survey of police surveillance oversight 
mechanisms resulting from local police abuse in the 1960s and 1970s, see Chevigny, supra note 132. 
145. See generally Chevigny, supra note 132 (providing an overview of actions in several 
jurisdictions challenging political surveillance and a comparison of various regulatory approaches); 
Fisher, supra note 22 (providing an overview of political surveillance practices conducted by the FBI 
and local law enforcement). 
146. Declaration of Deputy Comm’r David Cohen, Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 
Civ. 2203 (CSH) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2002). But see Jerrold L. Steigman, Note, Reversing Reform: The 
Handschu Settlement in Post-September 11 New York City, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 745, 782–83 (2003) (rejecting 
the NYPD’s reasoning for demanding the post-9/11 changes in the consent decree). 
147. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 288 F. Supp. 2d 411, 420, 429–30 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“In 
order to carry out its mission of preventing the commission of terrorist acts in or affecting the City of 
New York and the United States and its people, the NYPD must proactively draw on available 
sources of information to identify terrorist threats and activities. It cannot be content to wait for leads 
to come in through the actions of others, but rather must be vigilant in detecting terrorist activities to 
the full extent permitted by law, with an eye towards early intervention and prevention of acts of 
terrorism before they occur.”); see also Kassem, supra note 125, at 26; Leonard Levitt, NYPD Seeks to 
Overturn Surveillance Rules, NEWSDAY, Sept. 26, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 536399 (Westlaw); Police 
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investigations based on speech or expression protected by the First 
Amendment.148 They invest tremendous discretion to the Deputy Commissioner 
to approve investigations and investigatory techniques.149 For example, there are 
no restrictions placed on the use of informants except that their deployment must 
be authorized by the Deputy Commissioner of the Intelligence Division.150 
As discussed in Part III.B, the FBI and NYPD have come to rely on five 
policing techniques key to preventative counterterrorism policing, with a focus on 
“radicalization” in Muslim communities: mapping, aggressive recruitment and 
deployment of informants in mosques and other Muslim community spaces,151 
community engagement programs, voluntary interviews, and Internet monitor-
ing.152 Each of these policing techniques is permissible within or prior to an FBI 
assessment, so they can be deployed even where the police do not suspect illegal 
activity.153 Similarly, while attorneys continue to litigate the NYPD’s tactics for 
their compliance with the current Handschu Guidelines,154 the thresholds for 
deploying these tactics are de minimis. 
These tactics are also largely immune from post hoc review.155 Since the 
surveillance tactics are used indiscriminately in Muslim communities, typically the 
surveillance does not lead to indictment.156 In fact, a commanding officer of the 
 
Surveillance of Political Activity—the History and Current State of the Handschu Decree, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES 
UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/content/testimony-police-surveillance-of-political-activity-history-and 
-current-state-of-handschu-de (last visited Apr. 13, 2013) (testimony of Arthur N. Eisenberg). 
148. Handschu, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 421. 
149. Id. at 422–38. 
150. Id. at 428. 
151. Undercover police officers are also aggressively deployed. See, e.g., Apuzzo & Goldman, 
Police Watched Devout Muslims, supra note 123, at 1 (“Every day, undercover officers and informants 
filed reports from their positions as ‘listening posts’ inside Muslim communities.”); Adam Goldman et 
al., NYPD Eyed US Citizens in Intelligence Effort, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.ap 
.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2011/nypd-eyed-us-citizens-in-intel-effort (“[As part of the ‘Moroccan 
Initiative,’] [u]ndercover officers snapped photographs of restaurants frequented by Moroccans, 
including one that was noted for serving ‘religious Muslims.’”). 
152. These major tactics draw on and relate to a broader set of tactics, like growing 
information sharing and joint enforcement. See supra text accompanying note 128. 
153. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 139, at 4-13 to 6-3. Mapping may also be 
deployed as part of an assessment: the section on mapping states that “the relevance of the ethnic or 
racial information mapped to the authorized purpose of the Assessment or investigation must be 
clearly demonstrated and documented.” Id. at 4-14. 
154. The Galati deposition was taken by Handschu attorneys in connection with current efforts 
to determine whether the Intelligence Division’s Demographics Unit overstepped Handschu’s bounds. 
Galati Deposition, supra note 123; NYPD Testimony on Muslim Surveillance Operation Highlights Futility of 
Spying on Innocent People, ACLU (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/nypd 
-testimony-muslim-surveillance-operation-highlights-futility-spying-innocent. 
155. For a helpful discussion of the limitations to challenges to many of these tactics, see 
Emily Berman, Regulating Domestic Intelligence Collection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) 
(on file with author). 
156. Galati Deposition, supra note 123 (stating that none of the information collected by the 
NYPD Demographics Unit resulted in leads for terrorism investigations); see also Goldman & Apuzzo, 
NYPD: Muslim Spying, supra note 123 (noting that in more than six years of conducting surveillance on 
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NYPD recently admitted that the Intelligence Division’s program to gather such 
intelligence in Muslim communities resulted in not one indictment under his 
watch.157 Nonetheless, there are other real harms associated with surveillance. But 
the secret nature of surveillance makes it hard for plaintiffs to prove in court that 
they are subject to surveillance. Plaintiffs are hard pressed to prove sufficient harm 
to confer standing, deal as they must with the Supreme Court’s decision in Laird v. 
Tatum.158 “Allegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a 
claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.”159 
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA creates yet another hurdle to establishing 
standing to challenge national security surveillance.160 
Even when the FBI’s and NYPD’s tactics culminate in an indictment, there 
are significant barriers to challenges. The Handschu Guidelines, Attorney General’s 
Guidelines, and DIOG provide few limitations on police power.161 Nor do they 
give rise to private causes of action. Voluntary interviews and community 
engagement rely on consent; however facile that consent may be, courts are 
unlikely to be any more sympathetic to Fourth Amendment challenges in the 
terrorism context than in the ordinary crime context.162 Neither is the Fourth 
 
Muslim neighborhoods, NYPD’s Demographics Unit “never generated a lead or triggered a terrorism 
investigation”). 
157. Galati Deposition, supra note 123, at 124. 
158. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972); Lininger, supra note 22, at 1236–44 (discussing 
Laird and other hurdles to challenges to post-9/11 surveillance of Muslim communities as authorized 
under the 2002 Attorney General’s Guidelines); see also Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment 
Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 45–46 (2011) 
(discussing different interpretations of Laird ); Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal 
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 143–45 (2007) (same). 
159. Laird, 408 U.S. at 13–14. 
160. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1149, 1155 (2013) (dismissing plaintiffs’ 
constitutional challenge to section 702 under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) 
on standing grounds—plaintiffs did not establish injury in fact fairly traceable to the law they wished 
to challenge). 
161. For example, the limitations on entrapment are scant. The rules for dealing with 
informants are laid out in a specific set of guidelines. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., 
GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS, supra note 136, at 33 (“Otherwise illegal activity by a 
human source must be approved in conformity with the Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding the 
Use of FBI Confidential Human Sources.”). The relevant guidelines explicitly contemplate that 
informants will be authorized to engage in illegal activity, with limitations only on acts of violence and 
acts that would be unlawful if performed by an actual FBI agent. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE OF FBI CONFIDENTIAL HUMAN 
SOURCES 30 (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/ag-guidelines-use-of-fbi-chs.pdf 
(“The FBI is never permitted to authorize a Confidential Human Source to: a. participate in any act of 
violence except in self-defense or b. participate in an act designed to obtain information for the FBI 
that would be unlawful if conducted by a law enforcement agent (e.g., breaking and entering, illegal 
wiretapping, illegal opening or tampering with the mail, or trespass amounting to an illegal search).” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
162. The two scholarly pieces considering Fourth Amendment challenges to voluntary 
interviews in this context agree that courts are unlikely to find Fourth Amendment protections for the 
typical case, given most FBI interviews would not constitute seizures because of the myth of possible 
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Amendment likely to offer relief when it comes to physical or virtual dealings with 
informants (or undercover officers), since the third-party consent doctrine 
insulates undercover activity.163 Indeed, informant creation and deployment are 
“methodically exempted . . . from the kinds of constitutional regulations that 
cover other investigative techniques, including Fourth Amendment rules on 
searches, seizures, and warrants, the Fifth Amendment requirement that suspects 
be given Miranda warnings and counsel, and Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel 
rules.”164 The entrapment defense may be raised at trial. But in its focus on the 
defendant’s subjective state of mind, rather than the conduct of the government, 
the threshold for entrapment is near impossible to meet:165 it has not once 
 
refusal. Maclin, supra note 130, at 493–510; Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 46–47; 
see also Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 631–33 (2003); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203–04 
(2002); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 439–40 (1991); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 
(1983) (plurality opinion). 
163. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 744 (1979) (“Neither the Constitution nor any 
Act of Congress requires that official approval be secured before conversations are overheard or 
recorded by Government agents with the consent of one of the conversants.”); United States v. 
White, 401 U.S. 745, 750–54 (1971); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 748–51 (1952); see also 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244–45 (2009); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 566–70 (2009); Lininger, supra note 22, at 1248–49 (“An invited informer is a 
person who has express or tacit permission to be on the premises, even though the informer would 
have been denied permission if the informer’s true identity had been known. . . . The invited informer 
may enter a religious institution, wear a body wire, and carry a pinhole camera without ever ‘searching’ 
the premises. Only when the informer exceeds the scope of his invitation does a ‘search’ occur.” 
(footnotes omitted)); Tim Sobczak, Note, The Consent-Once-Removed Doctrine: The Constitutionality of 
Passing Consent from an Informant to Law Enforcement, 62 FLA. L. REV. 493, 509–518 (2010). For a 
comprehensive summary of the limitations of various challenges to government use of informants, 
see David A. Harris, Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering in Muslim and Immigrant Communities After 
9/11, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123, 141–58 (2010), and ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, 
SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 45–81 (2009). For 
general standards related to the government’s ability to surveil Internet-related spaces, see the Stored 
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006) (requiring a warrant only for the contents of 
electronic communications held on a third party’s server that are less than 180 days old), and the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(determining that, under the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement needs a warrant to access contents 
of emails); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (determining that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in IP addresses). See also Theodoric Meyer & Peter Maass, No 
Warrant, No Problem: How the Government Can Still Get Your Digital Data, PROPUBLICA, Dec. 4, 2012, 
http://www.propublica.org/special/no-warrant-no-problem-how-the-government-can-still-get-your 
-digital-data. 
164. NATAPOFF, supra note 163, at 85–86. 
165. Richard H. McAdams, The Political Economy of Entrapment, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
107, 115–19 (2005); see also Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548–49 (1992) (“Where the 
Government has induced an individual to break the law and the defense of entrapment is at issue, as 
it was in this case, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by Government agents.” 
(footnote omitted)); Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988); United States v. Russell, 411 
U.S. 423, 429 (1973) (explaining that the entrapment defense focuses “on the intent or predisposition 
of the defendant to commit the crime”); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958) 
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succeeded in the terrorism context, even on facts of outrageous government 
overreach.166 
Indictment or not, the government insulates its practices by relying on an 
arsenal of secrecy tools, to which courts largely defer.167 In one recent case, 
members of a Southern California Muslim community sued the FBI after an FBI 
informant spoke publicly about spying on the community as part of an FBI 
project dubbed Operation Flex.168 Relying on a classified declaration provided to 
the court ex parte and in camera, a federal district court sustained the Obama 
administration’s first invocation of the state secrets doctrine in relation to a 
domestic program.169 In shielding a much-criticized FBI surveillance operation, 
 
(“However, the fact that government agents merely afford opportunities or facilities for the 
commission of the offense does not constitute entrapment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
United States v. Harvey, 991 F.2d 981, 993 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Based upon Harvey’s prompt response to 
the government’s single invitation to him to purchase child pornography, the jury could rationally find 
that he possessed the requisite predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
166. For a review of the entrapment defense as raised in terrorism prosecutions, see Targeted 
and Entrapped, supra note 58, at 15–18, 59–63 nn.101–26; Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra note 59, 
at 28 (“Ten defendants who have been caught up in sting operations since 9-11 formally presented 
entrapment as a defense in court proceedings, but the defense has never been successful in a 
terrorism prosecution.” (footnote omitted)). See also Said, supra note 58 (describing the legal standards 
for and ineffectiveness of the entrapment defense). Most recently, the entrapment defense failed in 
the closely watched prosecution of Mohamed Osman Mohamud, charged with attempting to place a 
bomb at a Portland Christmas tree-lighting ceremony. See, e.g., Bryan Denson, Mohamed Mohamud 
Found Guilty in Portland Terrorism Trial, OREGON LIVE (Jan. 31, 2013), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2013/01/mohamed_mohamud_found_guilty 
_i.html; Kari Huus, Trial in Oregon’s Alleged Christmas Bomb Plot to Turn on ‘Entrapment’, NBC NEWS (Jan. 
10, 2013), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/01/10/16436454-trial-in-oregons-alleged-christmas 
-bomb-plot-to-turn-on-entrapment?lite; Joel Millman, Stings to Get Close Look in Oregon Terror Case, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 9, 2013, 8:30 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323706704578 
227740396234744.html. 
167. See, e.g., Joshua L. Dratel, Section 4 of the Classified Information Procedures Act: The Growing 
Threat to the Adversary Process, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 1041, 1041–42 (2007); Aziz Huq, Structural 
Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 887 (2012); Huq, supra note 23; Rovner & 
Theoharis, supra note 58, at 1386–91; Sam A. Schmidt & Joshua L. Dratel, Turning the Tables: Using the 
Government’s Secrecy and Security Arsenal for the Benefit of the Client in Terrorism Prosecutions, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 69, 80–89 (2003); Steve Vladeck, The New National Security Canon, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 
1329–30 (2012); Ellen C. Yaroshefsky, The Slow Erosion of the Adversary System: Article III Courts, FISA, 
CIPA and Ethical Dilemmas, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 203, 203–04 (2006); see also Jenny 
S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013 (2008); cf. Aziz Z. 
Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 227. 
 The most promising challenges may be to the NYPD’s program, since there is no state secrets 
privilege available to the police department. See, e.g., Complaint, Hassan v. City of New York, No. 
2:12-cv-03401-SDW-MCA (D.N.J. June 6, 2012), ECF No. 1. 
168. Fazaga v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 885 F. Supp. 2d 978, 980–81 (C.D. Cal. 2012); 
Fazaga v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2012). Muslim 
communities have attempted through the courts, with limited success, to learn about the FBI’s and 
NYPD’s information-collection programs. Fazaga is just one example. See, e.g., Islamic Shura Council 
of S. Cal. v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 635 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 2011); Complaint, Hassan v. 
City of New York, No. 2:12-cv-03401-SDW-MCA (D.N.J. June 6, 2012). 
169. Declaration of Att’y General Eric H. Holder, Fazaga v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. 
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the court further immunized from review the intelligence-gathering practices 
discussed here.170  
Finally, there is a lack of political checks on these police practices, waged as 
they are against Muslims in the name of national security. While there have been 
some victories at the local level,171 neither Congress nor the administration seems 
interested in any meaningful fix. 
B. Tactics 
The FBI and NYPD deploy a number of policing techniques shaped around 
and responsive to a concern with radicalization and violent extremism: mapping, 
aggressive recruitment and deployment of informants, voluntary or pretextual 
interviews, community engagement, and Internet trolling. These tactics focus on 
gathering intelligence on the religious and political cultures of Muslim 
communities—and places where Muslims gather and such cultures may emerge. 
They also rely on participation from Muslim community members, stemming 
from and creating pressures that Part IV explores. The police tactics described 
here are reminiscent of earlier periods of our history, where our law enforcement 
agencies have spent tremendous resources monitoring and disrupting 
communities and ideologies identified as outside the mainstream.172 From World 
War II to the 1970s, the FBI conducted covert domestic operations aimed at 
groups considered to be antagonistic to the U.S. government, including Black 
nationalists, women’s liberationists, and members of the Communist Party.173 The 
Senate Church Committee found that the FBI relied on: 
secret informants . . . wiretaps, microphone “bugs,” surreptitious mail 
 
8:11-cv-00301-CJC, (C.D. Cal., Aug. 1, 2011), ECF No. 32-3; Hamed Aleaziz, Want to Sue the FBI for 
Spying on Your Mosque? Sorry, That’s Secret., MOTHER JONES (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.motherjones 
.com/politics/2011/08/state-secrets-fazaga-v-fbi. 
170. Fazaga, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 1042; see also Adam Serwer, FBI Sting Lawsuit Blocked by “State 
Secrets” Doctrine, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/08/fbi-
sting-lawsuit-blocked-state-secrets-doctrine. 
171. For example, for years Portland resisted participating in the local JTTF, since 
participation typically deputizes local law enforcement to function under the FBI Guidelines. 
Recently, Portland decided to join the JTTF, on the condition that local law enforcement would 
continue to be bound by local law. See, e.g., William Yardley, Portland, Ore., Votes to Rejoin Task Force 
After Terrorism Scare, N.Y. TIMES DAILY, May 1, 2011, at A31. 
172. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 
449–50, 468, 498–500 (1985) (“[T]he overriding objective at all times should be to equip the first 
amendment to do maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox ideas 
is most prevalent and when governments are most able and most likely to stifle dissent 
systematically.”). 
173. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., FBI COMPLIANCE, supra note 133, at 33–34 
(stating that the FBI investigated civil rights, antiwar, and women’s rights movements); Lininger, supra 
note 22, at 1210–14 (discussing the FBI’s aggressive investigations in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly 
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference); Berman, supra 
note 130, at 8–9 (listing both generic and specific abuses of power by the FBI). 
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opening, and break-ins, [sweeping] in vast amounts of information about 
the personal lives, views, and associations of American citizens [and] 
conducted a sophisticated vigilante operation aimed squarely at preventing 
the exercise of First Amendment rights of speech and association, on the 
theory that preventing the growth of dangerous groups and the propagation 
of dangerous ideas would protect the national security and deter violence.174 
That these tactics predate 9/11 underline the importance of studying their 
contemporary use against Muslim communities. Indeed, this policing paradigm 
portends expansive surveillance practices more broadly, in particular against 
groups the government identifies as nonconforming or threatening.175 
1. Mapping 
Mapping has become a key tactic of preventative policing.176 The FBI and 
NYPD have each engaged in different mapping activities of Muslim communities 
in the name of national security.177 Places for religious and political discussion and 
gathering, and potential organizing, become important targets for intelligence 
gathering. The purpose of identifying these spaces seems to be twofold. First, by 
locating and then gathering intelligence on Muslim community spaces, law 
enforcement claims to be looking for spaces where individuals may radicalize. 
 
174. SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: BOOK 
II, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 5 (1976); SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS 
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF 
AMERICANS: BOOK III, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 3 (1976). 
175. For coverage of policing of Occupy and antiwar activists from the last three years, see, 
for example, Greenberg, New York: The Police and the Protesters, supra note 31; Colin Moynihan, F.B.I. 
Searches Antiwar Activists’ Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2010, at A10; Madeleine Baran, Papers Shed Light 
on FBI’s Anti-War Activist Probe, MPR NEWS (May 18, 2011), http://minnesota.publicradio.org 
/display/web/2011/05/18/fbi-documents-anti-war-activist-raids. 
176. The police practice of mapping jurisdictions predates 9/11: in 1919, a New York State 
legislative committee commissioned the NYPD and the New York State Police to prepare maps 
identifying neighborhoods where certain immigrants predominated, with a focus on organizations and 
individuals suspected as socialists, communists, and anarchists. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 22, at  
622–25; Sam Roberts, Police Demographics Unit Casts Shadows from Past, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM (Jan. 
30, 2012), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/03/police-demographics-unit-casts-shadows 
-from-past. 
177. Interestingly, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) announced a plan for 
mapping L.A.’s Muslim communities in 2007. That plan was pulled back after the announcement 
drew public outcry. Richard Winton & Teresa Watanabe, LAPD’s Muslim Mapping Plan Killed, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, at A1; Richard Winton et al., LAPD to Build Data on Muslim Areas, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 9, 2007, at A1; Richard Winton et al., Outcry over Muslim Mapping, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2007, at 
A1; see also Letter from Ranjana Natarajan et al. to Commander Michael P. Downing, Counter-
Terrorism/Criminal Intelligence Bureau, L.A. Police Dep’t (Nov. 8, 2007), available at http://makkah 
.files.wordpress.com/2007/11/muslim_leaders_to_lapd.pdf (expressing “grave concerns” about the 
LAPD’s community-mapping plans). 
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Second, law enforcement claims to be looking for spaces where already radicalized 
individuals may seek cover to avoid detection from law enforcement.178 
By identifying and mapping spaces where Muslims gather, the FBI and 
NYPD are literally constituting vulnerable geographies. The act of mapping makes 
the communities subjects of surveillance and suspicion. The FBI’s DIOG 
explicitly contemplates mapping as part of its ongoing “domain management” 
efforts.179 The DIOG allows the FBI “to identify locations of concentrated ethnic 
communities in the field office’s domain, if these locations will reasonably aid the 
analysis of potential threats and vulnerabilities, and, overall, assist domain 
awareness for the purpose of performing intelligence analysis.”180 The DIOG 
 
178. Galati Deposition, supra note 123. 
179. The concept of domain management is a bit obtuse, but seems to encapsulate an idea 
that, in order to be effective, the FBI needs to know the territory in which it operates. Memorandum 
from Detroit Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office 2 (July 6, 2009), available at http://www.aclu 
.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111019/ACLURM011609.pdf (“Domain management is the systematic 
process by which the FBI develops cross-programmatic domain awareness and leverages its 
knowledge to enhance its ability to (i) proactively identify threats, vulnerabilities, and intelligence gaps; 
(ii) discover new opportunities for needed intelligence collection and prosecution; and (iii) [redacted] 
to provide advance warning of national security and criminal threats.”); John S. Pistole, Deputy Dir., 
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC, 
FBI (Jan. 25, 2007), http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/implementing-the-intelligence-reform-and 
-terrorism-prevention-act (“Domain management is simply about ‘questions and choices’: What do 
we need to know about our territory to protect the people in it? What do we know about the threats 
and vulnerabilities that worry us most? What don’t we know about the threats and vulnerabilities that 
worry us most? What are we going to do to address our threats and vulnerabilities? . . . [Domain 
management is] designed to achieve a comprehensive understanding of a geographic or substantive 
area of responsibility.”); see also Scott Shane & Lowell Bergman, F.B.I. Struggling to Reinvent Itself to Fight 
Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/10/us/10fbi.html (discussing 
the then-proposal for Domain Management by Philip Mudd—who had recently joined the FBI from 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—including internal challenges that the program was vague and 
implied “ethnic targeting”). 
180. The DIOG continues: 
If, for example, intelligence reporting reveals that members of certain terrorist 
organizations live and operate primarily within a certain concentrated community of the 
same ethnicity, the location of that community is clearly valuable—and properly 
collectible—data. Similarly, the locations of ethnic-oriented businesses and other facilities 
may be collected if their locations will reasonably contribute to an awareness of threats and 
vulnerabilities, and intelligence collection opportunities. Also, members of some 
communities may be potential victims of civil rights crimes and, for this reason, 
community location may aid enforcement of civil rights laws. Information about such 
communities should not be collected, however, unless the communities are sufficiently 
concentrated and established so as to provide a reasonable potential for intelligence 
collection that would support FBI mission programs (e.g., where identified terrorist 
subjects from certain countries may relocate to blend in and avoid detection). 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 139, at 4-13. It has been reported that after FBI 
Director Mueller’s 2003 call for FBI field offices to map local mosques stirred outcry by civil 
libertarians, the FBI switched its rationale for the effort from monitoring terrorist activity to 
protecting Muslims from hate crimes. Lininger, supra note 22, at 1204 nn.7, 9. The prior DIOG 
allowed the FBI to collect information regarding ethnic and racial behaviors “reasonably believed to 
be associated with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community” and to collect 
“the locations of ethnic-oriented businesses and other facilities” (likely including religious facilities 
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empowers FBI field offices to collect, map, and analyze racial and ethnic 
demographic information, including the location of businesses and other facilities 
servicing those demographic groups. Documents obtained by the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
indicate local FBI offices have mapped the demographics of concentrated Muslim 
communities.181 The FBI data-mines commercially available information and 
government databases to generate these profiles.182 A 2009 Detroit field office 
memorandum opening a “domain assessment” provides as its basis that “[b]ecause 
Michigan has [a] large Middle-Eastern and Muslim population, it is prime territory 
for attempted radicalization and recruitment by these terrorist groups.”183 
The NYPD has also mapped Muslim communities, through its Intelligence 
Division’s Demographics Unit.184 The NYPD created records on businesses 
 
such as mosques) because “members of certain terrorist organizations live and operate primarily 
within a certain concentrated community of the same ethnicity.” FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
supra note 141, at 32–33. 
181. Importantly, the power is not limited to national security investigations, though the 
language of the 2008 DIOG shows particular concern with Muslims and national security, and the 
2011 DIOG does too, though to a lesser extent. See supra text accompanying note 180. The 
documents also suggest the FBI maps other communities. ACLU Eye on the FBI: The FBI is Engaged in 
Unconstitutional Racial Profiling and Racial “Mapping”, ACLU (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/files/ 
assets/aclu_eye_on_the_fbi_alert_-_fbi_engaged_in_unconstitutional_racial_profiling_and_racial 
_mapping_0.pdf (summarizing documents obtained by FOIA requests, including FBI mapping of 
“Black Separatist” groups, Chinese, Russian, and Salvadorian communities). 
182. Aaronson, supra note 113, at 33. 
183. Memorandum from Detroit Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office, supra note 179. In 
2003, prior to the rise of radicalization discourse, Newsweek reported that FBI Director Robert Mueller 
directed all FBI field offices to develop “demographic” profiles of their local areas, including a count 
of local mosques; this information would be used to “set specific numerical goals for 
counterterrorism investigations and secret national-security wiretaps in each region.” Michael Isikoff, 
Investigators: The FBI Says, Count the Mosques, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 3, 2003, at 6; Losing Liberty: The State of 
Freedom 10 Years After the Patriot Act, MUSLIM ADVOCATES 10–12 (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter Losing 
Liberty], http:// 
d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/muslimadvocates/pages/47/attachments/original/Losing_Liberty 
_The_State_of_Freedom_10_Years_After_the_PATRIOT_Act.pdf?1330650785. “Each of the field 
offices received a six-page questionnaire asking for data about the number of mosques, as well as the 
number of flight schools, charity groups, dams, bridges, nuclear plants, and other facilities or 
organizations that the F.B.I. deemed relevant to its task of protecting national security.” Lininger, 
supra note 22, at 1204–05 n.7. “After civil libertarians raised concerns about the burdens on religious 
freedom, the F.B.I. offered an entirely different rationale, claiming in public statements that mosque-
counting was necessary to protect Muslims from hate crimes.” Id. at 1205 n.9 (citing Marie Cocco, 
Ashcroft Makes Federal Cases Hither and Yon, NEWSDAY, Feb. 27, 2003, at A31 (“Once word of the 
briefing leaked, the F.B.I. changed its rationale, saying it wanted to count mosques to safeguard 
them.”)); Larry Witham, F.B.I. Defends Inclusion of Mosques in Crime Survey, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, 
at A12 (quoting FBI official who said mosque-counting would help the FBI to protect Muslims from 
hate crimes). 
184. The Demographics Unit was responsible for mapping “ethnic hot spots.” See Apuzzo & 
Goldman, NYPD Moves Covertly, supra note 123; Goldman et al., supra note 124; The Demographics Unit, 
supra note 123, at 2. That Unit has since been renamed the Zone Assessment Unit, it seems, in 2010. 
Galati Deposition, supra note 123, at 16–17. A Commanding Officer of the Intelligence Division 
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owned and patronized by Muslims, Muslim student organizations, mosques, 
hookah bars, cafes, and schools all throughout New York City and into New 
Jersey.185 The NYPD also created sets of “demographics” or “location” reports, 
organized by ethnicity and location, even outside New York City. For example, 
the AP published the NYPD’s Demographics Report on Newark, New Jersey, as well 
as its Egyptian Locations of Interest Report.186 Similar sets of maps were released for 
Suffolk and Nassau Counties on Long Island, and for Moroccan, Albanian, and 
Syrian communities,187 suggesting the department had reports for the broader 
New York City metropolitan area and for all its Muslim “ancestries of interest.”188 
Each of the reports included area maps marking Muslim religious schools, 
Muslim-owned and patronized businesses, Muslim houses of worship, and Muslim 
gathering places.189 The reports also included more granular entries for particular 
institutions, noting the address, ownership, services provided, and some 
assessment of the constituency/clientele, often including their nationality, 
ethnicity, and religious orientation.190 Where the NYPD created maps of Arab 
 
admitted the program yielded no results in terms of terrorism prosecutions. Id. at 96–97; see also 
Elliott, supra note 123. 
185. The NYPD “dispatched undercover officers, known as ‘rakers,’ into minority 
neighborhoods as part of a human mapping program, according to officials directly involved in the 
program. They’ve monitored daily life in bookstores, bars, cafes and nightclubs.” Apuzzo & 
Goldman, NYPD Moves Covertly, supra note 123; see also CYBER INTELLIGENCE UNIT, NYPD 
INTELLIGENCE DIV., WEEKLY MSA REPORT (2006), available at http://hosted.ap.org/specials/ 
interactives/documents/nypd-msa-report.pdf; Apuzzo & Goldman, Police Watched Devout Muslims, 
supra note 123; Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, NYPD Docs: ‘Focus’ Scrutiny on Muslim Americans, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.ap.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2012/focus-scrutiny 
-on-muslim-americans; Goldman et al., supra note 124; Chris Hawley & Matt Apuzzo, NYPD 
Infiltration of Colleges Raises Privacy Fears, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.ap.org/ 
content/ap-in-the-news/2011/nypd-infiltration-of-colleges-raises-privacy-fears; Hawley, supra note 93. 
186. DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, EGYPTIAN LOCATIONS OF INTEREST REPORT, supra note 124; 
DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIV., NEWARK, NEW JERSEY DEMOGRAPHICS 
REPORT (2007), available at http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/documents/nypd/nypd_newark 
.pdf. 
187. DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIV., ALBANIAN LOCATIONS OF 
CONCERN REPORT, available at http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/documents/nypd/nypd-
albania.pdf; DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIV., MOROCCAN LOCATIONS, available 
at http://wid.ap.org/documents/nypd-intel-morocco.pdf; DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, NYPD 
INTELLIGENCE DIV., NASSAU COUNTY DEMOGRAPHICS REPORT (2007), available at http://hosted 
.ap.org/specials/interactives/documents/nypd/nypd_nassau.pdf; NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIV., 
DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, SUFFOLK COUNTY DEMOGRAPHIC REPORT (2006), available at http://hosted 
.ap.org/specials/interactives/documents/nypd/nypd_suffolk.pdf; DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, SYRIAN 
LOCATIONS OF CONCERN REPORT, supra note 124; see also Target of Surveillance, http://hosted 
.ap.org/specials/interactives/documents/nypd/nypd_omar.pdf ( last visited Apr. 15, 2013) (providing 
a map of a particular mosque in Paterson, New Jersey). 
188. The nationality maps are consistent with a Demographics Unit PowerPoint enumerating 
twenty-eight “ancestries of interest”—focusing on countries with a majority or large Muslim 
population, and “American Black Muslim[s].” The Demographics Unit, supra note 123, at 5. 
189. See supra text accompanying notes 184, 186. 
190. Id. 
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neighborhoods that included Arab Jews and Christians, the maps explicitly 
excluded the non-Muslims from their purview.191 
2. Voluntary Interviews192 
Government reports on radicalization mark the content of the imam’s Friday 
sermon and a neighbor’s trip to Mecca as relevant to determining the threat of 
radicalization in an individual or community. The need for such information has 
translated into the FBI’s and NYPD’s aggressive and regular use of “voluntary 
interviews” in Muslim communities.193 Agents approach an individual at his home, 
work, or community institution to request an interview. Though the interview is 
technically voluntary,194 like in other contexts where communities of color deal 
 
191. See, e.g., DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, SYRIAN LOCATIONS OF CONCERN REPORT, supra note 
124 (“The Demographics Unit found that the Syrian community in NYC is divided into two parts, a 
Jewish Syrian and a Muslim Syrian community with the Jewish community being the larger of the two. 
This report will focus on the smaller Muslim community.”). 
192. Lapp, supra note 22, at 578–80 (discussing two waves of “‘voluntary’ interviews” ordered 
shortly after 9/11 by Attorney General John Ashcroft); Maclin, supra note 130, at 478; Sinnar, 
Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 46–56 (discussing the First Amendment implications of 
FBI “voluntary interviews” and Customs and Border Patrol interviews). 
193. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-459, HOMELAND SECURITY: JUSTICE 
DEPARTMENT’S PROJECT TO INTERVIEW ALIENS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, at 1 (2003), available 
at http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/115.pdf; Thomas Ginsberg, Officials 
Begin ‘Voluntary Interviews’ of Iraqi Nationals, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 21, 2003, at A15; Mary Beth 
Sheridan, Interviews of Muslims to Broaden, WASH. POST, July 17, 2004, at A1; Jodi Wilogren, Michigan 
‘Invites’ Men from Mideast to Be Interviewed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at A1; ACLU Warns of Resurrecting 
‘Voluntary’ Interview Program; Arab and Muslim Communities Should Not Be Targets of Racial Profiling, ACLU 
(June 22, 2004), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-warns-resurrecting-voluntary-interview 
-program-arab-and-muslim-communities-sh; Losing Liberty, supra note 183, at 10–11; Shamas & 
Arastu, supra note 83, at 28–29. It is hard to know the volume or rate at which the FBI or NYPD 
conducts these interviews, but estimates of the FBI’s voluntary interviews are 200,000 to 500,000 
interviews: “staggering numbers, if accurate, given estimates that adult Muslims in the United States 
number fewer than two million.” Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 47. “[T ]he FBI 
continues to interview U.S. Muslims, in waves and individually, in order to investigate specific 
terrorist threats, gather general intelligence about communities, follow up on tips of suspicious 
activity called in from the public, or solicit people to act as undercover informants.” Id. at 47–48 
(footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Racial Profiling and the Use of Suspect Classifications in Law Enforcement Policy: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 62–63 (2010) [hereinafter Racial Profiling and the Use of Suspect Classifications] (statement of 
Farhana Khera, President & Executive Director, Muslim Advocates); Petra Bartosiewicz, The FBI 
Stings Muslims, NATION, July 2–9, 2012, at 17 [hereinafter Bartosiewicz, The FBI Stings Muslims]; Phillip 
O’Connor, St. Louis-Area Somalis Feel Intimidated by FBI, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 3, 2011, 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/st-louis-area-somalis-feel-intimidated-by-fbi/article 
_45d06ac1-c3ea-5dcc-9ffc-5896a7e1598c.html; Turner, supra note 22, at 69 (documenting “reports of 
law enforcement targeting of Muslim donors in Texas, Michigan, New York, Virginia, Florida, 
Louisiana, California, Minnesota, Missouri, and Wisconsin for ‘voluntary’ interviews”). 
194. With regard to coercion, the tactics sometimes “virtually compel[ ] compliance.” Sinnar, 
Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 50. Shirin Sinnar documents reports of the FBI 
approaching people at work, where the ability to refuse without drawing more attention to the FBI 
visit at work is limited to nonexistent; FBI agents pressuring individuals to interview immediately, 
despite requests for counsel; late-night knocks on doors; and misrepresented purposes and threats in 
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with law enforcement, this technicality escapes most Muslims when they are 
confronted with law enforcement contact.195 Agents often pressure and harass 
individuals into accepting the interviews, making repeated visits at home and at 
work, threatening immigration consequences or placement on the No Fly List.196 
These interviews seem to serve at least two overlapping purposes. First, the 
interviews allow the government to gather as much information as possible on 
Muslim communities without much transparency or oversight.197 Second, the 
interviews serve as a way to seek out and cultivate potential informants—through 
whom more information can be gathered.198 
The FBI’s approach to “voluntary interviews” is better documented than the 
NYPD’s.199 FBI agents regularly ask about religious and political opinions and 
activities—posing questions such as what is your “honest opinion of the United 
States”200 and inquiring about travel.201 The selection criterion for interviews is 
 
order to induce interviews. Id. at 50–51. In an indeterminate number of cases, the FBI engaged in 
even more overt intimidation to compel people to agree to ostensibly voluntary interviews. For 
instance, after the arrests of a Lodi, California, father and son on terrorism charges, the FBI 
aggressively sought information from other Pakistani Muslims: agents stationed their cars in front of 
homes, followed people for days, circled a mosque hosting a “know your rights” presentation where 
individuals they sought to interview had gathered, called individuals as many as ten times a day, and 
warned people that they would be “bad mouthed” at work if they did not cooperate. Id. (footnote 
omitted). “These measures conveyed a broader impression that the FBI would ratchet up pressure on 
those who declined an interview request.” Id. 
195. In fact, many Muslims approached feel they should go out of their way to comply with 
such requests, to demonstrate they have “nothing to hide.” See Aziz, supra note 5, at 442 (“Many well-
intentioned Muslims accept the FBI’s requests to speak with them (often without a lawyer) only to 
find themselves prosecuted for making false statements on issues unrelated to terrorism.”). African 
American Muslim communities tend to be more familiar with the idea that refusing the police is a 
possible and often sensible option. 
196. Bartosiewicz, The FBI Stings Muslims, supra note 193; Aaronson, supra note 113, at 32,  
36–37; see supra note 194. 
197. See Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 41–45. 
198. Bartosiewicz, The FBI Stings Muslims, supra note 193. 
199. See Maclin, supra note 130, at 493–510; Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22, 
at 46–47, 50–55; Under the Radar, supra note 22, at 4–5, 9, 14; Losing Liberty, supra note 183, at 10–11; 
South Asian Americans Leading Together et al., In Our Own Words: Narratives of South Asian New 
Yorkers Affected by Racial and Religious Profiling, SAALT 15 (Mar. 2012), http://saalt.org/wp 
-content/uploads/2012/09/In-Our-Own-Words-Narratives-of-South-Asian-New-Yorkers-Affected 
-by-Racial-and-Religious-Profiling.pdf. 
200. Memorandum from L.A. Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office (May 28, 2003), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20120217/ACLURM013019.pdf (memorial-
izing what seems to be a voluntary interview conducted in response to a lead where there is nothing 
on the face of the document to suggest any criminal predicate). Customs and Border Patrol asks 
similar questions of Muslims relating to First Amendment activity. SINNAR ET AL., RETURNING 
HOME, supra note 22, at 11–16; Muslim Advocates, supra note 22, at 6–9. 
201. Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 53–54; South Asian Americans 
Leading Together et al., supra note 199, at 20 (showing that twenty-five percent of respondents who 
provided details on interactions with law enforcement reported being subject to secondary screening 
by TSA agents more than half of the time they traveled). Sinnar argues the nature of the interview 
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based in part on ethnic, religious, or First Amendment profiling.202 The NYPD 
seems to have similar practices, asking “about articles posted online and 
downloaded content”203 and about “opinions regarding the Arab Spring.”204 These 
interviews are also used as a way to cultivate informants who will then be asked to 
spy on their communities and proactively share that information with law 
enforcement.205 
3. Informants206 
Radicalization’s emphasis on monitoring Muslim communities and spaces 
has also affected the FBI’s and NYPD’s use of informants. Informants are 
standard fare in the criminal system. The problems of police coercion in recruiting 
and setting terms for the relationship, and secrecy and lack of accountability, apply 
across the board.207 In the counterterrorism context, however, informants are 
 
sends the signal that activity such as traveling triggers government scrutiny or is somehow disfavored 
by the government: 
Unlike covert investigative methods such as electronic surveillance, an interview is a highly 
personal encounter between an individual and a law enforcement officer who embodies 
the full force of the law—the power to arrest and imprison, to detain and deport, or to 
exclude altogether from the country. . . . Thus, the exchange that occurs in an interview 
signals the U.S. government’s beliefs as to what, or whom, it considers threatening. 
Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 54. There are traces of the FBI’s interest in travel, at 
least to Mecca for Hajj, in documents obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union through FOIA. 
Memorandum from S.F. Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office (Dec. 9, 2004), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20120302/ACLURM017866.pdf (memorializing mosque 
outreach conversation, including details about an upcoming trip to Mecca for Hajj); see also Eric Lichtblau, 
Thousands from Muslim Nations Were Investigated Before ‘04 Election, Data Show, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2008, at 
A17 (reporting that immigration agents asked Muslim foreign nationals what they thought of America, 
whether violence was preached at their mosques, and whether they had access to biological or chemical 
weapons). 
202. Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 54. 
203. Kassem, supra note 125. 
204. Id.; see also South Asian Americans Leading Together et al., supra note 199, at 29–32. 
205. Bartosiewicz, The FBI Stings Muslims, supra note 193. 
206. Informants have been long critiqued for their role in the criminal justice system. 
NATAPOFF, supra note 163; Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 
73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 658, 665–67 (2004); Amanda J. Schreiber, Note, Dealing with the Devil: An 
Examination of the FBI’s Troubled Relationship with Its Confidential Informants, 34 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 301, 302–03 (2001); see also Sarah Stillman, The Throwaways, NEW YORKER, Sept. 3, 2012, at 
38, 40 (describing the sometimes deathly consequences of law enforcement’s unregulated use of 
informants). 
207. Law enforcement draws on economic, immigration, and criminal vulnerabilities to recruit 
informants. See, e.g., Natapoff, supra note 206, at 645 (“The use of criminal informants in the U.S. 
justice system has become a flourishing socio-legal institution unto itself. Characterized by secrecy, 
unfettered law enforcement discretion, and informal negotiations with criminal suspects, the 
informant institution both embodies and exacerbates some of the most problematic features of the 
criminal justice process.” (footnote omitted)); Aaronson, supra note 113, at 36. With regard to 
informants’ vulnerability, Alexandra Natapoff explains: 
When an officer first confronts a potential informant, prior to an arrest or formal criminal 
charge, there are very few legal constraints. For example, a suspect’s right to receive 
Miranda warnings is triggered only if he is in custody, so if the suspect has not yet been 
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focused on assessing and fomenting radicalization in spaces where Muslims may 
gather.208 From FOIA requests to investigative journalism to accounts from 
current and former informants (including as government witnesses), the FBI’s and 
NYPD’s widespread use of informants in Muslim communities and community 
spaces is well established.209 There is reason to believe that there are informants at 
each and every mosque in the United States.210 Informants are deployed broadly 
among Muslim student groups, and Muslim student social networks, as well.211 
 
taken into custody or arrested, his unwarned statements to police can potentially be used 
against him. Similarly the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies only once a suspect 
has been formally charged with a crime, so police can legally—and often do—negotiate 
directly with uncharged suspects without a lawyer. As a result, police have wide latitude to 
confront, threaten, and negotiate with potential informants without the presence of 
defense counsel or other witnesses. 
NATAPOFF, supra note 163, at 46–49 (footnotes omitted). With regard to their utility as investigative 
tools: 
Because . . . constitutional constraints generally apply only to official actors, a private 
individual acting as an informant can obtain information that the government could not 
easily obtain on its own. Criminal informants are thus potent investigative tools, not only 
because they can be effective information gatherers but also because they are exempt from 
many of the rules that otherwise constrain official investigative techniques. 
Id. at 55–57. 
208. The changes to the governing standards for the FBI and NYPD to collect intelligence 
will likely mean changed approaches to informant deployment even outside of the counterterrorism 
context. 
209. See, e.g., Aaronson, supra note 113; Bartosiewicz, The FBI Stings Muslims, supra note 193, at 
18; Jerry Markon, Mosque Infiltration Feeds Muslims’ Distrust of FBI, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2010, at A1; 
Council on American-Islamic Relations, Greater L.A. Area Chapter, The FBI’s Use of Informants, 
Recruitment, and Intimidation Within Muslim Communities (Mar. 26, 2009) (on file with author); 
Targeted and Entrapped, supra note 58, at 9; Patel, supra note 12, at 21–23; see also Terrorists for the FBI, 
MOTHER JONES, http://www.motherjones.com/special-reports/2011/08/fbi-terrorist-informants 
( last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (detailing findings and conclusions of investigative report into over 500 
domestic terrorist prosecutions). Reports by the Center for Law and Security suggest an increased 
reliance on informants in terrorism prosecutions, which further suggests an overall increased reliance 
on informants in the counterterrorism context. See Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra note 59, at 
43–46. 
210. Indeed, the NYPD monitored all mosques within one hundred miles of New York City. 
Apuzzo & Goldman, NYPD Moves Covertly, supra note 123; see also Shelby Grad, FBI Plans to Continue 
Mosque Monitoring Despite Concerns in Orange County, L.A. TIMES L.A. NOW (June 9, 2009), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/06/fbi-plans-to-continue-mosque-monitoring-despite-
concerns-in-orange-county.html (“The FBI plans to continue using informants to monitor mosques 
in America despite strong criticism over such programs leveled this year by Muslim American leaders 
in Orange County.”). 
211. See, e.g., Hawley & Apuzzo, supra note 185; Hawley, supra note 93; Memorandum from 
Sacramento FBI Field Office (Nov. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Memorandum 1], available at http://www 
.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM007341.pdf (documenting outreach to the Saudi 
Student Association at California State University Chico); Memorandum from S.F. Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation Field Office (Jan. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Memorandum 2], available at http://www 
.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20120217/ACLURM017916.pdf (documenting “mosque outreach” 
attempts with Muslim Student Associations at local colleges); Memorandum from S.F. Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation Field Office (Sept. 27, 2005) [hereinafter Memorandum 3], available at http://www.aclu 
.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20120217/ACLURM017906.pdf (same); Memorandum from S.F. Fed. 
Bureau of Investigation Field Office (Oct. 28, 2004) [hereinafter Memorandum 4], available at http:// 
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Informants may serve as listening posts, gathering information about 
religious and political cultures of Muslim communities.212 Under the Guidelines, it 
is permissible for the FBI to instruct informants to gather information in the 
broadest possible sense, without any nexus to suspected criminal activity.213 
Informants have been tasked with recording license plates, ascertaining religious 
and political opinions, attending mosque, and joining student groups in their 
activities.214 The NYPD used informants dubbed “mosque crawlers,” who were 
tasked with documenting contents of sermons and lists of those in attendance, 
absent any concern with any crime.215 As with mapping and voluntary interviews, 
the gathering of all-encompassing information becomes imperative when a 
concern with radicalization defines your policing, and deploying as many 
informants as possible serves that end. 
Informants also function as agent provocateurs, who test community and 
individual susceptibility to radicalization.216 In a number of prominent 
investigations over the last few years, trial testimony and statements by informants 
have made clear that the FBI and NYPD send informants into Muslim 
communities to encourage and solicit political dissent to American foreign policy 
and to disseminate and observe the resonance of the view that Islam requires 
 
www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20120217/ACLURM017858.pdf (same); see also Shamas & 
Arastu, supra note 83, at 27. 
212. See, e.g., Shan Li, FBI Violated 1st Amendment Rights of Muslims, Suit Alleges, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 24, 2011, at AA3; Kiran Khalid, Iowa Muslim Leader: Law Enforcement Betrayed Us, CNN (Feb. 3, 
2012, 8:48 PM), http://inamerica.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/03/iowa-muslim-leader-law-enforcement-
betrayed-us. The distinction between listening post-styled informants and agent provocateurs is likely 
not always clear. Craig Monteilh, for example, was directed to monitor opinions, and to draw out 
reactions to suicide bombing. Li, supra. He was also encouraged to invite men from various mosques 
to work out with him at local gyms, where the FBI would then record conversations. Scott Glover, 
Informant Describes Work for FBI, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2009, at A3. 
213. See, e.g., BJELOPERA & RANDOL, supra note 136 (noting the Guidelines and DIOGs 
provide “the FBI more leeway to engage in proactive investigative work that does not depend on 
criminal predication (i.e., a nexus to past or future criminal activity)”); Li, supra note 212; see also 
Complaint, Fazaga v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. 8:11-cv-00301-CJC (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011), 
ECF No. 1. 
214. See, e.g., Li, supra note 212; Paul Harris, The Ex-FBI Informant with a Change of Heart: ‘There 
Is No Real Hunt. It’s Fixed.’, GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/ 
mar/20/fbi-informant; Khalid, supra note 212. The FBI has even asked American Muslims to go 
abroad and collect intelligence as informants. Bartosiewicz, The FBI Stings Muslims, supra note 193 
(referring to cases of American Muslim men asked by the FBI to go to Afghanistan to collect 
intelligence). Refusal can mean placement on the No Fly List and immigration consequences. Id.; 
Aaronson, supra note 113, at 32, 36–37. 
215. Apuzzo & Goldman, NYPD Moves Covertly, supra note 123; Goldman & Apuzzo, supra 
note 126. 
216. See generally Thomas Cincotta, From Movements to Mosques, Informants Endanger Democracy, 
PUB. EYE, Summer 2009, at 1, 11–17 (“By and large, evidence shows informants do not merely 
observe and collect data. They make things happen.”). There is also a concern that the informant-
induced plots justify in circular fashion the FBI’s counterterrorism work. See Bartosiewicz, To Catch a 
Terrorist, supra note 5. 
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Muslims to take violent action against the United States.217 In a number of cases, 
the FBI and NYPD have sent informants into mosques and other community 
institutions not only to gather information on the communities but also to see 
who responds, and how, when the informants speak of “jihad,” suicide bombing, 
American foreign policy, Osama bin Laden, and so on. Informants have openly 
espoused support for terrorism in mosques and other Muslim community 
institutions, and have taken to aggressively criticizing American foreign policy, 
while promoting the idea that Muslims have a duty to harm the United States. 
Informants have also emphasized the need to act on such a duty, to the point of 
pushing for, designing, and providing the means for a terrorist attack.218 
In espousing political dissent from American foreign policies and religious 
views that sanction violence against the United States, the informants seem most 
directly concerned with identifying individuals who agree with (or could be 
persuaded to agree with) those views. Indeed, while they provide something in the 
way of a caveat, Silber and Bhatt’s report for the NYPD suggests that 
radicalization works like a conveyer belt:219 one stage leads to the next to the next 
and the next.220 If it is just a matter of eventuality between being open to or 
adopting particular political and religious views, and committing a violent terrorist 
 
217. See, e.g., Aaronson, supra note 113, passim; Hamid Aleaziz, Wondering if Your “Jihadist” 
Friend Is with the FBI, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/ 
03/shahed-hussain-khalifah-al-akili; Wahajat Ali, Time for FBI to Stop Spying on American Muslims, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/dec/07/ 
islam-terrorism; Apuzzo & Goldman, Police Watched Devout Muslims, supra note 123 (describing how the 
NYPD used informants and plainclothes officers to investigate mosques and Muslim businesses “for 
reasons that included endorsing conservative religious views or having devout customers”); Goldman 
& Apuzzo, supra note 126; Greenberg, New York: The Police and the Protesters, supra note 31; Harris, supra 
note 214; Graham Rayman, The Alarming Record of the F.B.I.’s Informant in the Bronx Bomb Plot, VILLAGE 
VOICE (July 8, 2009), http://www.villagevoice.com/2009-07-08/news/the-alarming-record-of-the-f-
b-i-s-informant-in-the-bronx-bomb-plot; see also KUMAR, supra note 110, at 124; Said, The Terrorist 
Informant, supra note 58, at 715–32; Bartosiewicz, To Catch a Terrorist, supra note 5, passim; Shulman, 
supra note 110; Targeted and Entrapped, supra note 58, at 41–45; Elliot, supra note 123; Entrapment or 
Foiling Terror?, supra note 110; Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra note 59, at 26. 
218. The informants seem to focus their facilitation efforts on individuals open to their 
viewpoints and vulnerable to their authority and/or resources. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 163, at 146 
(detailing how an FBI informant built a case against Shahawar Siraj, described as “a suggestible young 
man” and a “‘dimwit,’” by making “persistent efforts to arouse anti-American feelings in Siraj”); 
Rayman, supra note 2177 (“[The FBI’s informant] initiated the conversations, introduced the idea of a 
terror plot, and delivered the money, equipment, and resources to back it up. He quickly became 
known as the guy with ready cash who was interested in the lives of others and was quick to provide 
aid and comfort.”); Said, The Terrorist Informant, supra note 58, at 715–38; Targeted and Entrapped, supra 
note 58; see also Rick Perlstein, How FBI Entrapment is Inventing ‘Terrorists’—and Letting Bad Guys Off the 
Hook, ROLLING STONE (May 15, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/national 
-affairs/how-fbi-entrapment-is-inventing-terrorists-and-letting-bad-guys-off-the-hook-20120515. 
219. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 10 (referring to the radicalization process as a funnel 
and then suggesting “[e]ntering the process does not mean one will . . . become a terrorist”). 
220. Id. at 77; see also Patel, supra note 12, at 3 (“[T]he FBI, along with many state and local 
law enforcement agencies, have followed the lead of the [NYPD] in affirmatively embracing the 
‘religious conveyer belt’ model.”). 
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act, it would be within law enforcement’s interests to hasten the process in a 
controlled setting, rather than to wait for the inevitable. That might explain the 
growing number of agent provocateur–driven sting operations,221 “premised on 
the idea that individuals who would participate in schemes initiated by FBI 
informants might otherwise have been approached by an actual terrorist 
recruiter.”222 
4. Internet Monitoring 
Consistent with governmental focus on the Internet as a hub for terrorist 
activity,223 the FBI and NYPD monitor Internet activity as part of their 
counterterrorism efforts.224 This includes monitoring what people consume and 
post on the Internet about their opinions and activities via email listservs, blogs, 
websites, and chatrooms.225 These efforts seem to focus on those who download 
content by particular Muslim scholars, like the late Anwar Al-Aulaqi; post on 
Muslim-identified websites or participate in Muslim-identified online chat and 
 
221. The most recent Terrorist Trial Report Card, published by the Center for Law and Security, 
found: 
The rise in indictments over the past two or three years is significantly affected by FBI 
informant operations. Since 2009, nearly 50% of terrorism cases have involved 
informants . . . . At least 15% of those informant cases can be considered sting operations. 
Since the early years of America’s war on terror, the FBI has developed a strategy of 
preventive law enforcement in which agents seek to identify not only individuals engaged 
in terrorist activity, but those who, if approached with strong enough incentives, will agree 
to participate in terrorism. In 2009 and 2010, ten of these cases, which can take years to 
develop, came to fruition. 
Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra note 59, at 4. The report goes on to note that the “spike in 
‘homegrown’ terrorism relies statistically on . . . those targeted by FBI stings.” Id. 
222. Id. at 5. 
223. See, e.g., King Hearing II, supra note 40, at 15–16 (statement of Paul N. Stockton, Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs, Office of Under Secre-
tary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense); Prison Radicalization, supra note 40; S. COMM. ON 
HOMELAND SEC., ONLINE ISLAMIST RADICALIZATION, supra note 40, at 50 (testimony of Gregory 
B. Saathoff, Executive Director, Critical Incident Analysis Group, University of Virginia School of 
Medicine); S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM, supra note 40. 
224. See, e.g., Racial Profiling and the Use of Suspect Classifications, supra note 193, at 67 (statement 
of Farhana Khera, President & Executive Director, Muslim Advocates); Kassem, supra note 125. 
Though the Internet has been stigmatized as a terrorist haven, Steven Morrison persuasively argues 
that that online communication is “no more dangerous than its real-world counterpart and may 
actually be safer when it comes to terror recruitment.” Steven R. Morrison, Terrorism Online: Is Speech 
the Same as It Ever Was?, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 963, 963 (2011); see also Dawinder S. Sidhu, The 
Chilling Effect of Government Surveillance Programs on the Use of the Internet by Muslim-Americans, 7 U. MD. L.J. 
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 375, 389–93 (2007) (reporting the results of a survey about 
Internet usage showing that American Muslims “overwhelmingly believe” that post-9/11 the 
government monitors their “general and online activities,” and that “a segment of the Muslim 
American population . . . has modified its Internet usage”). 
225. Kassem, supra note 125; Hawley & Apuzzo, supra note 185; Shamas & Arastu, supra note 
83, at 40; see also Racial Profiling and the Use of Suspect Classifications, supra note 193 (statement of Farhana 
Khera, President & Executive Director, Muslim Advocates) (stating that FBI monitoring of Internet 
use chills First Amendment protected activities for Muslim Americans). 
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discussion forums focused on religious discourse and U.S. foreign policy; and 
watch “jihadi” videos.226 Muslim social networks are also monitored in this way.227 
Like other methods of policing radicalization, Internet monitoring feeds into the 
other techniques; so, for example, Internet activity seems to trigger voluntary 
interviews and other scrutiny.228 
5. Community Engagement 
Community engagement has become a cornerstone of national security 
policing, and specifically to counter-radicalization efforts.229 These initiatives are 
premised on the idea that Muslim communities can serve as key partners in 
counterterrorism work.230 As with other community policing initiatives, 
community engagement programs acknowledge the historical lack of meaningful 
relationships between police and Muslim communities and emphasize the need for 
police to have strong, trusting relationships with Muslims. 
Both the FBI’s and NYPD’s community engagement programs serve to 
gather intelligence on demographics, opinions, religious practices, and community 
activities. Far from signaling a desire for trust-building, then, these community 
 
226. See FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., supra note 34, at 7 (“Internet Chat Rooms . . . [are a] 
virtual arena [that allow] vulnerable individuals from around the world to discuss Islamic doctrine. 
Radicalization is encouraged both directly and indirectly on the Internet: indirectly through extremist 
propaganda (inflammatory speeches, videos, etc.) and directly through chat rooms and bulletin 
boards.”); SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 22 (“The Internet, with its thousands of extremist 
websites and chat-rooms, is a virtual incubator of its own. In fact, many of the extremists began their 
radical conversion while researching or just surfing in the cyber world.”); see also Kassem, supra note 
125 (discussing NYPD e-mail monitoring of a student group at a state university). 
227. Shamas & Arastu, supra note 83, at 27 (documenting an instance where NYPD offered a 
college student ‘“400 or 500 dollars a month’” to “sit[ ]  in front of [his] computer and look at what 
people are doing”). 
228. Kassem, supra note 125. 
229. See Amna Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 
2015); BJELOPERA, supra note 8, at 5 (“Following the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement agencies came to 
realize the prevention of terrorist attacks would require the cooperation and assistance of American 
Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities.”); Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 153 
(“Domestic counter-radicalization efforts have increasingly been predicated on the idea that 
engagement—outreach to certain Muslim communities in order to make Official Islam a social 
reality—can play a crucial role in promoting domestic security. . . . The precise nature of outreach 
programs of this sort varies within agencies and from one agency to the next.”); Aziz, supra note 23, at 
456–59. U.S. Attorneys are part of these efforts. See BJELOPERA, supra note 8, at 6–7. 
230. Aziz Huq, Stephen Schulhofer, and Tom Tyler have done an important series of studies 
looking at cooperation with law enforcement, including in the national security context, which 
identify procedural justice, or the perception of it, as the most reliable predictor of the public’s 
cooperation with law enforcement. Aziz Z. Huq et al., Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation in 
Counterterrorism Policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 728 (2011); Aziz 
Z. Huq et al., Why Does the Public Cooperate with Law Enforcement?: The Influence of the Purposes and Targets of 
Policing, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 419 (2011); Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American Policing at a 
Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335 
(2011); Tom R. Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim 
Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365 (2010). 
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engagement programs feed into radicalization policing.231 FBI documents reveal 
that: FBI agents who have attended “community events under the guise of 
community outreach are recording the content of presentations given at the 
events; the names, identifying information, and opinions of attendees; and 
information about the community groups, the names and positions of leaders, and 
the racial, ethnic and national origin of members.”232 FBI agents would then share 
that information with other government agencies.233 For example, memorandums 
from the San Francisco Field Office—prepared by FBI agents who attended 
community iftar 234 dinners as part of their mosque outreach program—document 
names of attendees, and conversations with and presentations by those in 
attendance; memorandums also suggest follow up surveillance through Internet 
searches.235 Documents generated by FBI community outreach efforts indicate 
 
231. The NYPD seems to understand this, at least in theory. Falkenrath, supra note 31 (“[T]he 
counterterrorism deputy commissioner and the intelligence deputy commissioner are not responsible 
for community outreach. In part, we don’t want to stigmatize the interaction with these communities, 
and if the counterterrorism deputy commissioner or the intelligence go to a community meeting or a 
mosque, it sort of sends the message that the reason we’re here is we think there’s a threat.”). 
232. Ending Racial Profiling in America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights 
and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 22 (2012) (statement of Anthony D. 
Romero, Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union). 
233. ACLU Eye on the FBI: The FBI Is Using the Guise of “Community Outreach” to Collect and 
Illegally Store Intelligence Information on Americans’ Political and Religious Beliefs, ACLU 1 (Dec. 1, 2011), 
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_eye_on_the_fbi_alert_-_community_outreach_as_intelligence 
_gathering_0.pdf [hereinafter Eye on the FBI (Dec. 1, 2011)] (referencing a number of FBI documents 
obtained through FOIA); ACLU Eye on the FBI: The San Francisco FBI Conducted a Years-Long Mosque 
Outreach Program That Collected and Illegally Stored Intelligence About American Muslims’ First Amendment-
Protected Religious Beliefs and Practices, ACLU (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu 
_eye_on_the_fbi_-_mosque_outreach_03272012_0_0.pdf [hereinafter Eye on the FBI (Mar. 27, 2012)]. 
“Under this program, intelligence agents either make their own community outreach presentations . . . 
or accompany FBI community outreach specialists to meetings to collect intelligence . . . .” Eye on the 
FBI (Dec. 1, 2011), supra, at 2–3. “[T]he FBI categorized information about Muslims’ First 
Amendment-protected and other entirely innocuous activities, as well as mosque locations, as 
‘positive intelligence’ [uploaded and retained in FBI intelligence files] and disseminated it to agencies 
outside the FBI.” Eye on the FBI (Mar. 27, 2012), supra, at 1; see also Memorandum from S.F. Fed. 
Bureau of Investigation Field Office (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimapping 
foia/20111110/ACLURM011275.pdf (memorializing community outreach conversation with 
individual, including conversation regarding opinions on U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan). 
234. Iftar is the meal that breaks the daily fast Muslims observe during the holy month of 
Ramadan. 
235. Memorandum from S.F. Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office (Sept. 25, 2008), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM013443.pdf; Memoran-
dum from S.F. Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office, (Oct. 10, 2007), available at http:// 
www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM013438.pdf; Eye on the FBI (Dec. 1, 2011), 
supra note 2333, at 2; see also, e.g., Memorandum from S.F. Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office 
(Mar. 3, 2008) [hereinafter Memorandum 5], available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimapping 
foia/20111110/ACLURM011160.pdf (documenting community outreach to a Pakistani community 
organization, including organization activities, and identities of those involved); Memorandum from 
S.F. Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office (Feb. 21, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/ 
fbimappingfoia/20120302/ACLURM017992.pdf (documenting a conversation conducted as part of 
mosque outreach; after the call, the agent seems to have run the individual’s name through various 
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they were “disseminated outside [the] FBI”236 and are marked “positive 
intelligence.”237 
Similarly, the NYPD has monitored its closest community partners.238 The 
NYPD Demographics Unit listed as part of its activities, presumably to gather 
intelligence, “[p]articipat[ion] in social activities,” including “[c]ricket matches.”239 
Importantly, cricket matches are one of the NYPD Community Affairs Bureau’s 
activities in New York’s Muslim communities; the overlap in programming 
suggests collaboration between intelligence gathering and community policing.240 
IV. RADICAL HARMS 
What are the broader implications of law enforcement’s radicalization and 
counter-radicalization narratives, programs, and priorities? At the heart of 
radicalization is an idea that the religious and political cultures of Muslim 
 
databases, including Lexis-Nexis, the DMV, and a federal criminal database); Memorandum from S.F. 
Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office (May 11, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbi 
mappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM012669.pdf (documenting mosque outreach meeting and analyzing 
“demographics” of those in attendance, who represented twenty-seven Muslim community and 
religious organizations); Eye on the FBI (Mar. 27, 2012), supra note 2333 (describing similar FBI 
community outreach efforts). For documents regarding FBI mosque and community outreach 
activities to Muslim student groups, see Memorandum 1, supra note 211; Memorandum 2, supra note 
211; Memorandum 3, supra note 211; Memorandum 4, supra note 211. 
236. Memorandum from S.F. Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office (Sept. 25, 2008), supra 
note 2355, at 4; Memorandum from S.F. Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office (Oct. 10, 2007), 
supra note 2355, at 3. 
237. See, e.g., Memorandum from S.F. Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office, at 3 (May 31, 
2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20120302/ACLURM017882.pdf 
(showing “positive intelligence (disseminated outside FBI)” mark). Other documents are marked 
“800.” See, e.g., Memorandum 5, supra note 2355. This is a coding internal to the FBI for “domain 
management,” an intelligence program. Eye on the FBI (Dec. 1, 2011), supra note 2333; see also 
Memorandum from Sacramento Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office 1 (Aug. 28, 2008), available 
at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM007431.pdf (“The 800 series has 
been established for the Intelligence Program.”). Other community outreach documents are marked 
“domain management,” for example, Memorandum from Sacramento Fed. Bureau of Investigation 
Field Office 1 (Apr. 20, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ 
ACLURM007538.pdf, or “domain awareness,” for example, Memorandum from Sacramento Fed. 
Bureau of Investigation Field Office (Jan. 7, 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimapping 
foia/20111110/ACLURM013178.pdf (noting the hire of a new, Pakistani, “very charismatic” imam). 
238. Sullivan, supra note 125. 
239. The Demographics Unit, supra note 123, at 6. 
240. See Jacob Fischler, Cricket in Queens: A ‘Wicket’ Good Time, QUEENS CHRON. (July 8, 
2010), http://www.qchron.com/editions/north/cricket-in-queens-a-wicket-good-time/article_1ecfa 
70f-9405-5251-89aa-bbb42c5e4fe1.html; see also Bridging the Gap Between the Police and the Community at 
N.Y.P.D., CTR. FOR HOMELAND DEF. & SEC. (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.chds.us/?player 
&id=2545 (interviewing Amin Kosseim, NYPD Officer, about the NYPD’s community policing 
initiatives); Amin G. Kosseim, Counter-Radicalization: Best Practices in the United States and 
Lessons Learned from Abroad (Sept. 2011) (unpublished thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), available 
at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=691496 (discussing attempts at counter-radicalization through 
community policing initiatives including cricket games). 
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communities have the power to produce or inhibit terrorist violence.241 In this 
narrative, Muslim religious and political cultures, real and virtual spaces for 
congregation, come within the appropriate jurisdiction of state surveillance and 
regulation. Muslims are reduced to either potential terrorists or informants (willing 
to share with law enforcement information on religious activities of community 
members) and counter-radicalizers (committed to fighting back Islam’s violent 
tendencies). Legitimate differences of opinion—rooted in different conceptions of 
the world, political and economic realities—are reduced to irrational pathology. 
Radicalization and counter-radicalization programs may seek to create 
precisely these pressures on Muslim communities. An accounting of these harms 
is imperative to evaluating the radicalization project, however, because the 
resultant impossible-to-navigate tensions have gone entirely unappreciated.242 This 
Part lays out a schematic for the harms. 
A. Religion, Politics, and Geography 
Radicalization stigmatizes Muslim religious practices, political affiliations, 
and geographies in overlapping, messy ways. A broad range of activities (such as 
growing a beard or going to a mosque) and beliefs (such as opposition to 
American foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan) trigger law enforcement 
scrutiny. These activities draw scrutiny to the individual praying five times per day 
or attending the antiwar protest. They also draw scrutiny to the communities or 
spaces with which the individual may have contact of varying degrees: Is this the 
type of community where beard growth and antiwar activism is tolerated and 
growing? Is the beard growth and antiwar activism a result of local cultural 
tendencies? 
Muslim communities keenly feel the stigma that radicalization attaches to 
their religious and political cultures. Reports suggest decreased mosque 
attendance, reluctance to engage in “[p]olitical organizing, civil engagement and 
activism” and “self-censorship on many religious and political topics . . . 
[including] even the surveillance itself.”243 Similarly, imams have noted their 
 
241. See, e.g., Tracy Russo, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Attorney General Holder Meets with Muslim Leaders 
in Portland, JUST. BLOG (Sept. 30, 2011), http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/1617?print=1 (“The 
Muslim leaders who met with the Attorney General pledged their support and are undertaking 
practical steps resist [sic] violent extremists targeting their young people and help federal law 
enforcement do its job better.”). 
242. See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 809 (2012) 
(advocating that legal scholars pay attention to the harm efficiency of police practices, the law of the 
police beyond federal constitutional norms, and comparative institutional analysis). 
243. Shamas & Arastu, supra note 83, at 14–15, 20 (“Business owners, mosque leaders and 
community members alike actively censor conversations, event programming, and internet usage in 
hopes that avoiding certain political content will keep them and their respective religious and social 
spaces off the NYPD’s radar.”). Mapping Muslims is based on experiences in New York City. See 
generally id. The experiences of Muslims in New York may be somewhat unique, as the overlapping 
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“inability to fulfill their role as spiritual advisors” because they cannot guarantee 
confidential space in their mosques or cannot be sure who is an informant, and 
Muslim student groups have banned political discussions from their campus 
offices.244 Muslims feel the stigma in their bodies, and in their ability to move and 
speak in the world.245 
Radicalization policing reflects an almost obsessive desire to document and 
understand the minutiae of religious ideologies and practices in Muslim 
communities.246 At the same time that policing radicalization has become the 
norm, the government has promoted certain (“moderate”) Muslim religious views 
or leaders over others (“extreme,” “radical,” “fundamentalist”), with counter-
radicalization as the guiding ethic.247 In so doing, the government has placed itself 
in the role of an arbiter of various practices of Islam. Sam Rascoff has elegantly 
articulated this as a concern that government counter-radicalization “may 
contribute to the ‘establishment’ of . . . ‘Official Islam’: a government-sponsored 
account of ‘mainstream Islam’ offered by the state in place of radical doctrinal 
alternatives.”248 As the government promotes certain faith leaders and religious 
interpretations, it marks others as “beyond the pale.”249 
Likewise, in policing radicalization, law enforcement most carefully scruti-
nizes communities viewed as conservative, traditional, fundamentalist, or radical. 
The laser-beam focus on conservative or observant Muslims is embedded within 
the radicalization narrative. While the first stage, preradicalization, could describe 
 
NYPD and FBI jurisdictions result in even more focused surveillance than may be typical in Muslim 
communities elsewhere in the country. 
244. Id. at 14–18, 42. 
245. See, e.g., Ahmad, supra note 22, at 1262. 
246. See supra Part III.B; see also Goldman & Apuzzo, supra note 126 (“Informants who trawl 
the mosques—known informally as ‘mosque crawlers’—tell police what the imam says at sermons 
and provide police lists of attendees, even when there’s no evidence they committed a crime.”). 
247. See, e.g., Matthew Lee, The Mosque Flap, Part 2: State Department Sending Imam of Proposed 
Center on Mideast Trip, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2010, at A13; Haroon Moghul, Remarks at the 
Conference of the Center on Law and Security at New York University School of Law (Nov. 5, 2010) 
(audio available at http://clsline.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/protectingrightslibertiesofamericans 
.mp3) (discussing efforts by the U.S. government to “build[] networks of acceptable Muslim 
intellectuals”); John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, 
Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: Securing the Homeland by Renewing 
American Strengths, Resilience, and Values (May 26, 2010) (transcript available at http://csis.org/ 
event/statesmens-forum-securing-homeland-renewing-americas-strengths-resilience-and-values) 
(discussing the meaning of jihad). 
248. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 129–30 (footnote omitted). 
249. Id. at 143–44. Importantly, radicalization makes much ado about Salafism, a term 
insufficiently concrete or specific to refer to any particular sect or sub-set of Muslims. Salafism is a 
mode of religious interpretation and practice that has been adopted in different historical and 
geographical contexts. As much as Islam and terrorism should not be conflated, both as a matter of 
ethics and based on facts, conservative religious belief and terrorism should not be considered 
interchangeable either. See supra note 83; see also KUNDNANI, supra note 12, at 7 (“‘Extremism’ is a 
vague concept that is easily exploited to demonise [sic] anyone whose opinions are radically 
different.”). 
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anyone living in a Muslim geography (Muslim neighborhood, mosque, etc.), the 
second stage is more concerned with basic religious practice (growing a beard, 
undertaking pilgrimage to Mecca), and the third with more intensive religious 
practice (attending religious study groups). In so doing, the reductive discourse 
muddles distinctions between espousing radical or nonconforming views, whether 
religious or political, and intending to engage in terrorism or violence. 
Radicalization policing brings to bear scrutiny on individuals who identify or 
express sympathies with other Muslims in the United States or abroad—especially 
those Muslims who fall victim to U.S. policies. This is in part because opinions 
critical of the United States or U.S. policies are said to suggest radicalization.250 Of 
course many Americans are critical of the United States, Islamophobia, and anti-
Muslim discrimination. But in the case of Muslims, these concerns, if expressed, 
are not understood as legitimate civic engagement but as markers for potential 
radicalization. 
Radicalization policing is keenly focused on generating Muslim geogra-
phies—that is, in understanding and monitoring spaces where Muslims physically 
or virtually congregate, and in producing them as sites of difference and scrutiny. 
The FBI and NYPD have gone to great lengths to document mosques, Muslim 
student associations, Islamic bookstores, halal butchers, and Muslim websites and 
chatrooms.251 There is a transnational component, too. Alongside Customs and 
Border Patrol, the FBI regularly interviews Muslims about their travels abroad, 
including travel to see family.252 By virtue of associating with Muslim spaces, 
whether inside or outside the United States, Muslims are subject to intense state 
scrutiny. 
At the same time that radicalization policing is concerned with Muslim 
 
250. See supra Part III.B; see also Galati Deposition, supra note 123, at 30–31, 36 (“Their job 
was, if they hear people talking about it, you know, they should inform us. If what they’re hearing is 
hostility towards the United States or to the general public at large, you know, as a result of these 
events, would something happen here as a result? Their job is to listen for that.”); The NYPD Will 
Record Your Opposition to Drone Strikes, EMPTYWHEEL (Aug. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Opposition to Drone 
Strikes], http://www.emptywheel.net/2012/08/21/the-nypd-will-record-your-opposition-to-drone 
-strikes (noting Thomas Galati’s reference to a drone strike as “an example of a US-related world 
event in response to which the NYPD might send people out to listen how people respond”). 
251. These are, in the parlance of the NYPD Radicalization Report, “radicalization incubators.” 
SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 22. The FBI Intelligence Assessment similarly marks these places 
as “[v]enues where interactions between converts and Islamic extremists can occur.” FBI COUNTER-
TERRORISM DIV., supra note 34, at 6. 
252. See SINNAR ET AL., RETURNING HOME, supra note 22 (describing the questioning, 
searching, and profiling of individuals entering the country and recommending procedures to avoid 
civil rights violations); Muslim Advocates, supra note 22 (describing the interrogations and searches of 
Muslims, Arabs, and South Asian Americans returning to the United States from trips abroad). See 
generally supra note 94 and accompanying text. The U.S. government has also relied on “proxy 
detention” arrangements to have foreign governments detain American Muslims in order to facilitate 
FBI questioning abroad. See Nick Baumann, Locked Up Abroad, MOTHER JONES, Sept.–Oct. 2011, at 
47, 68. 
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communities as collectives and institutions, it simultaneously works to identify 
those individual Muslims the theory understands to portend terrorist violence 
most directly.253 American Muslims—young Muslim men in particular—are likely 
to find themselves within the ambit of law enforcement scrutiny if they are openly 
critical of American foreign policy, attend their local mosque or hookah bar, 
partake in their university Muslim student association, or travel to Muslim-
majority countries.254 While they may draw scrutiny by affiliating with other 
Muslims, the scrutiny follows them as individuals. 
B. A Fundamental Tension 
Radicalization and counter-radicalization conceive of Muslim communities 
and the government in fundamentally incompatible ways: as suspects and partners. 
Radicalization constructs Muslim religious and political cultures as generative of 
terrorism and therefore worthy of state scrutiny. Counter-radicalization 
emphasizes the importance of partnerships in Muslim communities.255 Muslim 
communities are necessary to monitor radicalization precisely because of the 
threats lurking within—the problem is said (or suggested) to be in Islam. The 
government needs Muslim partners to cultivate environments that sanction 
acceptable, non-radical viewpoints and practices.256 
 
253. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 48, at 6 n.6 (defining radicalization 
as “the process by which inmates who do not invite or plan overt terrorist acts adopt extreme views, 
including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes”). 
254. Fisher, supra note 22, at 622–23, 625–26; Rovner & Theoharis, supra note 58, at 1348–57; 
see Hussain, supra note 22, at 930–34; Kassem, supra note 125, at 25–26; see also Goldman & Apuzzo, 
supra note 126 (reporting that the NYPD sent an informant to monitor a Muslim student group and 
told the informant “to take pictures of people at the events, determine who belonged to the student 
association and identify its leadership”). Commentators have wondered, for example, if the 
government concerned itself with Fahad Hashmi as a politically outspoken critic of American foreign 
policy. Rovner & Theoharis, supra note 58, at 1351–57; Jeanne Theoharis, My Student, the ‘Terrorist ,’ 
CHRON. REV., Apr. 8, 2011, at B3. 
255. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 153 (“Domestic counter-radicalization 
efforts have increasingly been predicated on the idea that engagement—outreach to certain Muslim 
communities in order to make Official Islam a social reality—can play a crucial role in promoting 
domestic security . . . . The precise nature of outreach programs of this sort varies within agencies and 
from one agency to the next.”); Russo, supra note 241 (“The Department’s engagement efforts have 
two central components. First we seek to build trust by working with Muslim leaders to find out how 
we can better serve the community on issues like civil rights enforcement to anti-bullying efforts. In 
addition, we work to equip and empower local Muslim leaders to help them guard against violent 
extremists who are targeting young people in their communities for recruitment to misguided, violent 
causes.”). 
256. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 138–40, 145–62 (footnote omitted) 
(discussing government-sponsored sports leagues in Muslim communities, and government-
sponsored imam training); id. at 154 (“The phenomenon of engagement is also connected to the 
selection of specific interlocutors within various Muslim communities—a choice which necessarily 
implicates ‘theological criteria.’ These sorts of decisions are inevitable when the government 
dispatches American imams and other exponents of American Islam on overseas delegations.”); Huq, 
supra note 23 (manuscript at 21–73). 
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These constructions exist in fundamental tension. On the one hand, Muslim 
communities are expected to form trusting relationships with law enforcement: to 
play in police soccer leagues and to host agents at iftar dinners. In other words, 
they are expected to welcome law enforcement with open arms. On the other, 
radicalization and counter-radicalization construct Muslim religious and political 
cultures as central to the problem of terrorism. 
Here, a deposition of Thomas Galati, Commanding Officer of the NYPD’s 
Intelligence Division in the ongoing litigation surrounding the Handschu consent 
decree, is illuminating. He was asked about the purpose of the Demographics 
Unit’s mapping of Muslim communities. His deposition reflects a concern with 
Muslim communities as geographies where individuals may radicalize. It also 
captures a distinct fear that by virtue of their shared belief in Islam, Muslim 
geographies might provide cover for coreligionists’ radicalization.257 (The FBI’s 
DIOG captures similar fears in its provisions devising the FBI’s power to map.258) 
In discussing how such geographies or locations of concern were identified, Galati 
suggests any place where Pakistanis speak Urdu or talk politics would qualify.259 
He asserts conversations by Lebanese immigrants in a Lebanese café regarding 
from where in Lebanon they hail as important to document—these conversations 
may indicate support for Hezbollah.260 
What precisely marks these spaces as sites for radicalization? Is it an a priori 
assumption of Muslim communities and community spaces as cauldrons brewing 
 
257. Galati Deposition, supra note 123, at 24–26. Galati also makes passing reference to the 
idea that the Intelligence Division of the NYPD pays attention to places from which terrorists might 
recruit. Id. at 27, 36, 72–86 (“In order to fight terrorism, we needed to know where people lived from 
countries of concern that could either recruit, hide or secrete themselves in these communities that 
were radicalized towards violence and we needed to know where they were, to identify those 
countries of concern, to find those people that were radicalized towards violence.”). 
258. 2011 DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE, supra note 139, at 4-13 
(authorizing the consideration of individual race or ethnicity, community race or ethnicity, and geo-
mapping ethnic and racial demographics). 
259. Galati Deposition, supra note 123, at 72–87. For example, when asked why the NYPD 
had recorded information about a particular location where Pakistanis were speaking Urdu, Galati 
stated: 
I’m taking the conversation as a whole. I’m looking in that conversation. I’m seeing Urdu. 
I’m seeing them identify the individuals involved in [the conversation] are Pakistani. I’m 
using that information for me to determine that this would be a kind of place that a 
terrorist would be comfortable in and I’m retaining that for the fact that I can retain it, if 
it’s going to help me detect or prevent a potential unlawful or terrorist attack. So, a 
potential terrorist could hide in here and that piece of information is important for me to 
know. That this is where I’m going to find somebody that speaks Urdu. And again, I’ll go 
far beyond Pakistan. Most Urdu speakers from that region would be of concern, so that’s 
why it’s important to me. 
Id. at 85–86. 
260. Id. at 34–35 (“[A] conversation overheard by people in the Lebanese cafe may indicate to 
us that they are from South Lebanon or North Lebanon . . . . That may be an indicator of possibility 
that that is a sympathizer to Hezbollah because Southern Lebanon is dominated by Hezbollah.”). 
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radicalization?261 Alternatively, radicalization may imagine that Muslims who 
choose to connect and commune with other Muslims are opening themselves up 
to a radicalization process.262 In a slightly different gloss, the underlying logic 
could also suggest that Muslims gathering, talking politics or religion, or grieving 
the treatment of Muslims at home or abroad signals openness to radical ideas and 
radicalization.263 
The logic of radicalization imposes on Muslims a rigid hierarchy of social 
relations, or, more plainly, a loyalty question. American and Muslim identities 
become an either-or proposition: they cannot exist simpatico. By choosing to 
commune with or feel sympathy for other Muslims, Muslims are seen to choose 
Islam over America, Muslim identity over American identity. Alongside this 
fundamental suspicion of Muslim cultures and geographies, how can Muslim 
communities be conceived of as partners?264 Partnership exacts its own tax. 
Because now if a Muslim does not want to cooperate in a community relationships 
program, it suggests she is making a choice, she is picking “them” over “us.” 
C. Surveilled Identities 
To understand the dynamic harms of radicalization, identity performance 
theories prove useful. In the legal academy, Devon Carbado, Mitu Gulati, and 
Kenji Yoshino have theorized the work of performing and negotiating identities—
an ongoing task universal to the human condition—and the complex harms 
imposed on those marginalized on grounds of race, religion, gender, sexuality, and 
class.265 Carbado, Gulati, and Yoshino are just as concerned with documenting the 
 
261. SHERENE H. RAZACK, CASTING OUT: THE EVICTION OF MUSLIMS FROM WESTERN 
LAW & POLITICS 47–50 (2008) (citing Amit Rai, Of Monsters: Biopower, Terrorism and Excess in Genealogies 
of Monstrosity, 18 CULTURAL STUD. 538 (2004)) (“In terrorism studies, the focus is on the motivations 
and belief systems of individual terrorists. The psyche is thus the privileged site of investigation and 
terrorism is explained as a compulsion or psycho-pathology.”). 
262. In framing its concern with mosques and other institutions, the FBI Intelligence 
Assessment suggests a concern with recruitment: while “[n]ot all Muslim converts are extremists . . . 
they can be targeted for radicalization.” FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., supra note 34, at 6; see also 
Letter to Mueller, supra note 50 (arguing that the FBI’s “indicators” of a religious convert’s extremism 
are actually “innocuous behaviors [that] may indicate strong religious beliefs”). 
263. Serwer, supra note 123; Opposition to Drone Strikes, supra note 250. 
264. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra 
note 21, at 2, 3, 5, 6. For an insightful analysis of this construct, see Huq, supra note 23 (manuscript at 
21–26). 
265. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000); 
Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002); see also Frank Rudy Cooper, Surveillance and Identity 
Performance: Some Thoughts Inspired by Martin Luther King, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517, 525 
(2008) (“[S]urveillance encourages particular identity performances and discourages others.”). As this 
Article went to press, Carbado and Gulati published an expansion of Working Identity. DEVON W. 
CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE: RETHINKING RACE IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA 
(2013). 
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experiences of identity performance as with identifying antidiscrimination law’s 
inability to imagine, let alone address, these harms. 
Exploring their working identity theory in the workplace, Carbado and 
Gulati presented the identity negotiating options on a continuum from self-
affirming to self-negating.266 Carbado and Gulati situated the options in a matrix 
reflecting the dialectical relationship between stereotypes (positive and negative), 
institutional criteria, and workplace standing.267 They highlighted how members of 
outsider groups privilege their identities as workers over their outsider identities.268 
The negotiation occurs consciously and subconsciously as a matter of survival in 
the face of stereotypes:269 
[B]ehavior and stereotypes are not independent. When the stereotype is 
strong, and the conditions are such that ordinary behavior is likely to 
dissipate it, an outsider subject to a strong negative stereotype has an 
incentive to take actions to negate it. On the other hand, someone subject 
to strong positive stereotypes need not work as hard to achieve the same 
final evaluation as someone who is subject to negative stereotypes. 
Further, the stronger the stereotype, the greater the effect to be on the 
employee’s behavior.270 
From the disproportionate costs placed on outsiders to work their identity, to the 
psychic harm of self-negating and self-denying behavior, all options come with 
heavy costs.271 
In theorizing the relationship between assimilation, discrimination, and 
antidiscrimination doctrine, Yoshino identified a range of assimilatory options for 
gays and lesbians: to convert (underlying gay identity is altered), pass (underling 
gay identity is hidden), or cover (underlying gay identity is downplayed).272 
Yoshino observed the fluid nature of assimilation: the mode of assimilation one 
might adopt in any particular moment would depend on the context. He 
recognized “the relational aspects of presentations of the self”; “one must know 
not only the performance of the actor, but also the literacy of the audience.”273 
Both models offer insights into the harms of radicalization policing.274 
 
266. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 265, at 1266–67. 
267. Id. at 1271–72. 
268. Id. at 1279–307. 
269. Id. at 1267–70, 1278, 1307–08 (“[W]e do not mean to suggest that outsiders invite 
discrimination by performing their identities in certain ways; rather they are disciplined for not 
performing their identities in ways that are palatable to their insider employers. The result is that 
outsiders, to the extent they wish to survive in the workplace, often find themselves having to do 
extra work to make themselves palatable and their insider employers comfortable.” (footnote omitted)). 
270. Id. at 1270–71. 
271. Id. at 1279–93. 
272. Yoshino, supra note 265, at 772–73. 
273. Id. at 772–73, 837–49. 
274. For purposes of my analysis, I focus on the American and Muslim identities in American 
Muslim identity negotiation. Of course, as with anyone else, an American Muslim possesses multiple 
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Radicalization discourse feeds into preexisting Islamophobia in the United States, 
lending legitimacy to anti-Muslim sentiment.275 Radicalization and counter-
radicalization produce a tension between Muslim-ness and American-ness. That 
tension pressures Muslims to work their identity—to prove their American-ness, 
or their loyalty to the project of the United States over that of Islam. That 
pressure is intense given the weight of Muslim stereotypes and the scope of 
radicalization policing. 
To understand how the relational aspect of identity performance—between 
viewer and viewed—defines Muslim identity performance, recall the all-
consuming nature of radicalization policing. The radicalization policing techniques 
rely on participation from Muslim communities, informants, and undercover 
officers.276 By its system of policing radicalization, the government has brought 
Muslim communities into its surveillance apparatus, and thereby exponentially 
expanded the reach of surveillance. Radicalization policing effectuates a panoptic 
system of discipline for Muslim communities.277 In elaborating on Jeremy 
 
other identities that will affect their identity negotiations and performances. Even on the most basic 
level, to add just one more vector: identity negotiation for American Muslim men will be different 
than for American Muslim women. 
275. See, e.g., Ahmad, supra note 22, at 1262 (“The physical violence exercised upon the bodies 
of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians has been accompanied by a legal and political violence toward 
these communities. In the first two years after September 11, the United States has developed a 
corpus of immigration law and law enforcement policy that by design or effect applies almost 
exclusively to Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians. These laws operate in tandem with the individual 
acts of physical violence that have been carried out against these same communities, thereby aiding 
and abetting hate violence. Taken together, the multiple assaults on the bodies and rights of Arabs, 
Muslims, and South Asians produce a psychological violence as well and reracialize the communities 
they target as ‘Muslim-looking’ foreigners unworthy of membership in the national polity.”). 
276. Through voluntary interviews, law enforcement asks Muslims to share information on 
other Muslims. Through informants and undercover officers, law enforcement sends Muslims into 
physical and virtual Muslim collective spaces to gather information and test religious and political 
opinions. Through community engagement efforts, law enforcement creates incentives for Muslims 
to work with the state. Through Internet trolling, informants and undercover officers collect 
information on Muslim social networks, and religious and political opinions. See supra Part III.B. 
277. In the late 1700s, Jeremy Bentham envisaged the panopticon: a circular building with an 
inspection tower at its center and inmates around the perimeter. JEREMY BENTHAM: THE 
PANOPTICON WRITINGS 35–37 (Miran Božovi ed., 2d ed. 1995). The design would allow the 
watchman to see all the inmates without the inmates being able to tell whether or not they were 
actually under watch. The trick was ensuring constant apprehension of surveillance in the inmates: 
[T]he more constantly the persons to be inspected are under the eyes of the persons who 
should inspect them, the more perfectly will the purpose of the establishment have been 
attained. Ideal perfection, if that were the object, would require that each person should 
actually be in that predicament, during every instant of time. This being impossible, the 
next thing to be wished for is, that, at every instant, seeing reason to believe as much, and 
not being able to satisfy himself to the contrary, he should conceive himself to be so. 
Id. at 34. Whether or not they were actually under watch was beside the point. Then, in the 1970s, 
Michel Foucault invoked the panopticon to describe the modern disciplinary society and its way of 
deploying power to observe and shape people and institutions. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & 
PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 170–228 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) 
(1977). Since Foucault and Bentham, theorists have analyzed how technology allows for panoptic 
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Bentham’s panopticon, Michel Foucault noted how constant apprehension of the 
“[v]isible” and “[u]nverifiable” gaze of the state “automatizes and disindividualizes 
power”: 
The more numerous those anonymous and temporary observers are, the 
greater the risk for the inmate of being surprised and the greater his 
anxious awareness of being observed. . . .  
. . . He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes 
responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play 
spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in 
which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his 
own subjection.278 
The question of how to perform your identity arises in contexts where your 
outsider identity is at play. That assumes there is an inside, where one can more 
comfortably inhabit a particular outsider identity, where it is no longer outside.279 
Radicalization policing’s reach into Muslim communities—at the same time, 
extensive, undeniable, and covert—flips the inside out. Mosques are not 
sanctuaries but the most intensive sites of surveillance. There is no inside where 
you are not an outsider; or the inside is incredibly small, porous, and precarious.280 
Always weary of being watched, Muslims adopt self-regulating behavior. 
Muslims work their identity to claim full(er) standing in the polity, to avoid 
being rendered an object of suspicion and surveillance. The pressure emerges in a 
larger, hostile climate in the United States. As with other outsider groups, the 
stereotypes Muslims deal with in relation to law enforcement and the public 
overlap considerably. The pressure for identity work comes from both private 
citizens—including other Muslims—and the government, though the 
consequences might be distinct, and as always context matters. Making matters 
more complicated, the pervasiveness of surveillance obscures the line between 
private citizens and the government. 
Radicalization and counter-radicalization situate Muslim and American 
identity as antipodes. Imagine them as oppositional vectors: The choice to play up 
Muslim identity is a decision to signal less American-ness; emphasizing American 
identity destabilizes Muslim identity. The negative Muslim stereotype is so heavy, 
the pressures to perform American-ness are profound. The identity work, 
covering, or passing could take many forms. It could include removing a Muslim 
aesthetic—shaving a beard, removing a hijab—or downplaying Muslim aesthetics 
 
surveillance structures deeper into our lives. E.g., THOMAS ALLMER, TOWARDS A CRITICAL THEORY 
OF SURVEILLANCE IN INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (2012). 
278. FOUCAULT, supra note 277, at 201–02. 
279. I do not mean to suggest a static, true, underlying identity exists. Identity is complex and 
dynamic. 
280. The precarity of the inside will be particularly pronounced in urban Muslim 
communities—where, for example, mosque communities will be larger and less static, and large police 
departments may prioritze counterterrorism alongside the local FBI office. 
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in another way—exchanging a niqab for a hijab.281 It could include playing up 
one’s American-ness—drinking beers or watching football. These decisions might 
influence the law enforcement scrutiny you might draw. 
A recent community-and-interview-based report documented just such 
harms stemming from the NYPD Intelligence Division’s surveillance program. 
Muslims reported feeling pressure to signal their Muslim identity less visibly or 
differently, to cover, or to pass, in order to avoid state scrutiny. This signaling 
takes shape in relation to religion, politics, and geography. Muslims do not want to 
seem too religious: Men shave their beards and women remove their hijabs or 
niqabs.282 Or too political: Students stop talking politics in their Muslim student 
association office and switch out of political science majors.283 Muslims do not 
organize or organize differently. They “feel the need to repeatedly emphasize their 
peaceful position,”284 or to change how they inhabit Muslim geographies: Muslims 
go to the mosque less frequently, or only for prayer and not for other community 
and spiritual activities.285 
Making the performance matrix more complicated, certain quintessentially 
American activities, when engaged in by Muslims, are signs of radicalization. Of 
course this is the case at higher levels of abstraction for mosque going (church) or 
protesting the Iraq war (dissent). There are also certain activities that will have 
heightened significance, especially for young Muslim men: for example, paintball, 
target practice, and white-water rafting.286 
The suspicion of Muslim identity runs sufficiently deep that decisions to 
signal less Muslim-ness (covering or passing) can in themselves be read as 
suspicious or attempts to hide. For the same reason, it is not altogether clear that 
converting, at least not on its own, would wipe away the suspicion associated with 
Muslim identity. So while the NYPD radicalization report frames as suspicious a 
 
281. While the hijab covers the hair, the niqab also covers the mouth and the nose. 
282. Shamas & Arastu, supra note 83, at 15–17, 23–26 (“Almost all our interviewees noted 
that appearing Muslim, or appearing to be a certain type of Muslim, invites unwanted attention or 
surveillance from law enforcement. Outward displays of Muslim identity could include the choice to 
wear the hijab (headscarf), the niqab (full covering), grow a beard, or dress in certain kinds of 
traditional or Islamic clothing.”) 
283. Id. at 25, 44–45. 
284. Id. at 23. 
285. Id. at 14–15, 17 (quoting twenty-six-year-old Brooklynite Ahsan Samad: “I used to go to 
the masjid [mosque] quite a lot. That stopped as soon as they [the NYPD] knocked on the door.”); id. 
at 42 (quoting a nineteen-year-old college student: “‘[The upperclassmen] told us we encourage you to 
have free speech and political conversations, just not inside the MSA room. Because we don’t want an 
informant to be here to catch one of your lines or crazy rants and you would get in trouble. I don’t 
want to go to the MSA room because I’m worried that someone will report what I’m saying. . . .’”). 
286. See supra Part II; see also Paul Harris, Fort Dix Five: ‘If They Did Something Punish Them. But 
They’re Innocent Kids,’ GUARDIAN (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/16/ 
fbi-fort-dix-five; Steve Huff, The N.Y.P.D. Covertly Went Whitewater Rafting to Track Muslim Students, 
N.Y. OBSERVER (Feb. 18, 2012), http://observer.com/2012/02/the-n-y-p-d-covertly-went-whitewater 
-rafting-to-track-muslim-students. 
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name change from Mike to Maher (intensifying Muslim identity), the NYPD also 
monitors name changes from Mohammad to Matt (passing, covering, or 
converting Muslim identity). The Associated Press aptly captured how this 
practice turns topsy turvy immigrant assimilation practices: “[f ]or generations, 
immigrants have shed their ancestral identities and taken new, Americanized 
names as they found their place in the melting pot. For Muslims in New York, 
that rite of assimilation is now seen by police as a possible red flag in the hunt for 
terrorists.”287 
The question of identity work is relevant not simply to whether and how it 
marks you for state scrutiny. It is also relevant to how Muslims perform their 
direct relationship to the projects of radicalization policing and counter-
radicalization. Does one facilitate law enforcement’s efforts to collect intelligence 
on the day-to-day affairs of Muslim communities? That would signal assent in the 
American political project and affirmation of American identity. Refusal could 
signal dissent, prioritization of Muslim affinity, an Islamist or secret “jihadi” 
project. Indeed, recent efforts to conduct know-your-rights workshops and to 
educate Muslim communities on their rights to counsel in the face of law 
enforcement interviews—efforts replicating long-standing initiatives in 
communities of color negotiating difficult and abusive relationships with the 
police—have generated criticism along these axes: Muslim communities are not 
cooperating with law enforcement’s efforts to protect against radicalization; 
lawyers are advising Muslim communities against sharing tips with law 
enforcement about terrorist activity.288 Whereas willingness to agree to share 
information with law enforcement is constructed as serving American interests 
and national security, refusals are suspect. Retaining a lawyer is another 
quintessentially American act. When that retention positions a Muslim in the way 
of the national security intelligence gathering, however broad or abusive, it 
becomes a Muslim act, one drawing scrutiny and suspicion. 
Operating in the void of serious regulation, law enforcement quite literally 
incentivizes cooperation and penalizes refusals, creating dramatic performance 
pressures. Consider the case of Mohammad Tanvir, a twenty-something, working-
class immigrant in New York City, working at bodegas to send money home to his 
parents in Pakistan.289 For a few years, the FBI attempted to recruit him to 
 
287. In fall 2011, the Associated Press reported that the NYPD runs comprehensive 
background checks on New Yorkers with Arabic- or Muslim-sounding names, who change their 
names. Apuzzo & Goldman, supra note 101. 
288. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Laurie Goodstein, Deep Partisan Rift Emerges in Hearing on 
U.S. Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2011, at A15; Amna Akbar & Ramzi Kassem, Are Muslims Allowed 
Rights?, ALJAZEERA (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/11/2011 
112415501938290.html. 
289. I represented Tanvir during my time in the CLEAR project at CUNY’s clinical program. 
See Bartosiewicz, The FBI Stings Muslims, supra note 193, at 20 (chronicling Tanvir’s experience). 
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become an informant. The FBI asked him to collect information in local South 
Asian Muslim communities. The FBI also wanted to send him to Afghanistan to 
infiltrate terrorist training camps. The FBI offered to pay and to bring his wife 
from Pakistan to the United States.290 Their efforts were dogged and included 
threats of deportation. While Tanvir agreed he would call the FBI if he saw 
suspicious activity, he consistently refused to work as an informant: it did not feel 
right to him. In response, he was placed on the Department of Homeland 
Security’s No Fly List, likely by the FBI. The stress of the FBI’s harassment was so 
great, Tanvir decided to forego his green card and return to Pakistan permanently. 
But his placement on the No Fly List made that impossible, effectuating a limbo 
existence where he was stuck in a country that did not seem to want him, and yet 
could not return to his country of birth. 
Perversely, working with law enforcement provides purchase to signal 
Muslim identity. It might even require religious Muslim identity performance—
growing a beard, praying five times a day, going to the mosque—as that 
performance would give you the greatest access to religious Muslims. Rascoff 
observes: 
Imagine that the FBI is contemplating employing an individual as a 
confidential informant in a mosque where authorities are concerned 
about the proliferation of radical ideology. The individual is attractive to 
law enforcement precisely because he possesses radical bona fides 
(having previously been an exponent of radical Islam himself) and will 
therefore have access to the institution. Further consider that the Bureau 
might want to take measures to protect against the prospective 
informant’s reverting to a radical sensibility as he operates within a radical 
environment. It is conceivable under these circumstances the Bureau 
would, in effect, furnish tutorials for the informant in “moderate” Islam 
as a means of shoring up his participation in official work.291 
While Rascoff expresses a distinct concern about the state establishing Official 
Islam, his hypothetical also illustrates how cooperation might require Muslims to 
simultaneously play up and maintain distance from Muslim identity. The resulting 
identity performance calculus for Muslims wishing to partake in communal life—a 
central aspect of Islam—is incredible. The more religious are now constituted 
from the point of the view of the community as double suspect: as either radicals-
cum-terrorists or informants. 
In many ways, Muslim collective spaces are the most vulnerable, where 
performance matters most: 
 
Tanvir’s experience is in many ways representative of a broader set of experiences; the FBI regularly 
uses such pressure tactics. See supra Part III.B. 
290. The FBI also offered to pay expenses for his parents to perform the religiously obligatory 
hajj to Mecca. Bartosiewicz, The FBI Stings Muslims, supra note 193, at 20. 
291. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 158–59. 
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[R]eligious spaces, intended to provide a haven for new and old 
congregants to forge bonds and support networks, [have become] the 
opposite – a space where interactions [are] marred by mutual suspicion. 
Many former regular mosque-goers have decreased mosque attendance, 
and those who attend do so to just pray and leave, looking over their 
shoulders for eavesdropping spies the entire time.292 
The pressure to perform American-ness, then, extends to interactions with other 
Muslims and within Muslim institutions. While many have commented on 
constructions of the good Muslim / bad Muslim dichotomy by Western states and 
liberalism,293 that these dichotomies have carved up Muslim communities has 
gone lesser noticed. As a Muslim, you might be just as concerned with what the 
uniformed officer makes of you as he passes you in the street as what the woman 
at the mosque thinks when she engages you in conversation. That woman might 
be an undercover or an informant testing your opinions. Regardless of whether 
she is an undercover or informant, she might be keen on playing up her 
American-ness, and if she thinks you are radical, she might share your name with 
law enforcement. Or, she might suspect you as an informant, never engaging you 
in conversation. 
The ever-present gaze of the state heavily weighs on, defines even, 
contemporary American Muslim identity performance.294 That its ever-presence is 
brokered by other Muslims—or by those who appear to be Muslim—causes 
profound individual and communal harm. There is distrust of “people who ‘talk 
really passionately about Islam,’ or even by non-Muslims who come to the 
mosque expressing interest in learning about Islam”; the “overly religious” and 
those who “frequent[] the mosque”; those who “regularly attend[] [Muslim 
Student Association] events . . . [and] those who only came once in awhile.”295 
Indeed, as much as radicalization has stigmatized “radical Islam” or conservative 
Muslims for the American public at large, that stigma has been internalized in 
Muslim communities. 
The gaze also gives rise to pressures for collective performances of 
American-ness. While the individual Muslim might go out of her way to signal her 
own American-ness, collectives also have moments of performative opportunity 
and pressure. Mosques can choose to invite law enforcement in for community 
 
292. Shamas & Arastu, supra note 83, at 18. 
293. See generally MAHMOOD MAMDANI, GOOD MUSLIM, BAD MUSLIM: AMERICA, THE 
COLD WAR AND THE ROOTS OF TERROR (2004); RAZACK, supra note 261; Sunaina Maira, “Good” and 
“Bad” Muslim Citizens: Feminists, Terrorists, and U.S. Orientalisms, 35 FEMINIST STUD. 631 (2009). 
294. See Shamas & Arastu, supra note 83, at 26 (“Nearly all interviewees thought they knew 
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engagement and counsel their congregations to talk to law enforcement, or 
mosques can make announcements that “informants are not welcome here” and 
refuse to give law enforcement access. Muslim civil rights organizations can go out 
of their way to condemn terrorist attacks with which they have no connection and 
to celebrate all new terrorism-related indictments, or they can choose to stay silent 
on the occasion of a terrorist attack and engage critically in debate about the utility 
of the aggressive policing and prosecuting tactics at work in Muslim communities. 
The choices are ever-present and the decisions will trigger various outcomes, 
predictable and unpredictable alike.296 
CONCLUSION 
Policing radicalization exacts impossible pressures and real harms on Muslim 
communities. The police practices and the resulting pressures on Muslim 
communities are largely unregulated by law and almost untouched by critical 
public debate. Naming these practices and their harms was the project of this 
Article.  
Where the state marks ideology as tending towards criminality, the state 
generates a basis on which to discipline that ideology. Importantly, where the 
targeted are subaltern297—locked out of the channels of power and 
accountability—as Muslims are in the United States, the subaltern-ness is both 
what is targeted and what facilitates the targeting. Policing radicalization draws its 
legitimacy from proposed connections between certain Muslims and terrorism 
violence. But the government has not made its case. Government-produced 
radicalization theories reflect, and then reproduce, intense suspicion of Muslims 
and Islam, creating a dangerous self-perpetuating cycle. 
Deploying the language of radicalization implicitly counters charges of biased 
policing. Now, in monitoring Muslim communities, it is said law enforcement is 
not monitoring Muslims for being Muslim, but instead for radicalization to 
terrorism. Radicalization theories move the idea that Muslim communities and 
cultures threaten national security from the world of bias to the realm of savvy 
expertise. In turn, radicalization and counter-radicalization impose heavy costs on 
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